The great Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami devastated villages, cities and whole populations the day after Christmas two years ago. As with most calamities in which the number of deaths was high, the world pauses to remember, as does today’s Tsunami Lessons post.
The Public Broadcasting System’s NOVA show on December 19th was devoted to the documentary “Wave that Shook the World”, and like most documentaries, this one relies on interviews with scientists, seismologists, geologists and others who recalled the events of that day.
Reading the transcript of the show is disappointing for those of us who believe tens of thousands of lives were needlessly lost due to lack of forethought by tsunami warning planners about how they would issue a warning to populations in peril if a massive earthquake were to generate a tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
The Tsunami Was Not a Surprise
There’s no question the threat was well known. In the NOVA documentary, Australian seismologist Phil Cummins says: “In retrospect, the scientific community should have been aware that these massive earthquakes do occur off Sumatra, and probably a little more emphasis should have been focused on the Indian Ocean, where it's documented that massive earthquakes occur.”
On January 8, 2005, this blog documented that knowledge by calling attention to the report of The International Coordinating Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific’s October 2003 convention in Wellington, New Zealand. Page 30 of the convention’s report has the following about the potential for tsunamis in the Indian Ocean:
“Due to its tectonic setting which is located at the junction of three major plates of the Pacific, Eurasian and Indo-Australian, and one minor plate of the Philippines, Indonesia has a high activity in earthquakes and tsunamis. Historical data show that many tsunamis in Indonesia are destructives (sic) and have affected neighboring countries such as Australia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, etc.”
Page 48 of the document says: "...the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean has a significant threat from both local and distant tsunamis...."
These references establish what science knew about the tsunami potential in the region. Let’s turn now to what scientists and warning planners did with that knowledge. The available evidence suggests they did little or nothing to prepare for the day when millions of people would require a warning to save their lives.
International Media – A Warning Solution
We continue to draw attention to this issue, not to “blame” those who did not implement a warning to cover the Indian Ocean nations, but because tsunami warning planners and seismologists continue to avoid serious discussions about using the international news media to issue tsunami warnings in extraordinarily urgent situations.
Beginning with our first post on January 2, 2005, the Tsunami Lessons blog has advocated what to us is an obvious solution to the problem of sending messages to distant and isolated populations.
The Associated Press, Reuters, the BBC, CNN and other worldwide news networks do this routinely – day in and day out without interruption. They operate efficiently and professionally. Some of these networks have existed, not just for scores of years, but for generations.
Why Are the Media Ignored?
The international news networks were not a component of the tsunami warning plan on Christmas 2004, and they’re not in the plan today. It’s noteworthy that not once in the past two years has anyone refuted our premise that existing worldwide news networks could have been effectively used -- and could be used in the future -- in extraordinary circumstances.
We would have been happy to debate the point if an authoritative source within the tsunami warning community had come forward at any time during the past two years, but they haven’t. It’s as if the straightforward, workable and relatively simple method of cooperating with the media to issue tsunami warnings in extraordinary circumstances doesn’t merit their attention.
The reason why scientists have avoided this discussion may be their high-tech orientation; people whose lives revolve around scientific solutions may be unable to even conceive of a low-tech solution to the challenge of sending tsunami warnings quickly to far-away locations.
It’s a Policy Matter
The current crop of tsunami experts, seismologists and agency administrators may be so wedded to their high-cost exotic warning systems that they ignore the electromagnetic spectrum that bombards them with low-tech radio and television signals non-stop around the clock.
Incredible as it may seem, the news networks are ignored even after the 2004 tsunami tragedy because of a U.S. policy that prohibits scientists at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) from contacting the media directly by telephone. Dr. Charles McCreery made this astounding statement during our visit to the PTWC on March 25, 2005; our post on that visit was the first to report this prohibition.
Sound Bites Reveal a Pattern
As you read the documentary’s transcript, keep this blog’s pro-media arguments in mind; remember also that scientists knew of the tsunami threat that major earthquakes pose for the Indian Ocean region. Read their quotes for any indication they used that knowledge on Christmas Day 2004; assess from their own words what they were capable of doing to respond quickly with life-saving warnings to the region through tested networks.
From the “Wave that Shook the World” transcript:
BARRY HIRSHORN (PTWC seismologist): “No contact points, no organization, no warning systems that I know of, in the area. Picking up the phone and thumbing through the phone book or thumbing through the Web is useless. In fact, it can be dangerous because you're not concentrating on warning someone who can actually do something for the people. So we're brainstorming basically, ‘Who can we call?’”
STUART WEINSTEIN (geophysicist, PTWC): “We then created a tsunami travel time map for the Indian Ocean basin. This gave us an idea of how much time we had in order to warn people. It told us where the wave was presently. And then, immediately, we started to try to contact nations that were ahead of the wave.”
NARRATOR: “Less than four hours since the earthquake: the Maldives are next in the tsunami's path of destruction. With the wave charging across the ocean at the speed of a passenger jet, it seems like a losing battle, but using their travel time map, scientists at the Warning Center realize there's still time to alert Africa.”
CHARLES MCCREERY (director, PTWC): “We contacted our State Department, and we advised them that this was a very large earthquake and there was the possibility of tsunami waves striking the east coast of Africa.”
BARRY HIRSHORN: “The State Department operations immediately patched us through to the embassies of Madagascar and Mauritius and we gave them a warning.”
STUART WEINSTEIN: “...their embassies in East Africa. We also contacted people in positions of authority to try to get some sort of warning to the east Africa coast.”
These quotes describe the frenetic and fruitless efforts of these scientists to issue a life-saving warning, as described by a reporter for the Chicago Tribune two weeks after the quake:
"Chicago -- With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach."
Coping Becomes Rationalization
Despite their best intentions, PTWC scientists live today with the knowledge that nothing they did that day saved more than perhaps a handful of lives on the east coast of Africa -- and certainly none in Thailand, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Living with this knowledge must be difficult for those who interpreted the data as it arrived at the warning center; they suspected the tsunami could be a killer but did not possess the tools or contacts to send a warning.
We are sympathetic to their plight. This blog is not written by a psychologist, but even an amateur observer can conclude that the stress felt by these scientists has been traumatic and that one way for them to cope with their inability to help anyone that day would be to conclude that “nothing could have been done” to save those people.
We heard that in the days immediately following the quake, and we continue to hear it today.
Indeed, it appears that they did everything they could do with the tools they had in 2004. Two years ago, there were no protocols in place to distribute a warning directly to mass audiences. No discussions had been held with high-level news executives to establish the relationships and bona fides necessary to trigger an alert that could save thousands of lives.
But what about now? Why aren’t officials of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration talking with international news organizations to explore how their networks could be used in extraordinary circumstances, such as the Indian Ocean mega-earthquake? Why does every new initiative to improve the warning capability involve years of planning and major financial commitments by nations with few financial resources?
Those high-tech systems are worthwhile, of course, but to ignore the low-tech, boundary- and bureaucracy-indifferent news networks is no longer acceptable.
Learning from the Past
One week after the 2004 tsunami, Tsunami Lessons posted a report by National Public Radio science correspondent Christopher Joyce, who began his story on the PTWC’s response: “Seismologists have wired the earth. They listen constantly for vibrations from earthquakes.”
So, too, have the news networks wired the earth. They listen and inform using their satellite and land-line networks, bringing distant news events into homes in every nation so routinely that the world seems smaller because they exist.
Two years after thousands died due to a failure to communicate, American scientists and policymakers could advance their tsunami warning capabilities by opening a dialogue with the news networks. There's nothing stopping them from trying to devise a better system but their own policies and inertia.
The world shouldn't have to wait.
Saturday, December 23, 2006
Monday, December 04, 2006
Scientists Warn of Possible Indonesian Tsunami; Alerts to Public Still Depend on Intermediaries
• Click here for Tsunami Lesson's first post on January 2, 2005 to understand what got us started.
The Honolulu Advertiser carries an online story today on scientists' conclusion that the Indonesian area is hit by tsunamis every 30 years or so. (I think we have to disregard the specific reference to "230 years" as a typo and rely on other statements that specifically reference three decades.)
Of particular interest to the Tsunami Lessons blog is the story's final paragraph:
"Until the regional tsunami warning capability is established, NOAA's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii and the Japan Meteorological Agency are providing tsunami advisory and watches alerts to 27 Indian Ocean countries. The individual countries then determine if and how they issue a warning to their publics."
Back in March 2005, this blog surmised that the "control issue" may be the biggest obstacle to transmitting warnings quickly enough to do any good. This new report reaffirms our nearly two-year-old belief that routing warnings through all the nations' independent offices will be the equivalent of "snail mail" compared to using the mass media to send life-saving alerts.
The Honolulu Advertiser carries an online story today on scientists' conclusion that the Indonesian area is hit by tsunamis every 30 years or so. (I think we have to disregard the specific reference to "230 years" as a typo and rely on other statements that specifically reference three decades.)
Of particular interest to the Tsunami Lessons blog is the story's final paragraph:
"Until the regional tsunami warning capability is established, NOAA's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii and the Japan Meteorological Agency are providing tsunami advisory and watches alerts to 27 Indian Ocean countries. The individual countries then determine if and how they issue a warning to their publics."
Back in March 2005, this blog surmised that the "control issue" may be the biggest obstacle to transmitting warnings quickly enough to do any good. This new report reaffirms our nearly two-year-old belief that routing warnings through all the nations' independent offices will be the equivalent of "snail mail" compared to using the mass media to send life-saving alerts.
Saturday, November 18, 2006
Even California Couldn’t Send Appropriate Warning of Tsunami’s Damage Potential
Q. Why is a tsunami warning like the kids’ game of Telephone?
A. Because the person at the end of the line often fails to receive the right message.
Once again, officials are asking why a tsunami advisory failed to adequately warn people it was supposed to help.
The San Francisco Chronicle has reported extensively on the November 15th communications failure when a tsunami generated near Japan smashed boats and piers in Crescent City, CA. Folks in that tsunami-prone community were never told of the waves’ potential to create havoc.
Our sister blog, Citizens Helping Officials Respond to Emergencies (CHORE), advocates greater citizen involvement in the emergency communications process.
Average citizens seemingly can’t do worse than the experts in devising ways to communicate crucial information to people who need it. The linked story in the Chronicle (above) notes that "...for some reason, the (state Emergency Services) office failed to send a fax to DelNorte County" about the potential damage that the approaching tsunami could cause.
In other words, just like in December 2004, officials knew something bad was afoot but just couldn't quite get the word out to people with a crucial need to know.
Since January 2, 2005, this blog has advocated using the broadcast media as the fastest way to alert populations at risk. So here's a idea for the experts:
Show some faith in the population's ability to process information without panicking. Put your advisories on the air. Make them clear, concise and compelling without making them alarming.
Don't worry that we'll accuse you of crying wolf. We won't! It's better to be prepared for an event and have it pass without incident than to be surprised by something we knew nothing about.
It's only common sense.
A. Because the person at the end of the line often fails to receive the right message.
Once again, officials are asking why a tsunami advisory failed to adequately warn people it was supposed to help.
The San Francisco Chronicle has reported extensively on the November 15th communications failure when a tsunami generated near Japan smashed boats and piers in Crescent City, CA. Folks in that tsunami-prone community were never told of the waves’ potential to create havoc.
Our sister blog, Citizens Helping Officials Respond to Emergencies (CHORE), advocates greater citizen involvement in the emergency communications process.
Average citizens seemingly can’t do worse than the experts in devising ways to communicate crucial information to people who need it. The linked story in the Chronicle (above) notes that "...for some reason, the (state Emergency Services) office failed to send a fax to DelNorte County" about the potential damage that the approaching tsunami could cause.
In other words, just like in December 2004, officials knew something bad was afoot but just couldn't quite get the word out to people with a crucial need to know.
Since January 2, 2005, this blog has advocated using the broadcast media as the fastest way to alert populations at risk. So here's a idea for the experts:
Show some faith in the population's ability to process information without panicking. Put your advisories on the air. Make them clear, concise and compelling without making them alarming.
Don't worry that we'll accuse you of crying wolf. We won't! It's better to be prepared for an event and have it pass without incident than to be surprised by something we knew nothing about.
It's only common sense.
Thursday, November 16, 2006
Hawaii Tsunami Was Real, but Some Surfers Showed How Unreal Their Reaction Was
Here’s a Tsunami Lessons first – a parallel post from our other blog.
Tsunami Event Passes with Few Consequences,
Confirms Belief that Some People Are Stupid
The initial assessments of yesterday’s mini-tsunami event compliment the first responders for their measured efforts to alert the public. The absence of any significant damage and injuries validated their decision to not activate the siren system.
Aside from some minor scrapes among a few swimmers who ignored warnings to stay out of the water, this tsunami had no serious consequences. The biggest take-away may be that despite all that’s been done to educate the public about what not to do when a tsunami approaches, some people will do it anyway.
Officials may have to acknowledge that they can’t change those people.
Some Civil Defense staffers expressed concern in media reports that if they sound an alarm for what turns out to be a non-event, the “cry wolf” syndrome will desensitize the public to future earthquakes and tsunamis.
CHORE strongly encourages these officials to set aside that concern and concentrate on the needs of sensible people – the vast majority of us who occupy the middle of the bell curve. The loonies who want to “ride a tsunami” are probably beyond hope, and the rest of us will appreciate your efforts.
Continue educating the public, keep fine-tuning your alert system and rehearsing the broadcast industry on emergency procedures. When the “big one” does arrive and sweeps tsunami-riding surfers away, it won't be because you didn't do your jobs.
Tsunami Event Passes with Few Consequences,
Confirms Belief that Some People Are Stupid
The initial assessments of yesterday’s mini-tsunami event compliment the first responders for their measured efforts to alert the public. The absence of any significant damage and injuries validated their decision to not activate the siren system.
Aside from some minor scrapes among a few swimmers who ignored warnings to stay out of the water, this tsunami had no serious consequences. The biggest take-away may be that despite all that’s been done to educate the public about what not to do when a tsunami approaches, some people will do it anyway.
Officials may have to acknowledge that they can’t change those people.
Some Civil Defense staffers expressed concern in media reports that if they sound an alarm for what turns out to be a non-event, the “cry wolf” syndrome will desensitize the public to future earthquakes and tsunamis.
CHORE strongly encourages these officials to set aside that concern and concentrate on the needs of sensible people – the vast majority of us who occupy the middle of the bell curve. The loonies who want to “ride a tsunami” are probably beyond hope, and the rest of us will appreciate your efforts.
Continue educating the public, keep fine-tuning your alert system and rehearsing the broadcast industry on emergency procedures. When the “big one” does arrive and sweeps tsunami-riding surfers away, it won't be because you didn't do your jobs.
Sunday, October 29, 2006
Close to Home: Hawaii Officials Say Warning Gaps Exist but Won't Say Where
You have to love the government -- "always there to help" when you need it, we're told.
Read this and then see what you think.
Read this and then see what you think.
Wednesday, October 18, 2006
In Hawaii, the Warning Issue Has a New Twist: Silence during a Non-Tsunami Event
The 6.7 and 6.0 earthquakes near the Big Island of Hawaii on Octdober 15, 2006 resulted in an unusual response by the Hawaii Civil Defense crew regarding a potential tsunami threat.
Although they knew a tsunami was not suspected within minutes of the first quake, they decided not to tell the public there was no tsunami. Rather than relieve fears during the island-wide power blackout that dragged on forever on Oahu, they chose to reveal nothing.
One official was reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin as saying people might catch only the end of the emergency alert and misconstrue it to be a confirmation of a tsunami.
That's bizarre. On the chance that some people might get the wrong idea, don't tell anybody anything.
Next time, try a looped tape that says, "There is no tsunami... There is no tsunami... There is no tsunami........"
The Tsunami Lessons author has started a new blog, again with the best of intentions, called Citizens Helping Officials Respond to Emergencies (CHORE). Too many officials' comments since the Hawaii earthquakes make it clear average citizens have a role to play in improving emergency communications here.
Although they knew a tsunami was not suspected within minutes of the first quake, they decided not to tell the public there was no tsunami. Rather than relieve fears during the island-wide power blackout that dragged on forever on Oahu, they chose to reveal nothing.
One official was reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin as saying people might catch only the end of the emergency alert and misconstrue it to be a confirmation of a tsunami.
That's bizarre. On the chance that some people might get the wrong idea, don't tell anybody anything.
Next time, try a looped tape that says, "There is no tsunami... There is no tsunami... There is no tsunami........"
The Tsunami Lessons author has started a new blog, again with the best of intentions, called Citizens Helping Officials Respond to Emergencies (CHORE). Too many officials' comments since the Hawaii earthquakes make it clear average citizens have a role to play in improving emergency communications here.
Monday, August 07, 2006
New Strategy: BLAME THE MEDIA! Flummoxed Officials Clueless on Using Radio, TV for Tsunami Warnings; Reporters Let Them Get Away with It!
In keeping with the 2006 pattern to post fewer comments here but (hopefully) make the same point more economically, this is the first post on the TsunamiLessons blog since the July 17th killer tsunami that took hundreds of lives in Indonesia.
Once again, to no real surprise, the media were filled with reports on the failure of the warning system to alert the population in peril before it was too late. Here’s a sample from New Delhi Television Limited:
July 19, 2006 (Pangandaran): “Hundreds of bodies have been recovered from beaches, homes and hotels ravaged by the second tsunami to hit Indonesia in two years, pushing the death toll to more than 340. Nearly 230 others were missing. Meanwhile, the government acknowledged Tuesday it received regional warnings about the impending disaster but did not relay them to threatened communities along Java island's southern coast. Even if it had tried to tell local authorities, it is unclear how the alerts would have reached residents or tourists. There are no warning sirens or alarms.”
This is the same story, with different datelines and word combinations, that we’ve seen repeatedly since the December 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami. As the story above notes, disaster officials blame the lack of life-saving warnings on the absence of sirens and alarms.
But a second reading of that paragraph reveals something significant: It wasn’t an official who made the assertion; it was the journalist who wrote the copy for this story. In other words, the journalist – without attribution – concluded that the absence of warning sirens or alarms made it “unclear how the alerts would have reached residents or tourists.” The media have bought the spin – hook, line and sinker.
It’s pretty clear by now that government officials won’t change their behavior and reveal in public that they could have done more to save lives after this or that tsunami. Read all the posts on TsunamiLessons and you’ll come across their “we did everything we could” excuses time and again. They are what they are, so let’s not waste any more time on them.
We have to turn elsewhere and try a new tack. It’s time to work on the media. Hell, let’s BLAME the media for their collective incompetence in simply accepting the official explanation over and over that nothing could have been done to save those lives. Reporters everywhere have accepted these weak explanations without seemingly giving them a second thought.
On the off chance that journalists in tsunami-prone countries might just read these words, here’s a transcript of an apocryphal future post-tsunami press conference that might help journalists dig into the story:
Government Disaster Minister: “…and so, in conclusion, let me express the government’s sincere regret for the terrible loss of life we’ve suffered on our nation’s beaches and ocean-side villages. We did everything we could, but without warning sirens and alarms, we just could not alert the victims in time to do any good.”
Newspaper Journalist: “Excuse me, Minister, but the excuse you’ve just used rings hollow. It has been nearly two years since the December 2004 tsunami, and your government has failed to install a warning system in all of that time. Why?”
Minister: “Well, these systems are extremely expensive and difficult to come by. We’ve commissioned a thorough study of our warning requirements and expect to receive a recommendation from the study commission any month now.”
Journalist: “Following up on my first question, why is it taking so long? What is delaying the government’s official response? Hundreds died this weekend because you have not installed a warning system!”
Minister: “Your question is impertinent! Your tone accuses the government – accuses me! – of needless delay. I’ve told you that we are working as quickly as we can, but without a siren network, whose funds have not been appropriated by Parliament, by the way, we are powerless to alert the population.”
Radio Journalist: “Minister, are you unaware that my radio network broadcasts news and information programming 24 hours a day? Are you unaware that many of our affiliates are equipped and professionally conditioned to broadcast breaking news instantaneously? Are you unaware that according to our country’s most recent census, fully 92 percent of the population owns or has access to a radio? Do these facts mean anything to you?”
Minister: “No, and why should they? What are you suggesting – that people should receive tsunami warnings over the radio?”
Radio Journalist: “That is precisely what I am suggesting!”
Minister: “But that is impossible! There would be no way to control the message, no way to verify that a tsunami actually had been generated, no way to avoid needless panic among the population.”
Wire Service Journalist: “Minister, you already said more than 700 of our fellow citizens died on Sunday because they received no tsunami warning. Wouldn’t it be better to issue a radio warning readily accessible to the public and accept the risk that it might be premature or even inaccurate? Wouldn’t THAT be better than refusing to engage the broadcast media and let people die!?”
Government press assistant: “Thank you. This press conference is concluded.”
With apologies to fiction writers, this little drama is meant to suggest that journalists have a role they’ve heretofore shunned. Inquiring and inquisitive reporters in real life presumably could be as demanding of answers as the fictional trio above.
But have you seen any evidence of journalistic probing in your readings? No, because it’s not happening. From Washington to Honolulu to Jakarta, reporters do nothing more than hold their microphones and take their notes as government officials absurdly assert that there's no way to alert populations without building elaborate early-warning siren systems.
So, here’s a toast – to the first reporter who raises his or her hand at some future press conference anywhere around the Pacific Rim and asks impertinent questions.
Once again, to no real surprise, the media were filled with reports on the failure of the warning system to alert the population in peril before it was too late. Here’s a sample from New Delhi Television Limited:
July 19, 2006 (Pangandaran): “Hundreds of bodies have been recovered from beaches, homes and hotels ravaged by the second tsunami to hit Indonesia in two years, pushing the death toll to more than 340. Nearly 230 others were missing. Meanwhile, the government acknowledged Tuesday it received regional warnings about the impending disaster but did not relay them to threatened communities along Java island's southern coast. Even if it had tried to tell local authorities, it is unclear how the alerts would have reached residents or tourists. There are no warning sirens or alarms.”
This is the same story, with different datelines and word combinations, that we’ve seen repeatedly since the December 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami. As the story above notes, disaster officials blame the lack of life-saving warnings on the absence of sirens and alarms.
But a second reading of that paragraph reveals something significant: It wasn’t an official who made the assertion; it was the journalist who wrote the copy for this story. In other words, the journalist – without attribution – concluded that the absence of warning sirens or alarms made it “unclear how the alerts would have reached residents or tourists.” The media have bought the spin – hook, line and sinker.
It’s pretty clear by now that government officials won’t change their behavior and reveal in public that they could have done more to save lives after this or that tsunami. Read all the posts on TsunamiLessons and you’ll come across their “we did everything we could” excuses time and again. They are what they are, so let’s not waste any more time on them.
We have to turn elsewhere and try a new tack. It’s time to work on the media. Hell, let’s BLAME the media for their collective incompetence in simply accepting the official explanation over and over that nothing could have been done to save those lives. Reporters everywhere have accepted these weak explanations without seemingly giving them a second thought.
On the off chance that journalists in tsunami-prone countries might just read these words, here’s a transcript of an apocryphal future post-tsunami press conference that might help journalists dig into the story:
Government Disaster Minister: “…and so, in conclusion, let me express the government’s sincere regret for the terrible loss of life we’ve suffered on our nation’s beaches and ocean-side villages. We did everything we could, but without warning sirens and alarms, we just could not alert the victims in time to do any good.”
Newspaper Journalist: “Excuse me, Minister, but the excuse you’ve just used rings hollow. It has been nearly two years since the December 2004 tsunami, and your government has failed to install a warning system in all of that time. Why?”
Minister: “Well, these systems are extremely expensive and difficult to come by. We’ve commissioned a thorough study of our warning requirements and expect to receive a recommendation from the study commission any month now.”
Journalist: “Following up on my first question, why is it taking so long? What is delaying the government’s official response? Hundreds died this weekend because you have not installed a warning system!”
Minister: “Your question is impertinent! Your tone accuses the government – accuses me! – of needless delay. I’ve told you that we are working as quickly as we can, but without a siren network, whose funds have not been appropriated by Parliament, by the way, we are powerless to alert the population.”
Radio Journalist: “Minister, are you unaware that my radio network broadcasts news and information programming 24 hours a day? Are you unaware that many of our affiliates are equipped and professionally conditioned to broadcast breaking news instantaneously? Are you unaware that according to our country’s most recent census, fully 92 percent of the population owns or has access to a radio? Do these facts mean anything to you?”
Minister: “No, and why should they? What are you suggesting – that people should receive tsunami warnings over the radio?”
Radio Journalist: “That is precisely what I am suggesting!”
Minister: “But that is impossible! There would be no way to control the message, no way to verify that a tsunami actually had been generated, no way to avoid needless panic among the population.”
Wire Service Journalist: “Minister, you already said more than 700 of our fellow citizens died on Sunday because they received no tsunami warning. Wouldn’t it be better to issue a radio warning readily accessible to the public and accept the risk that it might be premature or even inaccurate? Wouldn’t THAT be better than refusing to engage the broadcast media and let people die!?”
Government press assistant: “Thank you. This press conference is concluded.”
With apologies to fiction writers, this little drama is meant to suggest that journalists have a role they’ve heretofore shunned. Inquiring and inquisitive reporters in real life presumably could be as demanding of answers as the fictional trio above.
But have you seen any evidence of journalistic probing in your readings? No, because it’s not happening. From Washington to Honolulu to Jakarta, reporters do nothing more than hold their microphones and take their notes as government officials absurdly assert that there's no way to alert populations without building elaborate early-warning siren systems.
So, here’s a toast – to the first reporter who raises his or her hand at some future press conference anywhere around the Pacific Rim and asks impertinent questions.
Saturday, May 20, 2006
Another Quake, Another Suspected Tsunami, Another Warning System Lapse; Tonga Confirms Media Must Be Built into News-Based Alert Plan
The length of today’s post will compensate for the infrequent postings here in 2006. Tsunami warning preparedness and execution has been a media focus in the past three weeks as “major” earthquakes in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean tested new procedures at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) here in Hawaii.
Despite the Center’s new 24/7 working hours and SOPs, things didn’t go as planned, and populations that should have received a warning of the tsunami potential remained ignorant of their potential peril. More on that below.
This web log’s premise is that a tsunami warning system missing proactive, human-to-human contact with the major international news media has a weak link in its chain. The BBC, CNN, Reuters and the Associated Press all have well-tested, efficient and rapid-fire international networks that dispense news around the world within seconds. (Click here to access this blog’s earliest posts dating to January 3, 2005 on the media’s potential role to transmit timely tsunami warnings to their international audiences.)
Mission: Contact Offices or Save Lives?
It’s a given in the news business that the ultimate consumer of broadcast and cablecast news is the individual viewer or listener. That also would seem to be the logical mission of the PTWC – to alert individuals of a potential tsunami. Yet that apparently is not how the PTWC and its parent organizations – the National Weather Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – see it.
All three entities persist in thinking they’ve done their jobs if tsunami warning bulletins arrive in a timely fashion at their sister agencies in American states or foreign countries – the civil defense and national disaster offices and equivalents.
One would think the 2004 tsunami experience would have shattered that mindset in light of the “office-to-office” model’s failure to save a single life. It has been documented repeatedly since the deadly tsunami that PTWC scientists had no procedure in place to alert individual men, women and children on Indian Ocean beaches that their lives were at risk.
Post-Tsunami Stories Exposed Plan’s Flaws
A March 29, 2005 NOVA broadcast on PBS revealed the lack of preparedness within the PTWC to achieve its presumed mission of alerting individuals. The focus then – and now – was on alerting offices, as revealed in a quote attributed to a PTWC scientist on duty that day:
No contact points, no organization, no warning systems that I know of, in the area. Picking up the phone and thumbing through the phone book or thumbing through the Web is useless. In fact, it can be dangerous because you're not concentrating on warning someone who can actually do something for the people. So we're brainstorming basically, “Who can we call?"
Who the PTWC could have called, of course, was the handful of major news media operations cited above – each with a global network that reaches into the Indian Ocean region around the clock every day of the year. No such media-contact protocol was in place, as a New York Times story on December 31, 2004 revealed in remarks attributed to the same scientist:
Their instinct was to somehow tell more, to warn the region that it would continue, to reach people who could clear beaches. But how? Mr. Hirshorn recalled a tsunami expert he knew in Australia, called and got an answering machine. He left a message. Someone phoned the International Tsunami Information Center, asking if they knew people in the stricken region. The center simply had no contacts in this distant world.
Note the wording of the first sentence above: “…to reach people who could clear beaches.” The focus was reaching the officials who could clear beaches -- a half-way measure that relies on people who may or may not be on the job. And in the many months since the Christmas 2004 tsunami, there have been few quotes from scientists suggesting they believe their mission is ensuring that the people ON THE BEACHES receive the warnings. The buck always stops with officials in the PTWC’s network of agencies and government offices.
Have Lessons of 2004 Actually Been Learned?
The scientists themselves probably shouldn’t be faulted for following a failed emergency warning model. Others at NOAA or NWS could have modified that model with some “what if” outside-the-box thinking to expose the missing link in the system that’s supposed to warn individuals and save lives.
But what about now, nearly 18 months after tsunami lessons presumably were learned? Fast forward to the recent tsunami episodes. Here are excerpts from an Associated Press story about what happened to the tsunami alert following the 7.8-magnitude earthquake near Tonga on May 3:
A powerful earthquake struck near the South Pacific nation of Tonga early Thursday, triggering tsunami warnings for as far away as Fiji and New Zealand. But word of the imminent danger never reached the tiny country closest to the epicenter….
But nearly 18 months after an earthquake-driven tsunami in the Indian Ocean left at least 216,000 people dead or missing, sparking international calls for a better warning system, Pacific islanders received little or no notice of Thursday's threat….
Tonga did not receive the alert because of a power failure there, said the center's acting director, Gerard Fryer. "There was problem in Tonga where there was a power outage and they didn't get our initial message," Fryer said, adding that the center needs to work with Tonga to correct the problem. He said he did not know whether the power failure was caused by the earthquake.
The “power failure” explanation stood for several days, but then the PTWC revealed that the Center itself hadn’t performed as intended:
…Tonga... was inadvertently left off a list of areas predicted to be hit by a possible tsunami following the latest earthquake. The communication failure raised troubling questions about the effectiveness of such alerts, which have come under global scrutiny since an earthquake-driven tsunami in the Indian Ocean nearly 18 months ago left at least 216,000 people dead or missing.
Power outages, human error….”if something can go wrong, it will,” the saying goes. Another saying – my friends have heard it too often – is that “the Universe makes no mistakes.” Maybe it was no mistake that weak links in the warning chain were revealed in an earthquake/tsunami episode that inflicted no human suffering.
Media Channel Credited with Warning
Two items of note from the recent earthquake: First, here’s the same scientist referenced in the stories above as quoted in an MSNBC story after the Tonga quake:
“If people don’t get it (the warning), it’s not worth anything, but we don’t have people in every country who can help keep their sirens running and their power running. It’s frustrating.”
Let's hope by "people" he means the end user, not those hard-to-reach officials we've heard so much about. Second, buried in yet another story about the Tonga quake were three sentences that should be required reading for all PTWC, NOAA and NWS policy-making officials:
In Fiji, a tsunami warning alarm sounded in the capital, Suva. But authorities apparently failed to inform citizens, many on tiny and remote islands with poor communications. At the Wakaya Club, a private luxury Fijian island resort where recent guests have included Rolling Stone guitarist Keith Richards, staff were alerted to the danger through satellite television news.
That last part is worth repeating: “…staff were alerted to the danger through satellite television news.”
Satellite television news -- not government officials -- told people on remote beaches that a tsunami might have been generated. And if a power outage had interrupted the TV news, battery-powered radios monitoring overseas broadcasts just as easily could have been the channel.
The Tonga experience was yet another wake-up call for NOAA, the NWS and the PTWC. It may not be pleasant for public affairs personnel (who should appreciate the media’s importance) to go up against senior officials to whom “control of the message” seems more important than warning efficiency. The challenge will be even greater to convince officials of foreign governments that it’s more important to warn their citizens than it is to maintain control of the message.
But Tonga’s lesson is obvious: The message must get through as quickly and efficiently as possible to people, not only offices. The media do that routinely through thick and thin – through power outages and contact-list mistakes and offices that don’t answer the telephone and officials who oversleep.
I don't think NOAA is asleep, but it definitely needs to brew some strong coffee and wake up to the need for change from within.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
Despite the Center’s new 24/7 working hours and SOPs, things didn’t go as planned, and populations that should have received a warning of the tsunami potential remained ignorant of their potential peril. More on that below.
This web log’s premise is that a tsunami warning system missing proactive, human-to-human contact with the major international news media has a weak link in its chain. The BBC, CNN, Reuters and the Associated Press all have well-tested, efficient and rapid-fire international networks that dispense news around the world within seconds. (Click here to access this blog’s earliest posts dating to January 3, 2005 on the media’s potential role to transmit timely tsunami warnings to their international audiences.)
Mission: Contact Offices or Save Lives?
It’s a given in the news business that the ultimate consumer of broadcast and cablecast news is the individual viewer or listener. That also would seem to be the logical mission of the PTWC – to alert individuals of a potential tsunami. Yet that apparently is not how the PTWC and its parent organizations – the National Weather Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – see it.
All three entities persist in thinking they’ve done their jobs if tsunami warning bulletins arrive in a timely fashion at their sister agencies in American states or foreign countries – the civil defense and national disaster offices and equivalents.
One would think the 2004 tsunami experience would have shattered that mindset in light of the “office-to-office” model’s failure to save a single life. It has been documented repeatedly since the deadly tsunami that PTWC scientists had no procedure in place to alert individual men, women and children on Indian Ocean beaches that their lives were at risk.
Post-Tsunami Stories Exposed Plan’s Flaws
A March 29, 2005 NOVA broadcast on PBS revealed the lack of preparedness within the PTWC to achieve its presumed mission of alerting individuals. The focus then – and now – was on alerting offices, as revealed in a quote attributed to a PTWC scientist on duty that day:
No contact points, no organization, no warning systems that I know of, in the area. Picking up the phone and thumbing through the phone book or thumbing through the Web is useless. In fact, it can be dangerous because you're not concentrating on warning someone who can actually do something for the people. So we're brainstorming basically, “Who can we call?"
Who the PTWC could have called, of course, was the handful of major news media operations cited above – each with a global network that reaches into the Indian Ocean region around the clock every day of the year. No such media-contact protocol was in place, as a New York Times story on December 31, 2004 revealed in remarks attributed to the same scientist:
Their instinct was to somehow tell more, to warn the region that it would continue, to reach people who could clear beaches. But how? Mr. Hirshorn recalled a tsunami expert he knew in Australia, called and got an answering machine. He left a message. Someone phoned the International Tsunami Information Center, asking if they knew people in the stricken region. The center simply had no contacts in this distant world.
Note the wording of the first sentence above: “…to reach people who could clear beaches.” The focus was reaching the officials who could clear beaches -- a half-way measure that relies on people who may or may not be on the job. And in the many months since the Christmas 2004 tsunami, there have been few quotes from scientists suggesting they believe their mission is ensuring that the people ON THE BEACHES receive the warnings. The buck always stops with officials in the PTWC’s network of agencies and government offices.
Have Lessons of 2004 Actually Been Learned?
The scientists themselves probably shouldn’t be faulted for following a failed emergency warning model. Others at NOAA or NWS could have modified that model with some “what if” outside-the-box thinking to expose the missing link in the system that’s supposed to warn individuals and save lives.
But what about now, nearly 18 months after tsunami lessons presumably were learned? Fast forward to the recent tsunami episodes. Here are excerpts from an Associated Press story about what happened to the tsunami alert following the 7.8-magnitude earthquake near Tonga on May 3:
A powerful earthquake struck near the South Pacific nation of Tonga early Thursday, triggering tsunami warnings for as far away as Fiji and New Zealand. But word of the imminent danger never reached the tiny country closest to the epicenter….
But nearly 18 months after an earthquake-driven tsunami in the Indian Ocean left at least 216,000 people dead or missing, sparking international calls for a better warning system, Pacific islanders received little or no notice of Thursday's threat….
Tonga did not receive the alert because of a power failure there, said the center's acting director, Gerard Fryer. "There was problem in Tonga where there was a power outage and they didn't get our initial message," Fryer said, adding that the center needs to work with Tonga to correct the problem. He said he did not know whether the power failure was caused by the earthquake.
The “power failure” explanation stood for several days, but then the PTWC revealed that the Center itself hadn’t performed as intended:
…Tonga... was inadvertently left off a list of areas predicted to be hit by a possible tsunami following the latest earthquake. The communication failure raised troubling questions about the effectiveness of such alerts, which have come under global scrutiny since an earthquake-driven tsunami in the Indian Ocean nearly 18 months ago left at least 216,000 people dead or missing.
Power outages, human error….”if something can go wrong, it will,” the saying goes. Another saying – my friends have heard it too often – is that “the Universe makes no mistakes.” Maybe it was no mistake that weak links in the warning chain were revealed in an earthquake/tsunami episode that inflicted no human suffering.
Media Channel Credited with Warning
Two items of note from the recent earthquake: First, here’s the same scientist referenced in the stories above as quoted in an MSNBC story after the Tonga quake:
“If people don’t get it (the warning), it’s not worth anything, but we don’t have people in every country who can help keep their sirens running and their power running. It’s frustrating.”
Let's hope by "people" he means the end user, not those hard-to-reach officials we've heard so much about. Second, buried in yet another story about the Tonga quake were three sentences that should be required reading for all PTWC, NOAA and NWS policy-making officials:
In Fiji, a tsunami warning alarm sounded in the capital, Suva. But authorities apparently failed to inform citizens, many on tiny and remote islands with poor communications. At the Wakaya Club, a private luxury Fijian island resort where recent guests have included Rolling Stone guitarist Keith Richards, staff were alerted to the danger through satellite television news.
That last part is worth repeating: “…staff were alerted to the danger through satellite television news.”
Satellite television news -- not government officials -- told people on remote beaches that a tsunami might have been generated. And if a power outage had interrupted the TV news, battery-powered radios monitoring overseas broadcasts just as easily could have been the channel.
The Tonga experience was yet another wake-up call for NOAA, the NWS and the PTWC. It may not be pleasant for public affairs personnel (who should appreciate the media’s importance) to go up against senior officials to whom “control of the message” seems more important than warning efficiency. The challenge will be even greater to convince officials of foreign governments that it’s more important to warn their citizens than it is to maintain control of the message.
But Tonga’s lesson is obvious: The message must get through as quickly and efficiently as possible to people, not only offices. The media do that routinely through thick and thin – through power outages and contact-list mistakes and offices that don’t answer the telephone and officials who oversleep.
I don't think NOAA is asleep, but it definitely needs to brew some strong coffee and wake up to the need for change from within.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
Friday, April 28, 2006
The More Things Change, The More They Don't; Last-Ditch Warning Still Relies on Phone Calls; Media Still Ignored as Quickest Way to Send Alert
This web log has been idle since January 2, 2006, the one-year anniversary of its start-up. Our post that day said much seemed to have been accomplished in 2005 to raise our tsunami watchers' awareness at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) of ways to improve the transmission of alerts to populations endangered by an approaching tsunami.
Our hope was that the new protocols enacted by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) would reflect some outside-the-box thinking in how those alerts are proactively disseminated.
Why crank this blog up again today? Because the story in today's Honolulu Advertiser on the new operating protocols at the PTWC reveals that the staff still is not empowered to pick up the telephone and call the news media in a tsunami crisis.
Visitors to this blog can click on virtually any post in 2005 to find our theme -- that the failure of the PTWC to contact the major news media on December 25, 2004 (HST) with a tsunami alert contributed to many needless deaths in the Indian Ocean region. The record is clear that no such effort was made.
Why contact the major media? Because they've had worldwide communications networks in place for years, decades, generations. Because one phone call to a clued-in and rehearsed international desk at the Associated Press, Reuters, BBC or CNN could have conveyed life-saving messages on their networks and to their outlets in the imperiled region.
Here's the key paragraph from today's Advertiser story:
"It (the PTWC) also has e-mail systems in place to alert people of potential Indian Ocean tsunamis. To make sure people are seeing the bulletins, there is a list of English-speaking offices they can telephone in the region that are operated around the clock, LeDouce said."
Doesn't this system seem more than a little sketchy? What they've put in place is a 21st Century version of the "telephone" game with an e-mail twist.
First, let's say there are 15 countries in the path of the next killer earthquake and tsunami, which naturally will strike at the least convenient time when there's only a skeleton crew at the PTWC -- in the dead of night, one staffer unexpectedly out sick, one on vacation, etc. (Think Murphy's Law.) So maybe one staff person is supposed to call these 15 countries, one after the other, to be sure they've received and actually read the warning e-mail -- in addition to the scientific analysis that must be accomplished.
And if they don't get through for whatever reason -- what then? Or even if they do, has the warning actually reached the people with a need to know? No, it's reached an office, and by reaching an office, "mission accomplished" it isn't, because the mission of a warning center is to actually warn people at risk.
Is this plan smart? Is it modern? Does it reflect creative thinking, lessons learned, common sense?
Every NOAA and PTWC official lives in a radio universe, bombarded every second of their lives by frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. It's safe to say every one of them relies on radio and television newscasts repeatedly each day. Every one of them would rather have access to radio and television bulletins about an approaching tornado or hurricane than sit by a telephone hoping for a call from Civil Defense.
It seems incredible that after all the discussion, critiques and after-action reports, NOAA and the PTWC still don't get it. They still refuse to acknowledge the potential for a telephone call to one or two major news networks to spread the word at the speed of light around the world and save lives.
Tsunami warning are meant for populations -- not offices! People rely on the broadcast and cablecast media for information, yet the media are virtually ignored as first-tier tools in the warning protocols.
On December 28, 2004, Chicago Tribune writer James Janega began his story on the tsunami warning fiasco:
"Chicago -- With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach."
Sixteen months later, we're told the big safeguard in the PTWC's warning protocols is "a list of English-speaking offices they can telephone in the region that are operated around the clock."
"Sketchy" isn't the word for it.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
Our hope was that the new protocols enacted by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) would reflect some outside-the-box thinking in how those alerts are proactively disseminated.
Why crank this blog up again today? Because the story in today's Honolulu Advertiser on the new operating protocols at the PTWC reveals that the staff still is not empowered to pick up the telephone and call the news media in a tsunami crisis.
Visitors to this blog can click on virtually any post in 2005 to find our theme -- that the failure of the PTWC to contact the major news media on December 25, 2004 (HST) with a tsunami alert contributed to many needless deaths in the Indian Ocean region. The record is clear that no such effort was made.
Why contact the major media? Because they've had worldwide communications networks in place for years, decades, generations. Because one phone call to a clued-in and rehearsed international desk at the Associated Press, Reuters, BBC or CNN could have conveyed life-saving messages on their networks and to their outlets in the imperiled region.
Here's the key paragraph from today's Advertiser story:
"It (the PTWC) also has e-mail systems in place to alert people of potential Indian Ocean tsunamis. To make sure people are seeing the bulletins, there is a list of English-speaking offices they can telephone in the region that are operated around the clock, LeDouce said."
Doesn't this system seem more than a little sketchy? What they've put in place is a 21st Century version of the "telephone" game with an e-mail twist.
First, let's say there are 15 countries in the path of the next killer earthquake and tsunami, which naturally will strike at the least convenient time when there's only a skeleton crew at the PTWC -- in the dead of night, one staffer unexpectedly out sick, one on vacation, etc. (Think Murphy's Law.) So maybe one staff person is supposed to call these 15 countries, one after the other, to be sure they've received and actually read the warning e-mail -- in addition to the scientific analysis that must be accomplished.
And if they don't get through for whatever reason -- what then? Or even if they do, has the warning actually reached the people with a need to know? No, it's reached an office, and by reaching an office, "mission accomplished" it isn't, because the mission of a warning center is to actually warn people at risk.
Is this plan smart? Is it modern? Does it reflect creative thinking, lessons learned, common sense?
Every NOAA and PTWC official lives in a radio universe, bombarded every second of their lives by frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. It's safe to say every one of them relies on radio and television newscasts repeatedly each day. Every one of them would rather have access to radio and television bulletins about an approaching tornado or hurricane than sit by a telephone hoping for a call from Civil Defense.
It seems incredible that after all the discussion, critiques and after-action reports, NOAA and the PTWC still don't get it. They still refuse to acknowledge the potential for a telephone call to one or two major news networks to spread the word at the speed of light around the world and save lives.
Tsunami warning are meant for populations -- not offices! People rely on the broadcast and cablecast media for information, yet the media are virtually ignored as first-tier tools in the warning protocols.
On December 28, 2004, Chicago Tribune writer James Janega began his story on the tsunami warning fiasco:
"Chicago -- With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach."
Sixteen months later, we're told the big safeguard in the PTWC's warning protocols is "a list of English-speaking offices they can telephone in the region that are operated around the clock."
"Sketchy" isn't the word for it.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
Monday, January 02, 2006
Taking Stock of Tsunami Warning Capabilities After One Year of Writing About the Need
Today is the first anniversary of this web log’s initial post, which was headlined: “No Tsunami Warning – Why?” The question was prompted by an emerging awareness that the news media were not contacted proactively by scientists when they first detected the Indian Ocean earthquake and probable tsunami.
The next day, we asked: “What’s in the Communications Plan?” when innumerable news reports ignored the issue of why victims received no warning via existing high-speed communications networks (CNN, AP, BBC) before the waves struck many Indian Ocean nations. The January 7th post was topped: “More Critics Are Asking: Why Weren’t the News Media Called?” That question was asked repeatedly during the following months.
The Indian Ocean catastrophe shook up NOAA’s thinking about its role in the world. One example of the shift is that the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center no longer sees events beyond the Pacific Rim as outside its area of interest and sphere of influence. The PTWC is working cooperatively more than ever with Indian Ocean nations after reevaluating its mission and retraining its personnel on appropriate action to take after major earthquakes are detected anywhere in the world.
New SOP in the Works
Today, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration is implementing a new Standard Operating Procedure to activate warnings via the news media following major earthquakes that may trigger tsunamis. The SOP includes procedures not in place on December 26, 2004.
The West Coast Tsunami Warning of June 14, 2005 has been studied and evaluated for sufficiency, and an After Action Report on that warning contains numerous recommendations for changes in media notification procedures. NOAA’s National Weather Service will soon issue its assessment on the report.
From our perspective, much has been accomplished in the past year to make the world’s populations safer after mega-earthquakes and tsunamis. What remains to be accomplished, judging from the available evidence, is any high-level coordination by senior personnel at NOAA with the major media networks. Now that the PTWC and other warning centers have gone to an around-the-clock staffing model, it's only logical that the public affairs side of NOAA's house should reach out and proactively ensure that its links with the major media are solidified.
This blog will continue advocating for these contacts and will report on them if and when they occur.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
The next day, we asked: “What’s in the Communications Plan?” when innumerable news reports ignored the issue of why victims received no warning via existing high-speed communications networks (CNN, AP, BBC) before the waves struck many Indian Ocean nations. The January 7th post was topped: “More Critics Are Asking: Why Weren’t the News Media Called?” That question was asked repeatedly during the following months.
The Indian Ocean catastrophe shook up NOAA’s thinking about its role in the world. One example of the shift is that the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center no longer sees events beyond the Pacific Rim as outside its area of interest and sphere of influence. The PTWC is working cooperatively more than ever with Indian Ocean nations after reevaluating its mission and retraining its personnel on appropriate action to take after major earthquakes are detected anywhere in the world.
New SOP in the Works
Today, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration is implementing a new Standard Operating Procedure to activate warnings via the news media following major earthquakes that may trigger tsunamis. The SOP includes procedures not in place on December 26, 2004.
The West Coast Tsunami Warning of June 14, 2005 has been studied and evaluated for sufficiency, and an After Action Report on that warning contains numerous recommendations for changes in media notification procedures. NOAA’s National Weather Service will soon issue its assessment on the report.
From our perspective, much has been accomplished in the past year to make the world’s populations safer after mega-earthquakes and tsunamis. What remains to be accomplished, judging from the available evidence, is any high-level coordination by senior personnel at NOAA with the major media networks. Now that the PTWC and other warning centers have gone to an around-the-clock staffing model, it's only logical that the public affairs side of NOAA's house should reach out and proactively ensure that its links with the major media are solidified.
This blog will continue advocating for these contacts and will report on them if and when they occur.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
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