(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Media reports this week revealed heightened tsunami awareness in the Indian Ocean region. An Associated Press dispatch from Bangkok: “Within minutes of the earthquake, the word went out: Radio and television stations repeated government warnings, workers at beachfront hotels pounded on doors to awaken guests, and police used loudspeakers to urge residents away from the sea.”
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center reacted differently, too, as noted here in a March 28 post. Its first bulletin mentioned a possible tsunami just 19 minutes after the quake, or three-quarters of an hour quicker than in December. And judging from tons of media coverage, PTWC scientists were more successful this time in alerting colleagues and government agencies through e-mails and telephone calls.
This blog continues to speculate, though, about how the Center contacted the media on Monday. We have to speculate because we don’t know much about its media-contact protocols.
What we do know is remarkable
During my visit to the Center on March 25, Director Charles McCreery told me the National Weather Service “won’t allow” the Center to make telephone calls to the news media – i.e., no calls like the ones they made to their scientific colleagues in the region on Monday (see PTWC Visit, Part 2).
The reason, McCreery said, is that if you call some news media, you have to call them all. That reason won’t hold water, of course, and any competent news professional could map out a plan in minutes that would satisfy this alleged concern. The media “pool” their efforts all the time.
A policy that inhibits the transmission of tsunami warnings is indefensible. Maybe McCreery is misinformed or inadvertently misinformed me, but his assertion is on the table and must be addressed. Here are questions I’ve sent to a NOAA communications representative in Silver Springs, MD:
• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media for the stated reason or any other?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• Is there a review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them?
On second thought, these questions should be directed to NOAA's leadership. I'll route a letter to Admiral Lautenbacher through Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye's Washington office.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
Thursday, March 31, 2005
Wednesday, March 30, 2005
PBS's "NOVA" Show Disappointing; Tsunami Program Offers More Hand-Wringing, Little Else
(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
This was the depth of last night’s NOVA program -- “Wave that shook the world” -- about the December tsunami:
Near the end of the show a seismologist intoned that an effective tsunami warning system has three parts – buoys, public education and research. Buoys we understand, public education seems obvious enough and maybe so does research.
But where does the actual “warning” part fit in this list? Where’s the proactive effort that saves lives, the part missing on December 26?
I listened closely and took notes and don’t think I heard “news media” or “radio” or “television” mentioned once. Why? Because this was a show about and by scientists, and it’s obvious by now that the scientists who own the tsunami warning system don’t think the media have a role in the warning plan.
As for hand-wringing, we’ve seen it all before – the lack of Indian Ocean points of contact, nobody to call, nothing to do, we did all we could, etc. In light of 300,000 dead people in the region, this line is getting more than a little old. It appears a great deal of time has been spent on explaining why scientists couldn’t save lives on December 26, with little effort focused on what they might have done had a media plan been in place.
Again, the question must be asked: Where are NOAA's communications GS-whatevers and what are they doing to improve low-tech media-related tsunami warnings? If they have a work plan for improved communications, what is it, and how are they spending their time?
Which brings me to……
If the Media Are Great at Telling PTWC's Story, Can't They Do the Same for Tsunami Warnings?
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center’s response to Monday’s earthquake was much better than in December. Just ask the staff.
Reporters did ask, and the results are on hundreds of Internet news sites.
Not to be too cynical about it, but if the media can be used to transmit PTWC’s story all over the world, shouldn’t they have a role in transmitting tsunami warnings, too? Can it be, as suggested by the Center's director last week (see March 26 posts), that the PTWC is prohibited from engaging the media more energetically? It seems implausible, but that's what he said...and it's a subject worthy of follow-up with NOAA and the National Weather Service.
The PTWC may believe the system worked better this week, but there are still gaps in getting the information to the ultimate consumers – men, women and children on the ground. The Christian Science Monitor’s on-line story today makes that clear:
“Among the countries with quicker responses were Thailand and Sri Lanka. Thai police with loudspeakers fanned out to order thousands of residents and tourists to evacuate. Slower on the draw were India and Indonesia. India's tsunami warning came at 11:30 p.m., nearly two hours after the quake. In Indonesia, thousands of coastal residents didn't wait for government warnings. They felt the quake and fled.”
Two-hour delay? The news media can move tsunami alerts and advisories to radio and television stations in affected countries within minutes. The story also describes the success of “low-tech” methods in Phuket, Thailand. “People were telling each other and banging on doors…. It worked pretty well, even though the warning system isn’t in place yet,” said a newspaper editor.
Here’s a simple communications model: PTWC contacts Media Agencies which transmit to their Broadcast Clients which broadcast to the Public. That might take 15 minutes at most.
NOAA’s communications professionals – who are doing a good job polishing PTWC’s image – would presumably do an equally fine job creating communications plans built around that model.
Aftershock – A Sea of Bafflement
Judging from on-line stories filed since Monday’s earthquake, a major media theme is the bafflement, puzzlement and amazement of scientists that the quake didn’t generate a tsunami.
Anyone who has watched more than a few hours of the Science Channel might be amazed at their amazement. Even lay people know horizontal shifts in the earth’s plates or quakes deep in the mantel -- as NOVA reported Tuesday night -- might not trigger tsunamis.
More to the point, scientists freely acknowledged this week that earthquakes of 8.0 magnitude or more usually generate major tsunamis. Their each and every quote keeps alive questions about why that general understanding didn’t immediately trigger a tsunami alert in December, why it took 65 minutes for a bulletin to mention the possible tsunami for the first time.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 30, 2005
This was the depth of last night’s NOVA program -- “Wave that shook the world” -- about the December tsunami:
Near the end of the show a seismologist intoned that an effective tsunami warning system has three parts – buoys, public education and research. Buoys we understand, public education seems obvious enough and maybe so does research.
But where does the actual “warning” part fit in this list? Where’s the proactive effort that saves lives, the part missing on December 26?
I listened closely and took notes and don’t think I heard “news media” or “radio” or “television” mentioned once. Why? Because this was a show about and by scientists, and it’s obvious by now that the scientists who own the tsunami warning system don’t think the media have a role in the warning plan.
As for hand-wringing, we’ve seen it all before – the lack of Indian Ocean points of contact, nobody to call, nothing to do, we did all we could, etc. In light of 300,000 dead people in the region, this line is getting more than a little old. It appears a great deal of time has been spent on explaining why scientists couldn’t save lives on December 26, with little effort focused on what they might have done had a media plan been in place.
Again, the question must be asked: Where are NOAA's communications GS-whatevers and what are they doing to improve low-tech media-related tsunami warnings? If they have a work plan for improved communications, what is it, and how are they spending their time?
Which brings me to……
If the Media Are Great at Telling PTWC's Story, Can't They Do the Same for Tsunami Warnings?
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center’s response to Monday’s earthquake was much better than in December. Just ask the staff.
Reporters did ask, and the results are on hundreds of Internet news sites.
Not to be too cynical about it, but if the media can be used to transmit PTWC’s story all over the world, shouldn’t they have a role in transmitting tsunami warnings, too? Can it be, as suggested by the Center's director last week (see March 26 posts), that the PTWC is prohibited from engaging the media more energetically? It seems implausible, but that's what he said...and it's a subject worthy of follow-up with NOAA and the National Weather Service.
The PTWC may believe the system worked better this week, but there are still gaps in getting the information to the ultimate consumers – men, women and children on the ground. The Christian Science Monitor’s on-line story today makes that clear:
“Among the countries with quicker responses were Thailand and Sri Lanka. Thai police with loudspeakers fanned out to order thousands of residents and tourists to evacuate. Slower on the draw were India and Indonesia. India's tsunami warning came at 11:30 p.m., nearly two hours after the quake. In Indonesia, thousands of coastal residents didn't wait for government warnings. They felt the quake and fled.”
Two-hour delay? The news media can move tsunami alerts and advisories to radio and television stations in affected countries within minutes. The story also describes the success of “low-tech” methods in Phuket, Thailand. “People were telling each other and banging on doors…. It worked pretty well, even though the warning system isn’t in place yet,” said a newspaper editor.
Here’s a simple communications model: PTWC contacts Media Agencies which transmit to their Broadcast Clients which broadcast to the Public. That might take 15 minutes at most.
NOAA’s communications professionals – who are doing a good job polishing PTWC’s image – would presumably do an equally fine job creating communications plans built around that model.
Aftershock – A Sea of Bafflement
Judging from on-line stories filed since Monday’s earthquake, a major media theme is the bafflement, puzzlement and amazement of scientists that the quake didn’t generate a tsunami.
Anyone who has watched more than a few hours of the Science Channel might be amazed at their amazement. Even lay people know horizontal shifts in the earth’s plates or quakes deep in the mantel -- as NOVA reported Tuesday night -- might not trigger tsunamis.
More to the point, scientists freely acknowledged this week that earthquakes of 8.0 magnitude or more usually generate major tsunamis. Their each and every quote keeps alive questions about why that general understanding didn’t immediately trigger a tsunami alert in December, why it took 65 minutes for a bulletin to mention the possible tsunami for the first time.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 30, 2005
Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Q: To Contact a Fishing Village, What’s Faster – an E-mail to an Official or a Radio Broadcast?
(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Yesterday’s earthquake produced no killer tsunami, but it could have reinforced a mindset among Pacific Tsunami Warning Center scientists that may impede the flow of information to distant populations.
The big story today coming out of the PTWC is that it was perfectly able to communicate with the Indian Ocean region. The Honolulu Advertiser’s story quotes a geophysicist:
“We had phone numbers and we had e-mail addresses from places that had contacted us after the big December earthquake so we had lots of numbers. This time around we had people to contact and we called everybody very quickly. Instead of having no one to talk to we had lots of people to talk to.”
But if the whole point of the communications effort is to inform potentially endangered people and save their lives, how sensible is it to rely exclusively on intermediaries in the system without also using the mass media?
A Honolulu Star-Bulletin story quotes PTWC Director Charles McCreery as saying the Center had more success in communicating with the Indian Ocean region after Monday's quake than it did in December "...so they can take some action and get people out of harm's way."
A suggestion for the mainstream media: Ask authorities in the region how or if they did that. How many of the e-mails carrying the PTWC’s first bulletin at 11:29 p.m. local time in the region were read at that hour? How many phone calls got through to their intended targets around midnight? And if they did get through, what did those recipients do with the information at that hour – sit on it or pass it on? And if they passed it on, how long did that take, what form did it take and was the information useful to individual citizens?
Asking the “What If?” Question
There was no tsunami of consequence, but what if there had been? Would populations at risk have been alerted to their peril at midnight? What systems were in place for those recipient agencies to communicate to the ultimate consumers of the PTWC’s information?
This may be at the heart of the matter: If you ask the PTWC who it serves, the first answer is the Member States in the Pacific Tsunami Warning System. Since December 26 there’s been a grudging acknowledgement that although it’s not the PTWC’s job to alert “outside” nations, they also can benefit from PTWC-generated information.
But judging by PTWC officials’ comments, that’s where it stops. They don’t see the individual in the seaside village as a link in the official communications chain. And that’s why early involvement of the international news media doesn’t have much of a priority within NOAA.
The mass media must be engaged early to ensure that life-saving information can flow throughout a threatened region no matter what happens in government agencies there. The danger is that the apparent satisfaction that all went well on March 28 may delay the PTWC's stated intention to open a dialogue with the media (see March 26 posts).
Aftershocks
Each one of these incidents prompts questions that deserve downstream attention by mainstream media. For example:
PTWC Director McCreery expresses surprise in the Advertiser article that Monday’s 8.7 earthquake didn’t generate a tsunami because, he is paraphrased as saying, earthquakes 8.0 and stronger usually generate major tsunamis.
But three months ago this expectation about 8.0 and higher earthquakes seems to have been absent. NOAA’s timeline for the December 26 earthquake says that 11 minutes after the initial shock the PTWC “initially underestimated the size as around a magnitude 8.0.” Yet no mention was made of a possible tsunami until 65 minutes after the quake, and scientists were quoted repeatedly saying they first learned of the tsunami from news reports.
Why did scientists wait 54 minutes before transmitting their presumed expectation of a tsunami in a bulletin? Has the PTWC adjusted its procedures since December? What other adjustments have been made in the Center’s standard operating procedures?
The Advertiser story reinforces the widespread notion that PTWC scientists telephoned their colleagues even before the December tsunami reached some countries in the Indian Ocean region:
When the earthquake struck on Dec. 26, the warning center staff said it frantically tried to contact Indian Ocean nations of a potential disaster. But with only two clients in the Indian Ocean – Australia and Indonesia – and no contact list, valuable time was lost. They worked for hours, sounding warnings as the tsunami swept across the vast ocean basin with deadly results.
Here again is the description of scientists who suspected a tsunami unsuccessfully trying to contact people in the region before the tsunami arrived.
PTWC Director Charles McCreery adamantly disputed a similar point I made during my March 25 visit to the PTWC (March 26 posts). Are all these reporters making it up? Not likely. Are they relying on a new “urban legend” about the the December tsunami? Maybe so, but to fully understand the recent past, the issue deserves to be clarified and resolved.
Yesterday’s earthquake thankfully did not generate a tsunami and it hopefully did not sweep away questions that must be answered about the PTWC’s communications readiness.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 29, 2005
Yesterday’s earthquake produced no killer tsunami, but it could have reinforced a mindset among Pacific Tsunami Warning Center scientists that may impede the flow of information to distant populations.
The big story today coming out of the PTWC is that it was perfectly able to communicate with the Indian Ocean region. The Honolulu Advertiser’s story quotes a geophysicist:
“We had phone numbers and we had e-mail addresses from places that had contacted us after the big December earthquake so we had lots of numbers. This time around we had people to contact and we called everybody very quickly. Instead of having no one to talk to we had lots of people to talk to.”
But if the whole point of the communications effort is to inform potentially endangered people and save their lives, how sensible is it to rely exclusively on intermediaries in the system without also using the mass media?
A Honolulu Star-Bulletin story quotes PTWC Director Charles McCreery as saying the Center had more success in communicating with the Indian Ocean region after Monday's quake than it did in December "...so they can take some action and get people out of harm's way."
A suggestion for the mainstream media: Ask authorities in the region how or if they did that. How many of the e-mails carrying the PTWC’s first bulletin at 11:29 p.m. local time in the region were read at that hour? How many phone calls got through to their intended targets around midnight? And if they did get through, what did those recipients do with the information at that hour – sit on it or pass it on? And if they passed it on, how long did that take, what form did it take and was the information useful to individual citizens?
Asking the “What If?” Question
There was no tsunami of consequence, but what if there had been? Would populations at risk have been alerted to their peril at midnight? What systems were in place for those recipient agencies to communicate to the ultimate consumers of the PTWC’s information?
This may be at the heart of the matter: If you ask the PTWC who it serves, the first answer is the Member States in the Pacific Tsunami Warning System. Since December 26 there’s been a grudging acknowledgement that although it’s not the PTWC’s job to alert “outside” nations, they also can benefit from PTWC-generated information.
But judging by PTWC officials’ comments, that’s where it stops. They don’t see the individual in the seaside village as a link in the official communications chain. And that’s why early involvement of the international news media doesn’t have much of a priority within NOAA.
The mass media must be engaged early to ensure that life-saving information can flow throughout a threatened region no matter what happens in government agencies there. The danger is that the apparent satisfaction that all went well on March 28 may delay the PTWC's stated intention to open a dialogue with the media (see March 26 posts).
Aftershocks
Each one of these incidents prompts questions that deserve downstream attention by mainstream media. For example:
PTWC Director McCreery expresses surprise in the Advertiser article that Monday’s 8.7 earthquake didn’t generate a tsunami because, he is paraphrased as saying, earthquakes 8.0 and stronger usually generate major tsunamis.
But three months ago this expectation about 8.0 and higher earthquakes seems to have been absent. NOAA’s timeline for the December 26 earthquake says that 11 minutes after the initial shock the PTWC “initially underestimated the size as around a magnitude 8.0.” Yet no mention was made of a possible tsunami until 65 minutes after the quake, and scientists were quoted repeatedly saying they first learned of the tsunami from news reports.
Why did scientists wait 54 minutes before transmitting their presumed expectation of a tsunami in a bulletin? Has the PTWC adjusted its procedures since December? What other adjustments have been made in the Center’s standard operating procedures?
The Advertiser story reinforces the widespread notion that PTWC scientists telephoned their colleagues even before the December tsunami reached some countries in the Indian Ocean region:
When the earthquake struck on Dec. 26, the warning center staff said it frantically tried to contact Indian Ocean nations of a potential disaster. But with only two clients in the Indian Ocean – Australia and Indonesia – and no contact list, valuable time was lost. They worked for hours, sounding warnings as the tsunami swept across the vast ocean basin with deadly results.
Here again is the description of scientists who suspected a tsunami unsuccessfully trying to contact people in the region before the tsunami arrived.
PTWC Director Charles McCreery adamantly disputed a similar point I made during my March 25 visit to the PTWC (March 26 posts). Are all these reporters making it up? Not likely. Are they relying on a new “urban legend” about the the December tsunami? Maybe so, but to fully understand the recent past, the issue deserves to be clarified and resolved.
Yesterday’s earthquake thankfully did not generate a tsunami and it hopefully did not sweep away questions that must be answered about the PTWC’s communications readiness.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 29, 2005
Monday, March 28, 2005
Today's Quake Was Predicted 2 Weeks Ago
Seismologists are getting better at calling their shots:
Paris (March 16) - Seismologists say there is a heightened risk that a major earthquake may soon strike the western coast of Sumatra as a result of the monster quake that generated the December 26 tsunami. The Indonesian city of Bandar Aceh, which was already badly hit by the killer wave, could be at risk from a quake measuring up to 7.5 on the Richter scale and there is a potential for a tsunami-making 8.5 quake offshore, they warn.
Now that he has our attention, Professor John McCloskey is saying today another massive quake is to be expected in the region.
Paris (March 16) - Seismologists say there is a heightened risk that a major earthquake may soon strike the western coast of Sumatra as a result of the monster quake that generated the December 26 tsunami. The Indonesian city of Bandar Aceh, which was already badly hit by the killer wave, could be at risk from a quake measuring up to 7.5 on the Richter scale and there is a potential for a tsunami-making 8.5 quake offshore, they warn.
Now that he has our attention, Professor John McCloskey is saying today another massive quake is to be expected in the region.
Today’s Earthquake – A Chance to See What Changes, if Any, Have Been Made Since December
The Indian Ocean has now had two 8.7 or higher earthquakes in the past three months. It’s only natural to ask whether procedures to warn the region of a potential tsunami were different for today’s quake than they were in December.
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center's first mention of a possible tsunami today was contained in its first bulletin, issued just 19 minutes after the earthquake. First mention of a possible tsunami in December didn't occur until one hour and five minutes after the triggering quake. (See this UPI report for a similar comparison.)
The much earlier warning is evidence of shifts in emphasis and perhaps policy within NOAA. What else has changed? With my PTWC visit as background (see the March 26 post), here are questions I’d like to ask its director, Dr. Charles McCreery:
• In addition to the earlier mention today of the tsunami potential, were there any other changes in the NOAA and PTWC warning protocols in effect for today's earthquake?
• What message about today's quake was sent to the news media and in what form? How long did it take for this product to be transmitted to the media? What's the media contact list?
• Was Tsunami Bulletin Number 001, issued at 6:29 a.m. HST, the primary message intended for the media? (See below)
• The warning contained in Bulletin Number 001 (emphasis added below) wasn't given much prominence; in newsroom terms, it was “buried” inside the bulletin. Was any other message sent to the media that accentuated the warning about a potential tsunami?
• What communication channels exist or have been established recently to facilitate messages from the Indian Ocean region back to the PTWC?
• If a meteorological agency in the region knows a tsunami has been created, does the PTWC receive a message from that agency – by telephone, e-mail, fax or other means?
• If such a message were received, how would the PTWC react? Would it relay that information to other agencies, to the news media, to anyone?
Today’s first bulletin was issued 19 minutes after the earthquake:
TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 1629Z 28 MAR 2005
THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
... TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN ...
THIS MESSAGE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE IS NO TSUNAMI WARNING OR WATCH IN EFFECT.
AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS
ORIGIN TIME - 1610Z 28 MAR 2005
COORDINATES - 2.3 NORTH 97.1 EAST
LOCATION - NORTHERN SUMATERA INDONESIA
MAGNITUDE - 8.5
EVALUATION
THIS EARTHQUAKE IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC. NO TSUNAMI THREAT EXISTS TO COASTLINES IN THE PACIFIC.
WARNING... THIS EARTHQUAKE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE A WIDELY DESTRUCTIVE TSUNAMI IN THE OCEAN OR SEAS NEAR THE EARTHQUAKE. AUTHORITIES IN THOSE REGIONS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS ACTION SHOULD INCLUDE EVACUATION OF COASTS WITHIN A THOUSAND KILOMETERS OF THE EPICENTER AND CLOSE MONITORING TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR EVACUATION FURTHER AWAY.
THIS CENTER DOES NOT HAVE SEA LEVEL GAUGES OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC SO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DETECT OR MEASURE A TSUNAMI IF ONE WAS GENERATED. AUTHORITIES CAN ASSUME THE DANGER HAS PASSED IF NO TSUNAMI WAVES ARE OBSERVED IN THE REGION NEAR THE EPICENTER WITHIN THREE HOURS OF THE EARTHQUAKE.
THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.
THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center's first mention of a possible tsunami today was contained in its first bulletin, issued just 19 minutes after the earthquake. First mention of a possible tsunami in December didn't occur until one hour and five minutes after the triggering quake. (See this UPI report for a similar comparison.)
The much earlier warning is evidence of shifts in emphasis and perhaps policy within NOAA. What else has changed? With my PTWC visit as background (see the March 26 post), here are questions I’d like to ask its director, Dr. Charles McCreery:
• In addition to the earlier mention today of the tsunami potential, were there any other changes in the NOAA and PTWC warning protocols in effect for today's earthquake?
• What message about today's quake was sent to the news media and in what form? How long did it take for this product to be transmitted to the media? What's the media contact list?
• Was Tsunami Bulletin Number 001, issued at 6:29 a.m. HST, the primary message intended for the media? (See below)
• The warning contained in Bulletin Number 001 (emphasis added below) wasn't given much prominence; in newsroom terms, it was “buried” inside the bulletin. Was any other message sent to the media that accentuated the warning about a potential tsunami?
• What communication channels exist or have been established recently to facilitate messages from the Indian Ocean region back to the PTWC?
• If a meteorological agency in the region knows a tsunami has been created, does the PTWC receive a message from that agency – by telephone, e-mail, fax or other means?
• If such a message were received, how would the PTWC react? Would it relay that information to other agencies, to the news media, to anyone?
Today’s first bulletin was issued 19 minutes after the earthquake:
TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 1629Z 28 MAR 2005
THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
... TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN ...
THIS MESSAGE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE IS NO TSUNAMI WARNING OR WATCH IN EFFECT.
AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS
ORIGIN TIME - 1610Z 28 MAR 2005
COORDINATES - 2.3 NORTH 97.1 EAST
LOCATION - NORTHERN SUMATERA INDONESIA
MAGNITUDE - 8.5
EVALUATION
THIS EARTHQUAKE IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC. NO TSUNAMI THREAT EXISTS TO COASTLINES IN THE PACIFIC.
WARNING... THIS EARTHQUAKE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE A WIDELY DESTRUCTIVE TSUNAMI IN THE OCEAN OR SEAS NEAR THE EARTHQUAKE. AUTHORITIES IN THOSE REGIONS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS ACTION SHOULD INCLUDE EVACUATION OF COASTS WITHIN A THOUSAND KILOMETERS OF THE EPICENTER AND CLOSE MONITORING TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR EVACUATION FURTHER AWAY.
THIS CENTER DOES NOT HAVE SEA LEVEL GAUGES OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC SO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DETECT OR MEASURE A TSUNAMI IF ONE WAS GENERATED. AUTHORITIES CAN ASSUME THE DANGER HAS PASSED IF NO TSUNAMI WAVES ARE OBSERVED IN THE REGION NEAR THE EPICENTER WITHIN THREE HOURS OF THE EARTHQUAKE.
THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.
THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.
Saturday, March 26, 2005
PTWC Visit (Part 1): Understanding the Mission, Agreeing to Disagree
My visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center came off as planned yesterday, the three-month anniversary of the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami. Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, and I talked for two hours and noted at the midpoint that the earthquake had struck at 2:59 HST. McCreery is an effective representative – and sometimes defender – of the PTWC and its procedures, but I came away thinking he is open to improving tsunami alert procedures. It may be a slow process, because some of his comments suggest the PTWC’s collective hands are tied due to policies imposed by superior organizations.
I spent a fair amount of time on the basic premise of this web log – that although PTWC scientists suspected a potentially killer tsunami, there was no mechanism in place to issue a warning directly to people in harm’s way; by extension, 300,000 people died. He made two primary points: 1) the PTWC provides advice but isn’t in a position to know what’s really happening out there in the world. “We have no magic here,” he said. They do their best to interpret, but it’s really an imprecise science when it comes to tsunamis; and 2) it’s not even the PTWC’s responsibility to be watchdog for the whole world. They have neither the resources nor the capability to alert the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. My main point, of course, is that media notification, had it been pre-coordinated, could have been the channel for a warning to the region. Another point is, if not the PTWC, who? The world looks to the building we were sitting in as the leader in tsunami warning capability. As he noted (below), the rest of the world may not be eager for a bigger U.S. role, notwithstanding the PTWC’s expertise.
What Did They Know, When Did They Know It?
McCreery flatly disputed my assertion (made yesterday and throughout the past three months on this log) that PTWC scientists called colleagues in the region before the waves struck Sri Lanka, India and points further west. I told him that was the obvious inference to be made from numerous interviews they’ve given to media all over the world, and I recalled some of the reports.
The very first story that caught my attention in this regard was in the December 29 Honolulu Advertiser; it prompted my initial letter to the editor the next day, leading a few days later to creation of this log. The reporter wrote that PTWC scientists “frantically worked the phones…trying largely in vain to warn Indian Ocean nations of the incoming tsunami disaster.” The most striking description of the scientists’ actions that I’ve found was in the lead of a Chicago Tribune story (posted on January 14): “With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach.”
The clear implication is that they did know enough to start making phone calls, but to the wrong people, in my view. McCreery essentially said all these inferences by the media were wrong. He said he constantly is asked by reporters about this alleged “failure” to send a warning, and he says he always straightens them out.
But consider NOAA spokesperson Delores Clark’s comments reported by UPI Pentagon correspondent Pamela Hess and linked from my January 8 post: "The watch standers first learned of the tsunami through the media almost four hours after the earthquake.” (That was Clark’s quote in January and that’s McCreery’s assertion today, but according to NOAA’s timeline, scientists first mentioned the possibility of a tsunami in a bulletin 65 minutes after the earthquake and 41 minutes before the waves arrived in Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. More telling is the continuation of Clark’s statement.) “Following the realization that a massive tsunami had been generated, they did the best job they could to contact authorities. But they were fixed on reaching agencies that have responsibilities for warning such as weather offices or disaster management offices."
NPR’s Christopher Joyce’s report for “Morning Edition” on December 28 included the following: “Other U.S. scientists who monitor earthquakes say when they realized how big the quake really was there was no clear way to get the information to authorities who might have been able to warn people in time." One of his sources said on tape: "There was knowledge that a tsunami was being generated and that information was available, but the problem we ran into was that there were not appropriate agencies in places like India and in Somalia on the East and the Horn of Africa region. There was no system set up by which we could take that information and translate it into actions that the public could react to."
Over and over again scientists have been quoted in apparent exasperation at their inability to translate what they knew or suspected into a usable warning before the waves struck because no system existed to alert the Indian Ocean. I, of course, said the media represent that system and recalled another Delores Clark quote from the UPI story: “Not only was the center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list of media contacts.”
Continued.....
I spent a fair amount of time on the basic premise of this web log – that although PTWC scientists suspected a potentially killer tsunami, there was no mechanism in place to issue a warning directly to people in harm’s way; by extension, 300,000 people died. He made two primary points: 1) the PTWC provides advice but isn’t in a position to know what’s really happening out there in the world. “We have no magic here,” he said. They do their best to interpret, but it’s really an imprecise science when it comes to tsunamis; and 2) it’s not even the PTWC’s responsibility to be watchdog for the whole world. They have neither the resources nor the capability to alert the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. My main point, of course, is that media notification, had it been pre-coordinated, could have been the channel for a warning to the region. Another point is, if not the PTWC, who? The world looks to the building we were sitting in as the leader in tsunami warning capability. As he noted (below), the rest of the world may not be eager for a bigger U.S. role, notwithstanding the PTWC’s expertise.
What Did They Know, When Did They Know It?
McCreery flatly disputed my assertion (made yesterday and throughout the past three months on this log) that PTWC scientists called colleagues in the region before the waves struck Sri Lanka, India and points further west. I told him that was the obvious inference to be made from numerous interviews they’ve given to media all over the world, and I recalled some of the reports.
The very first story that caught my attention in this regard was in the December 29 Honolulu Advertiser; it prompted my initial letter to the editor the next day, leading a few days later to creation of this log. The reporter wrote that PTWC scientists “frantically worked the phones…trying largely in vain to warn Indian Ocean nations of the incoming tsunami disaster.” The most striking description of the scientists’ actions that I’ve found was in the lead of a Chicago Tribune story (posted on January 14): “With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach.”
The clear implication is that they did know enough to start making phone calls, but to the wrong people, in my view. McCreery essentially said all these inferences by the media were wrong. He said he constantly is asked by reporters about this alleged “failure” to send a warning, and he says he always straightens them out.
But consider NOAA spokesperson Delores Clark’s comments reported by UPI Pentagon correspondent Pamela Hess and linked from my January 8 post: "The watch standers first learned of the tsunami through the media almost four hours after the earthquake.” (That was Clark’s quote in January and that’s McCreery’s assertion today, but according to NOAA’s timeline, scientists first mentioned the possibility of a tsunami in a bulletin 65 minutes after the earthquake and 41 minutes before the waves arrived in Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. More telling is the continuation of Clark’s statement.) “Following the realization that a massive tsunami had been generated, they did the best job they could to contact authorities. But they were fixed on reaching agencies that have responsibilities for warning such as weather offices or disaster management offices."
NPR’s Christopher Joyce’s report for “Morning Edition” on December 28 included the following: “Other U.S. scientists who monitor earthquakes say when they realized how big the quake really was there was no clear way to get the information to authorities who might have been able to warn people in time." One of his sources said on tape: "There was knowledge that a tsunami was being generated and that information was available, but the problem we ran into was that there were not appropriate agencies in places like India and in Somalia on the East and the Horn of Africa region. There was no system set up by which we could take that information and translate it into actions that the public could react to."
Over and over again scientists have been quoted in apparent exasperation at their inability to translate what they knew or suspected into a usable warning before the waves struck because no system existed to alert the Indian Ocean. I, of course, said the media represent that system and recalled another Delores Clark quote from the UPI story: “Not only was the center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list of media contacts.”
Continued.....
PTWC Visit (Part 2): Identifying Areas for Change, Starting with Policy
Reacting to my repeated assertions about the importance of contacting the media, McCreery made one of his more notable comments: The National Weather Service (NWS) won’t allow the PTWC to call the media; the media have to come to the PTWC. This policy apparently is based on a concern at NWS and NOAA that if the PTWC calls some media, it would have to call them all. So right there is a major policy problem. The PTWC is prohibited by the NWS and possibly NOAA from using the news media as an improved warning channel over what exists today.
That policy needs focus and change. I put it to him: If tomorrow the PTWC detected a 9.5 earthquake in a subduction zone region of the Indian Ocean that assuredly had generated a tsunami, would the PTWC do anything different than what it did on December 25 HST? I.E., have lessons been learned? Are media notification protocols being rewritten? What are NOAA’s communications professionals doing to ensure lives are saved after tomorrow’s earthquake because of what the PTWC knows and does?
Maybe he was just wearing down after nearly two hours along this line, but McCreery started making observations that were encouraging. Without putting him on the spot here in this web log, I think McCreery sees the appropriateness of attempting to warn people when the PTWC detects an imminent danger.
I read him a quote from the Communiqué of the early-March conference in Paris on the establishment of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean region – “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;” – and asked McCreery what that means to him. He said the so-called Member States don’t want evacuations within their territories without first having an ability to evaluate a warning from the PTWC or any other source. That’s understandable, but doesn’t this requirement to receive and evaluate warning information simply delay transmission to coastline inhabitants? Couldn’t McCreery raise the implications of the Communiqué at the next planning meeting in Mauritius in April?
McCreery said he indeed could raise the issue and ask the Member States’ representatives what they could live with in the way of alerts from sources such as the Associated Press, CNN, etc., coming into their territories. That truly is encouraging, as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission -- the United Nations agency coordinating the new tsunami warning effort -- may not deal with the media-notification issue without prompting from someone like McCreery.
We talked about the problem of reaching out to the news media efficiently. Telephonic contact seems unlikely due to the PTWC’s workload, staffing level and the great number of media that logically would need to be reached. McCreery noted that electronic messages are sent routinely to the media about earthquakes and potential tsunamis within the Pacific, so he feels the media already are covered. I told him that the media may receive dozens of such messages a day, so a truly urgent message would need to stand out. Also, a message intended for the Indian Ocean region that requires immediate attention might well be lost in the chatter, which is why I’ve been fixated on telephone contact.
McCreery then asked whether there’s a better way to issue a warning for a tsunami or earthquake outside the PTWC’s priority area. On his own he suggested that perhaps a special electronic product could be created and coordinated with the media – a product that would be used only in extraordinary circumstances to cover situations that aren’t within the PTWC’s normal area of responsibility, such as the Indian Ocean.
The Bottom Line
McCreery seems willing to consider improvements in the warning protocols. When it was put to him that maintaining the status quo in alert procedures would be inconceivable in light of 300,000 deaths in December, he agreed. He asked for the number of the Associated Press’s Honolulu bureau and apparently intends to make at least an initial introductory call that we’ve been urging for several weeks. Contact with CNN for preliminary discussions also seems likely.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 26, 2005
That policy needs focus and change. I put it to him: If tomorrow the PTWC detected a 9.5 earthquake in a subduction zone region of the Indian Ocean that assuredly had generated a tsunami, would the PTWC do anything different than what it did on December 25 HST? I.E., have lessons been learned? Are media notification protocols being rewritten? What are NOAA’s communications professionals doing to ensure lives are saved after tomorrow’s earthquake because of what the PTWC knows and does?
Maybe he was just wearing down after nearly two hours along this line, but McCreery started making observations that were encouraging. Without putting him on the spot here in this web log, I think McCreery sees the appropriateness of attempting to warn people when the PTWC detects an imminent danger.
I read him a quote from the Communiqué of the early-March conference in Paris on the establishment of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean region – “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;” – and asked McCreery what that means to him. He said the so-called Member States don’t want evacuations within their territories without first having an ability to evaluate a warning from the PTWC or any other source. That’s understandable, but doesn’t this requirement to receive and evaluate warning information simply delay transmission to coastline inhabitants? Couldn’t McCreery raise the implications of the Communiqué at the next planning meeting in Mauritius in April?
McCreery said he indeed could raise the issue and ask the Member States’ representatives what they could live with in the way of alerts from sources such as the Associated Press, CNN, etc., coming into their territories. That truly is encouraging, as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission -- the United Nations agency coordinating the new tsunami warning effort -- may not deal with the media-notification issue without prompting from someone like McCreery.
We talked about the problem of reaching out to the news media efficiently. Telephonic contact seems unlikely due to the PTWC’s workload, staffing level and the great number of media that logically would need to be reached. McCreery noted that electronic messages are sent routinely to the media about earthquakes and potential tsunamis within the Pacific, so he feels the media already are covered. I told him that the media may receive dozens of such messages a day, so a truly urgent message would need to stand out. Also, a message intended for the Indian Ocean region that requires immediate attention might well be lost in the chatter, which is why I’ve been fixated on telephone contact.
McCreery then asked whether there’s a better way to issue a warning for a tsunami or earthquake outside the PTWC’s priority area. On his own he suggested that perhaps a special electronic product could be created and coordinated with the media – a product that would be used only in extraordinary circumstances to cover situations that aren’t within the PTWC’s normal area of responsibility, such as the Indian Ocean.
The Bottom Line
McCreery seems willing to consider improvements in the warning protocols. When it was put to him that maintaining the status quo in alert procedures would be inconceivable in light of 300,000 deaths in December, he agreed. He asked for the number of the Associated Press’s Honolulu bureau and apparently intends to make at least an initial introductory call that we’ve been urging for several weeks. Contact with CNN for preliminary discussions also seems likely.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 26, 2005
Friday, March 25, 2005
The "Control" Issue May Be Biggest Obstacle
In less than two hours I'll ask Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Dr. Charles McCreery about several fundamental aspects of the tsunami warning issue. One of them is the issue of "control."
Dr. McCreery attended the Paris meeting described in the March 23 post; a report on the meeting linked here contains the following paragraph in the Communique section:
11. Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;
The wording is murky. Does "should have the responsibility to have control" mean "should control", or does it mean something else? Whatever it means, "control" is probably what it's all about.
How can a global tsunami warning issued by one or more international news organizations coexist with this agreed-to control provision of the Communique? Maybe it can't. Maybe the ability to issue an ocean-wide warning minutes after a tsunami is suspected is undercut by the requirement for Member States "to have control over the issuance of warning (sic) within their respective territories."
If that were the case, "control" would seem to trump "effectiveness." Let's hope my visit to the Center today -- exactly three months to the minute after the Indonesia earthquake and resulting tsunami -- dispells that notion.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 25, 2005
Dr. McCreery attended the Paris meeting described in the March 23 post; a report on the meeting linked here contains the following paragraph in the Communique section:
11. Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;
The wording is murky. Does "should have the responsibility to have control" mean "should control", or does it mean something else? Whatever it means, "control" is probably what it's all about.
How can a global tsunami warning issued by one or more international news organizations coexist with this agreed-to control provision of the Communique? Maybe it can't. Maybe the ability to issue an ocean-wide warning minutes after a tsunami is suspected is undercut by the requirement for Member States "to have control over the issuance of warning (sic) within their respective territories."
If that were the case, "control" would seem to trump "effectiveness." Let's hope my visit to the Center today -- exactly three months to the minute after the Indonesia earthquake and resulting tsunami -- dispells that notion.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 25, 2005
Wednesday, March 23, 2005
Fly in the Ointment: Tsunami Warning Centers Have No Role in Contacting the News Media
Scores of tsunami and crisis management experts gathered early this month in Paris for a conference on creating a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean region. Buried in the conference report is a description of how tsunami warnings are to be issued – a protocol that this web log believes does not improve on the ineffective warning procedures that were used on December 26.
The International Coordination Meeting for the Development of a Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for the Indian Ocean within a Global Framework has made its report on the March 3-8 conference available here. Page 43 of the PDF document (#37 in the report itself) makes a statement about the issuance of tsunami warnings that runs 180 degrees counter to the thrust of this web log (emphasis added):
“Tsunami Warning Centres issue warnings based on scientific information, but do not provide instructions to the public for action. This is the responsibility of NDMO (each nation's National Disaster Management focal point/Organization). The NDMO must be able to interpret the warning information to provide clear, simple, and concise instructions to first responders and the affected public. Recipients of warning information include policy and decision-makers, emergency management and emergency responders, media, and the affected public….”
In other words, tsunami instructions/information for the general public must come from an agency within each country that receives the tsunami center’s warning.
Let’s leave that alone for a minute and jump to how the media are treated in this report. Page 15 of the PDF (#9 in the report) states:
“The mass media have a crucial role in assuring wide and effective warning dissemination and awareness raising. Education and training for the media is required….” (The authors must have liked that sentence so much they included it twice, one sentence after the other.)
So while the mass media are considered crucial in disseminating urgent warnings to mass audiences, the tsunami warning centers “do not provide instructions to the public for action.” Information about an approaching tsunami must come from another agency down the communications chain.
In the Indian Ocean region, that means 27 NDMOs will be critical links in that chain in transmitting tsunami information to the hundreds of millions of people living near the ocean in those countries.
There’s a Better Way
As this blog has consistently advised, the international news media should be contacted by warning centers as soon as the centers suspect a tsunami has been generated. One call to the Associated Press and/or CNN – authenticated for trustworthiness – could result in the dissemination of a tsunami warning over international electronic networks and radio broadcasts to distant populations WITHIN MINUTES!
Contrast that speed with the mish-mash of warnings that likely would emanate from 27 disparate nations around the Indian Ocean – from Australia to Yemen, with Madagascar, Mauritius and Myanmar in between.
A Visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
I intend to press this point when I visit the Center on March 25 at the invitation of Dr. Charles McCreery. His graciousness in light of the criticism his Center has received from some quarters (particularly the lawsuit's attorneys) over the past three months is appreciated. I hope one outcome of our conversation will be a dialogue between the Center and the Associated Press office here on how best to transmit a warning through the AP’s globe-circling network.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 23, 2005
The International Coordination Meeting for the Development of a Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for the Indian Ocean within a Global Framework has made its report on the March 3-8 conference available here. Page 43 of the PDF document (#37 in the report itself) makes a statement about the issuance of tsunami warnings that runs 180 degrees counter to the thrust of this web log (emphasis added):
“Tsunami Warning Centres issue warnings based on scientific information, but do not provide instructions to the public for action. This is the responsibility of NDMO (each nation's National Disaster Management focal point/Organization). The NDMO must be able to interpret the warning information to provide clear, simple, and concise instructions to first responders and the affected public. Recipients of warning information include policy and decision-makers, emergency management and emergency responders, media, and the affected public….”
In other words, tsunami instructions/information for the general public must come from an agency within each country that receives the tsunami center’s warning.
Let’s leave that alone for a minute and jump to how the media are treated in this report. Page 15 of the PDF (#9 in the report) states:
“The mass media have a crucial role in assuring wide and effective warning dissemination and awareness raising. Education and training for the media is required….” (The authors must have liked that sentence so much they included it twice, one sentence after the other.)
So while the mass media are considered crucial in disseminating urgent warnings to mass audiences, the tsunami warning centers “do not provide instructions to the public for action.” Information about an approaching tsunami must come from another agency down the communications chain.
In the Indian Ocean region, that means 27 NDMOs will be critical links in that chain in transmitting tsunami information to the hundreds of millions of people living near the ocean in those countries.
There’s a Better Way
As this blog has consistently advised, the international news media should be contacted by warning centers as soon as the centers suspect a tsunami has been generated. One call to the Associated Press and/or CNN – authenticated for trustworthiness – could result in the dissemination of a tsunami warning over international electronic networks and radio broadcasts to distant populations WITHIN MINUTES!
Contrast that speed with the mish-mash of warnings that likely would emanate from 27 disparate nations around the Indian Ocean – from Australia to Yemen, with Madagascar, Mauritius and Myanmar in between.
A Visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
I intend to press this point when I visit the Center on March 25 at the invitation of Dr. Charles McCreery. His graciousness in light of the criticism his Center has received from some quarters (particularly the lawsuit's attorneys) over the past three months is appreciated. I hope one outcome of our conversation will be a dialogue between the Center and the Associated Press office here on how best to transmit a warning through the AP’s globe-circling network.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 23, 2005
Sunday, March 20, 2005
Suggested Call for Pacific Tsunami Warning Center: 808-536-5510
Three months after the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami, events have settled into a predictable pattern.
Indian Ocean governments have vowed to establish a high-tech tsunami warning system, which was not in place when approximately 300,000 people died on December 26.
Scores of tsunami, meteorological and all sorts of other experts have met in Tokyo, Bangkok, Paris, Moscow and Jakarta and soon will convene in Italy, India and Mauritius for tsunami-related conferences.
The news media have written X number of words about those conferences and 1 million times X about the tsunami itself, with X being a number too high to contemplate.
Some of those words were about the lawsuit filed on March 4 on behalf of tsunami victims. The media will write even more words about that lawsuit regardless of whether it progresses or is tossed out. It represents conflict, and that surely is news.
Comparatively speaking, though, the media haven’t written much about the general focus of this web log – the advisability of integrating direct telephonic media contact into the tsunami warning protocols of NOAA agencies, particularly the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii.
Frankly, I’ve not done a particularly good job of pressing the issue with either the PTWC or the media. Yes, I had a few contacts with the Associated Press, which seems to me, at least, to be a major link in distributing time-sensitive tsunami warnings to communities thousands of miles away. I’ve had a couple telephone calls with someone at CNN International, but I’ve yet to talk with a decision-maker there.
And I’ve exchanged some phone calls and e-mails with Dr. Charles McCreery, the PTWC’s director, who has been attending several of the aforementioned international conferences. Dr. McCreery was in Indonesia last week but is expected back in Honolulu this week.
And that brings me back to the telephone number shown above. It’s for the AP’s Honolulu bureau. Dr. McCreery should dial that number soon and talk with bureau chief Dave Briscoe.
They both know the subject of that call: What is the fastest and most efficient way for PTWC scientists to issue a usable warning to the AP for eventual transmission to endangered regions of the world when a tsunami is suspected?
I.E., what phone number in which AP office should the PTWC’s scientists call to alert the world the next time a tsunami-generating 9.2 earthquake cracks the planet?
Mr. Briscoe and the Associated Press needn’t worry the AP will be helping “make the news” by taking that call and providing the requested information. The agency already tells the general public the number to call with news tips. The only difference is that this number wouldn’t be published in a directory available to the public. There’s precedent for the news media to give “insider” information such as unpublished telephone numbers to personnel who have messages they need to communicate urgently to the media.
This call should happen soon, because it apparently didn’t happen at any time before December 26. It needs to happen so attorneys like Edward Fagan don’t file lawsuits the next time a warning fails to arrive on distant beaches before a tsunami does.
The stage is set for this call. With Dr. McCreery back in town and Mr. Briscoe anticipating it, let’s hope it happens this week.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 20, 2005
Indian Ocean governments have vowed to establish a high-tech tsunami warning system, which was not in place when approximately 300,000 people died on December 26.
Scores of tsunami, meteorological and all sorts of other experts have met in Tokyo, Bangkok, Paris, Moscow and Jakarta and soon will convene in Italy, India and Mauritius for tsunami-related conferences.
The news media have written X number of words about those conferences and 1 million times X about the tsunami itself, with X being a number too high to contemplate.
Some of those words were about the lawsuit filed on March 4 on behalf of tsunami victims. The media will write even more words about that lawsuit regardless of whether it progresses or is tossed out. It represents conflict, and that surely is news.
Comparatively speaking, though, the media haven’t written much about the general focus of this web log – the advisability of integrating direct telephonic media contact into the tsunami warning protocols of NOAA agencies, particularly the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii.
Frankly, I’ve not done a particularly good job of pressing the issue with either the PTWC or the media. Yes, I had a few contacts with the Associated Press, which seems to me, at least, to be a major link in distributing time-sensitive tsunami warnings to communities thousands of miles away. I’ve had a couple telephone calls with someone at CNN International, but I’ve yet to talk with a decision-maker there.
And I’ve exchanged some phone calls and e-mails with Dr. Charles McCreery, the PTWC’s director, who has been attending several of the aforementioned international conferences. Dr. McCreery was in Indonesia last week but is expected back in Honolulu this week.
And that brings me back to the telephone number shown above. It’s for the AP’s Honolulu bureau. Dr. McCreery should dial that number soon and talk with bureau chief Dave Briscoe.
They both know the subject of that call: What is the fastest and most efficient way for PTWC scientists to issue a usable warning to the AP for eventual transmission to endangered regions of the world when a tsunami is suspected?
I.E., what phone number in which AP office should the PTWC’s scientists call to alert the world the next time a tsunami-generating 9.2 earthquake cracks the planet?
Mr. Briscoe and the Associated Press needn’t worry the AP will be helping “make the news” by taking that call and providing the requested information. The agency already tells the general public the number to call with news tips. The only difference is that this number wouldn’t be published in a directory available to the public. There’s precedent for the news media to give “insider” information such as unpublished telephone numbers to personnel who have messages they need to communicate urgently to the media.
This call should happen soon, because it apparently didn’t happen at any time before December 26. It needs to happen so attorneys like Edward Fagan don’t file lawsuits the next time a warning fails to arrive on distant beaches before a tsunami does.
The stage is set for this call. With Dr. McCreery back in town and Mr. Briscoe anticipating it, let’s hope it happens this week.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 20, 2005
Tuesday, March 15, 2005
Sri Lanka Offers ‘Lessons Learned’ Advice on Using The Media; NOAA, Are You Taking Notice?
The world would do well pay attention to the "lessons learned" advice coming from Indian Ocean region countries hit by the December 26 tsunami. As much as western nations want to prevent future tragedies on this scale, these nations want it more.
In Sri Lanka, for example, more than 30,000 people died and one million were left homeless in a population of 19 million. A web site maintained by LIRNE.NET, the Learning Initiatives on Reforms for Network Economies in Sri Lanka, asks: “Could the tsunami have been avoided? No. Could this extent of human loss have been avoided? Yes.”
LIRNE.NET says casualties could be limited with a society-wide reform of Sri Lanka’s emergency preparedness system, including communications:
“Public warning is a system, not a technology. The identification, detection and risk assessment of a hazard, the accurate identification of the vulnerability of a population at risk and finally the communication of information to the vulnerable population about the threat in sufficient time and clarity so that they take action to avert negative consequences constitute the system of public warning. Warning allows people to act in order to prevent hazards from becoming disasters. Effective public warning saves lives, reduces economic loss, reduces trauma and disruption in society and instills confidence and a sense of security in the public. It is an important component of the foundation of a sound economy.” (emphasis added)
Here’s what LIRNE.NET says about the integration of the broadcast media into the warning network – something this web log has advocated since January 2:
“The telecommunications and electronic broadcasting industries play crucial roles in the effective dissemination of warnings. Action to ensure optimal contributions from the telecommunications network of networks should be ensured through the collective efforts of the operators, facilitated by the regulator. Government should also work collaboratively with the electronic broadcasting industry to ensure effective contributions to early warning at national and local levels.”
Good observations from people who paid too high a price for a communications breakdown on December 26. If NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center have done a similar review to improve tsunami warnings through media contacts, we haven't yet found it and certainly look forward to reading it.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 15, 2005
In Sri Lanka, for example, more than 30,000 people died and one million were left homeless in a population of 19 million. A web site maintained by LIRNE.NET, the Learning Initiatives on Reforms for Network Economies in Sri Lanka, asks: “Could the tsunami have been avoided? No. Could this extent of human loss have been avoided? Yes.”
LIRNE.NET says casualties could be limited with a society-wide reform of Sri Lanka’s emergency preparedness system, including communications:
“Public warning is a system, not a technology. The identification, detection and risk assessment of a hazard, the accurate identification of the vulnerability of a population at risk and finally the communication of information to the vulnerable population about the threat in sufficient time and clarity so that they take action to avert negative consequences constitute the system of public warning. Warning allows people to act in order to prevent hazards from becoming disasters. Effective public warning saves lives, reduces economic loss, reduces trauma and disruption in society and instills confidence and a sense of security in the public. It is an important component of the foundation of a sound economy.” (emphasis added)
Here’s what LIRNE.NET says about the integration of the broadcast media into the warning network – something this web log has advocated since January 2:
“The telecommunications and electronic broadcasting industries play crucial roles in the effective dissemination of warnings. Action to ensure optimal contributions from the telecommunications network of networks should be ensured through the collective efforts of the operators, facilitated by the regulator. Government should also work collaboratively with the electronic broadcasting industry to ensure effective contributions to early warning at national and local levels.”
Good observations from people who paid too high a price for a communications breakdown on December 26. If NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center have done a similar review to improve tsunami warnings through media contacts, we haven't yet found it and certainly look forward to reading it.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 15, 2005
Sunday, March 13, 2005
Lawsuit Turns Spotlight on Officials' Rationale for Why No Effective Tsunami Warning Was Issued
The tsunami victims’ lawsuit filed on March 4 (reported today for the first time in The Honolulu Advertiser) seems destined to use U.S. officials’ own words against them. They can be found in hundreds, if not thousands, of web postings.
Here, for example, an Associated Press story quotes NOAA Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher: “Folks out there (at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) tried to contact people that they thought would be interested….” But they didn’t try to contact the news media.
Here, one of those scientists is quoted: “At the time, given what I knew, there wasn’t a system in place to save these people and I feel very, very bad.” He refers to the lack of a high-tech system in the Indian Ocean, but there also was no low-tech system in place in Hawaii to alert the media that a devasting tsunami probably had been generated.
And here, a professor from Sri Lanka reports on his visit to the Island of Hawaii’s Emergency Operations Center: “They are engaged in a polite exchange with (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) about the timing of the release of disaster information: if CNN carries the story before their phone tree is activated, they get a busy tone which bothers them. I tell them it’s possible to give them priority numbers so their calls will go through. But they are not too keen about shedding ordinary people from the phone system.” Professor Rohan Samarajiva’s report hints at inefficiencies even inside the Hawaii emergency agency network.
Professor Samarajiva concludes his column with excellent post-tsunami advice for Sri Lanka that is equally applicable everywhere in the tsunami warning network:
“The core business of government is safeguarding the lives of its citizens; Let us train the people in the Railway Department to stop the trains going on the coastal lines when a tsunami warning is out; Let us train the Navy to communicate facts like massive waves battering the East Coast to the media; Let us train the staff of the Meteorological Department (with four alumni of the Bangkok course) and the National Disaster Management Centre (three trained, including Director, now retired) to wear pagers on holidays.
“And let’s make sure that the people who go to the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center actually attend the lectures and not go shopping or whatever else they do in Bangkok. And more than anything else, let’s make sure we have the right kind of organization to keep watch on behalf of our citizens; keep watch not only against tsunamis, but also against cyclones and flash floods and land slides and all the other hazards that turn into massive disasters in this little country. So the next time we’ll be ready and we’ll save ourselves and our children, despite the politicians who say that Sri Lanka had no reason to be prepared having only a few droughts as disasters. We need disaster education for politicians too. That might be the hardest task of all.”
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 13, 2005
Here, for example, an Associated Press story quotes NOAA Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher: “Folks out there (at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) tried to contact people that they thought would be interested….” But they didn’t try to contact the news media.
Here, one of those scientists is quoted: “At the time, given what I knew, there wasn’t a system in place to save these people and I feel very, very bad.” He refers to the lack of a high-tech system in the Indian Ocean, but there also was no low-tech system in place in Hawaii to alert the media that a devasting tsunami probably had been generated.
And here, a professor from Sri Lanka reports on his visit to the Island of Hawaii’s Emergency Operations Center: “They are engaged in a polite exchange with (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) about the timing of the release of disaster information: if CNN carries the story before their phone tree is activated, they get a busy tone which bothers them. I tell them it’s possible to give them priority numbers so their calls will go through. But they are not too keen about shedding ordinary people from the phone system.” Professor Rohan Samarajiva’s report hints at inefficiencies even inside the Hawaii emergency agency network.
Professor Samarajiva concludes his column with excellent post-tsunami advice for Sri Lanka that is equally applicable everywhere in the tsunami warning network:
“The core business of government is safeguarding the lives of its citizens; Let us train the people in the Railway Department to stop the trains going on the coastal lines when a tsunami warning is out; Let us train the Navy to communicate facts like massive waves battering the East Coast to the media; Let us train the staff of the Meteorological Department (with four alumni of the Bangkok course) and the National Disaster Management Centre (three trained, including Director, now retired) to wear pagers on holidays.
“And let’s make sure that the people who go to the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center actually attend the lectures and not go shopping or whatever else they do in Bangkok. And more than anything else, let’s make sure we have the right kind of organization to keep watch on behalf of our citizens; keep watch not only against tsunamis, but also against cyclones and flash floods and land slides and all the other hazards that turn into massive disasters in this little country. So the next time we’ll be ready and we’ll save ourselves and our children, despite the politicians who say that Sri Lanka had no reason to be prepared having only a few droughts as disasters. We need disaster education for politicians too. That might be the hardest task of all.”
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 13, 2005
Saturday, March 12, 2005
Senate Panel OKs Tsunami Alert Bill; News Media Start to Notice the Tsunami Victims' Lawsuit
Backed by two of the U.S. Senate’s more influential members, S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act, was approved by the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation this week. Chair Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Ranking Member Dan Inouye (D-Hawaii) are co-sponsors.
The improvement to the bill suggested here in a February 12 post isn’t included in the bill as currently written. According to Senator Inouye’s office, he won’t make changes to the bill until mark-up. One can still hope the final version will include early news media notification among the methods to issue tsunami warnings that are specifically mentioned in the legislation.
It’s a tad after the fact, but the Honolulu news media are starting to cover the lawsuit brought by victims of the December 26 tsunami against the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration and its Honolulu-based Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. The Honolulu Star-Bulletins story today doesn’t give the filing date, which was eight days ago.
Harvard Law School student Daniel Lyons has penned a column denouncing the lawsuit that so far has appeared in The Baltimore Sun, The Houston Chronicle and perhaps other papers. Whatever one's take on the suit, it's going to keep the focus on the Warning Center and presumably will at least moderately interest the Honolulu media.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 12, 2005
The improvement to the bill suggested here in a February 12 post isn’t included in the bill as currently written. According to Senator Inouye’s office, he won’t make changes to the bill until mark-up. One can still hope the final version will include early news media notification among the methods to issue tsunami warnings that are specifically mentioned in the legislation.
It’s a tad after the fact, but the Honolulu news media are starting to cover the lawsuit brought by victims of the December 26 tsunami against the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration and its Honolulu-based Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. The Honolulu Star-Bulletins story today doesn’t give the filing date, which was eight days ago.
Harvard Law School student Daniel Lyons has penned a column denouncing the lawsuit that so far has appeared in The Baltimore Sun, The Houston Chronicle and perhaps other papers. Whatever one's take on the suit, it's going to keep the focus on the Warning Center and presumably will at least moderately interest the Honolulu media.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 12, 2005
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Paris Meeting Agrees on Tsunami Warning Net; Elsewhere, Ed Fagan and Friends File Lawsuit
Two news items have hit nearly simultaneously about events that will ripple across the network of tsunami-related agencies for months and years to come.
The Paris conference sponsored by the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission ended with a plan to create a tsunami warning network in the Indian Ocean region. An Agence France-Press story details the timetable to put the system in place by the end of 2006 (see the meeting's Communique).
And then there's the lawsuit that attorney Ed Fagan and associates publicized in mid-February at a Vienna, Austria press conference. He finally filed it in New York on March 4 and named the Thai government, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii among the defendants. The New York Post has dubbed the case $UE-NAMI.
The goal of this web log has never been to nail someone's hide to the wall, as Mr. Fagan appears intent on doing. Rather, we've sought to establish the importance of contacting the news media with tsunami warnings as quickly as possible after a tsunami has been detected. Mr. Fagan's lawsuit may ultimately prove more effective in driving home that concept within NOAA than anything written here.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 8, 2005
The Paris conference sponsored by the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission ended with a plan to create a tsunami warning network in the Indian Ocean region. An Agence France-Press story details the timetable to put the system in place by the end of 2006 (see the meeting's Communique).
And then there's the lawsuit that attorney Ed Fagan and associates publicized in mid-February at a Vienna, Austria press conference. He finally filed it in New York on March 4 and named the Thai government, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii among the defendants. The New York Post has dubbed the case $UE-NAMI.
The goal of this web log has never been to nail someone's hide to the wall, as Mr. Fagan appears intent on doing. Rather, we've sought to establish the importance of contacting the news media with tsunami warnings as quickly as possible after a tsunami has been detected. Mr. Fagan's lawsuit may ultimately prove more effective in driving home that concept within NOAA than anything written here.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 8, 2005
Sunday, March 06, 2005
Tsunami Crisis Communications Plan Located; Too Bad It Ignores Contacting the International Media
On January 3 this web log asked, “What’s in the Communications Plan?” at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. Now, we know.
A draft version of what appears to be the new “Communications Plan for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System (2005 edition)” can be downloaded as a PDF on the web site for a meeting now under way in Paris. This plan was made available to officials attending the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) meeting on creating tsunami warning and mitigation systems for the Indian Ocean (see text of e-mail to attendees, below).
The draft notes it was reviewed just four days ago by Francois Schindele of France, chairman of the International Tsunami Information Center in Honolulu, and Dr. Laura Kong, its director. It would seem to be the definitive word on how to get the word out about a tsunami.
So what's the plan for contacting the news media to issue urgent warnings?
The plan doesn’t say.
With two months hindsight on how the media were not contacted on December 26 and speculation that doing so might have saved tens of thousands of lives in the Indian Ocean region, this new draft ignores media notification with one minor exception.
The only reference in the entire plan to news media notification is within the context of what a “dissemination agency” should do – i.e., what the agencies of member governments should do when they receive tsunami watch or warning information from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:
“Tsunami Watch and Warning information may be passed (depending on the time and facilities available) to the coastal population by any or all of the following methods: radio, television, sirens, bells, whistles, warning flags, mobile loud speakers, and personal contact.”
That’s all there is on using the media to communicate life-saving messages to populations in danger; the plan leaves that function up to “disseminating agencies” of member governments. Nowhere does it suggest or outline procedures for the Warning Center itself to contact the media and thereby shave previous minutes off the notification time.
It looks as if it's going to be a “long, hard slog” to get international tsunami experts to agree that immediate telephonic contact with the major international news media has a crucial place in the crisis communications plan.
Message to IOC Attendees in Paris
The following e-mail was sent on March 3 to more than 140 IOC officials who are included on the IOC Action Addresses list available at the web page linked above:
Ladies and Gentlemen, many of you are attending the International Coordination Meeting for the Development of Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Systems for the Indian Ocean in Paris. The rest of you share the goal of mitigating the loss of life in future tsunamis through the creation of effective warning systems.
Much of your deliberation naturally will involve high-tech solutions, but I urge you to not lose sight of the importance of low-tech media notification in sending useable warnings to populations at risk. As a private citizen living in Hawaii, I have maintained a web log since January 2 on this critical -- but overlooked — communications channel.
Based on media reports, it would appear nearly all tsunami experts are focused on technology-oriented solutions to the warning problem. Certainly they must be implemented, but you are encouraged also to consider how effective a simple yet timely telephone call can be when made to major news organizations, such as the Associated Press, Reuters and CNN. Thorough coordination with the media is necessary, of course.
I hope that even a small percentage of the people who receive this e-mail will take time to read some of my web log (below) and then include low-tech media notification in your plans. A great number of lives might have been saved in the Indian Ocean region if a warning had been disseminated in this fashion.
Sincerely,
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 6, 2005
A draft version of what appears to be the new “Communications Plan for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System (2005 edition)” can be downloaded as a PDF on the web site for a meeting now under way in Paris. This plan was made available to officials attending the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) meeting on creating tsunami warning and mitigation systems for the Indian Ocean (see text of e-mail to attendees, below).
The draft notes it was reviewed just four days ago by Francois Schindele of France, chairman of the International Tsunami Information Center in Honolulu, and Dr. Laura Kong, its director. It would seem to be the definitive word on how to get the word out about a tsunami.
So what's the plan for contacting the news media to issue urgent warnings?
The plan doesn’t say.
With two months hindsight on how the media were not contacted on December 26 and speculation that doing so might have saved tens of thousands of lives in the Indian Ocean region, this new draft ignores media notification with one minor exception.
The only reference in the entire plan to news media notification is within the context of what a “dissemination agency” should do – i.e., what the agencies of member governments should do when they receive tsunami watch or warning information from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:
“Tsunami Watch and Warning information may be passed (depending on the time and facilities available) to the coastal population by any or all of the following methods: radio, television, sirens, bells, whistles, warning flags, mobile loud speakers, and personal contact.”
That’s all there is on using the media to communicate life-saving messages to populations in danger; the plan leaves that function up to “disseminating agencies” of member governments. Nowhere does it suggest or outline procedures for the Warning Center itself to contact the media and thereby shave previous minutes off the notification time.
It looks as if it's going to be a “long, hard slog” to get international tsunami experts to agree that immediate telephonic contact with the major international news media has a crucial place in the crisis communications plan.
Message to IOC Attendees in Paris
The following e-mail was sent on March 3 to more than 140 IOC officials who are included on the IOC Action Addresses list available at the web page linked above:
Ladies and Gentlemen, many of you are attending the International Coordination Meeting for the Development of Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Systems for the Indian Ocean in Paris. The rest of you share the goal of mitigating the loss of life in future tsunamis through the creation of effective warning systems.
Much of your deliberation naturally will involve high-tech solutions, but I urge you to not lose sight of the importance of low-tech media notification in sending useable warnings to populations at risk. As a private citizen living in Hawaii, I have maintained a web log since January 2 on this critical -- but overlooked — communications channel.
Based on media reports, it would appear nearly all tsunami experts are focused on technology-oriented solutions to the warning problem. Certainly they must be implemented, but you are encouraged also to consider how effective a simple yet timely telephone call can be when made to major news organizations, such as the Associated Press, Reuters and CNN. Thorough coordination with the media is necessary, of course.
I hope that even a small percentage of the people who receive this e-mail will take time to read some of my web log (below) and then include low-tech media notification in your plans. A great number of lives might have been saved in the Indian Ocean region if a warning had been disseminated in this fashion.
Sincerely,
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 6, 2005
Thursday, March 03, 2005
Paris Conference Begins; Will Media Be in Plans?
The world’s leading tsunami experts are in Paris for a week of meetings on creating a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean. A USA Today story on the conference paraphrases Patricio Bernal, executive secretary of the U.N. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission:
“Simple cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26, Bernal says.”
As Dr. Jerry Comcowich of the University of Hawaii said after reading this story: “Why can’t these people see that the media and especially radio are the best way to communicate tsunami warnings?”
We’ve been asking the same question for two months.
“Simple cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26, Bernal says.”
As Dr. Jerry Comcowich of the University of Hawaii said after reading this story: “Why can’t these people see that the media and especially radio are the best way to communicate tsunami warnings?”
We’ve been asking the same question for two months.
Associated Press's Senior News Executive Writes
Kathleen Carroll, executive editor of the Associated Press, responded to an e-mail I sent her yesterday with the same points made earlier in my e-mail to the David Briscoe, the AP’s Honolulu bureau chief. She said she had nothing more to add to Briscoe’s response on behalf of the AP regarding the suggestion the news cooperative could play a role in transmitting life-saving warnings about future tsunamis (see yesterday’s post).
I responded to Ms. Carroll and thanked her for her tacit reaffirmation that the AP is willing to provide information to U.S. government agencies that would facilitate warnings. My e-mail continued:
Since the AP’s Honolulu bureau is not manned 24/7 and since a tsunami could be detected in the office’s down time, one must conclude that there needs to be some higher level of coordination with the AP than the Honolulu office — perhaps with New York or a West Coast bureau that is manned around the clock and that has key decision-making authority to move bulletins on your primary wire.
I hope I’m wrong in having the impression that the AP seems needlessly stand-offish on this matter. Perhaps it’s because, as Briscoe suggested, news people don’t want to be seen as “making the news”. As a former reporter, I understand that, but it would be helpful if the AP appeared even slightly more interested than it presently does in facilitating communications channels that could save many many lives. Just today in USA Today a UN official is paraphrased as saying “simple warning cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26.” So would have radio bulletins and cable TV bulletins carrying information transmitted by the Associated Press.
It would be no violation of journalism ethics if the AP were to clarify for NOAA and the PTWC how they can best communicate their emergency messages to your organization. If you agree, perhaps you could help ensure that when Dr. McCreery does call or write your Honolulu office, he will be given information that will result in truly effective means for him and his scientists to contact your news agency at an appropriate level when minutes count.
That’s all I’m trying to accomplish. As the UN official said, thousands of people died — maybe tens of thousands — because an effective warning wasn’t given to the region. How can any of us be complacent knowing the news media have the ability to send information around the world at lightning speed?
Aloha, Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 3, 2005
I responded to Ms. Carroll and thanked her for her tacit reaffirmation that the AP is willing to provide information to U.S. government agencies that would facilitate warnings. My e-mail continued:
Since the AP’s Honolulu bureau is not manned 24/7 and since a tsunami could be detected in the office’s down time, one must conclude that there needs to be some higher level of coordination with the AP than the Honolulu office — perhaps with New York or a West Coast bureau that is manned around the clock and that has key decision-making authority to move bulletins on your primary wire.
I hope I’m wrong in having the impression that the AP seems needlessly stand-offish on this matter. Perhaps it’s because, as Briscoe suggested, news people don’t want to be seen as “making the news”. As a former reporter, I understand that, but it would be helpful if the AP appeared even slightly more interested than it presently does in facilitating communications channels that could save many many lives. Just today in USA Today a UN official is paraphrased as saying “simple warning cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26.” So would have radio bulletins and cable TV bulletins carrying information transmitted by the Associated Press.
It would be no violation of journalism ethics if the AP were to clarify for NOAA and the PTWC how they can best communicate their emergency messages to your organization. If you agree, perhaps you could help ensure that when Dr. McCreery does call or write your Honolulu office, he will be given information that will result in truly effective means for him and his scientists to contact your news agency at an appropriate level when minutes count.
That’s all I’m trying to accomplish. As the UN official said, thousands of people died — maybe tens of thousands — because an effective warning wasn’t given to the region. How can any of us be complacent knowing the news media have the ability to send information around the world at lightning speed?
Aloha, Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 3, 2005
Wednesday, March 02, 2005
AP's Cautious Response Opens Door for Improved Tsunami Warning Procedures
It’s not a ringing statement and it’s not in writing, but at least we have the Associated Press’s official response to the view it has a role in helping save lives in future tsunami emergencies.
As noted in the February 27 post, AP’s Corporate Communications office bucked the issue back to David Briscoe, the AP bureau chief in Honolulu. After giving him a couple days to respond to my e-mail, I called him today after correctly concluding the agency didn’t intend to put its response in writing.
Here’s Briscoe’s spoken statement on behalf of the Associated Press:
“The official position of the Associated Press is that it’s the responsibility of government to devise the best warning systems for natural disasters, and it’s our job to report the news – including news of impending disasters – in as timely and accurate a manner as possible.”
Briscoe said the AP’s statement “doesn’t really go any further than that.” Unofficially, though, Briscoe made it clear the agency will provide information to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center that could help facilitate future warnings.
“We want to open as many channels as possible to disseminate news. There’d still a matter of judgment of what’s put on the wire and what’s not…. We’d want to disseminate news (about a tsunami) as far as we could. That represents a problem. Don’t overestimate the reach of any news agency. We have members and subscribers all over the world but don’t have them on every shore.”
This whole issue was prompted by the fact that an effective warning reached no shores around the Indian Ocean region on Decembeer 26. We can only do what we can do, and it’s encouraging that the AP is willing to provide information to NOAA and the PTWC on how to enhance transmission of tsunami warning messages to the agency.
That said, you have to wonder whether AP executives are a wee bit too focused on (drum roll, please) JOURNALISM ETHICS when what we're talking about is simple proactive engagement by a news organization in ways that quite easily could save lives.
Next Step: Encourage the PTWC to Call the Associated Press
The AP’s door is open. NOAA and the PTWC have to go through it. I’ll write Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, suggesting he make a formal request to David Briscoe here in Honolulu for guidance on how to contact the agency in a future tsunami emergency. And although the Honolulu bureau if only a few miles from the Center, the best contact point probably is in far-off New York with someone who has the authority to approve transmission of a warning message on the AP’s global network.
Footnote:
Danette Johnson at CNN International (see February 24 post) said today she’s following up to see what can be done to help the PTWC get the word more efficiently to CNN in future emergencies.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 2, 2005
As noted in the February 27 post, AP’s Corporate Communications office bucked the issue back to David Briscoe, the AP bureau chief in Honolulu. After giving him a couple days to respond to my e-mail, I called him today after correctly concluding the agency didn’t intend to put its response in writing.
Here’s Briscoe’s spoken statement on behalf of the Associated Press:
“The official position of the Associated Press is that it’s the responsibility of government to devise the best warning systems for natural disasters, and it’s our job to report the news – including news of impending disasters – in as timely and accurate a manner as possible.”
Briscoe said the AP’s statement “doesn’t really go any further than that.” Unofficially, though, Briscoe made it clear the agency will provide information to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center that could help facilitate future warnings.
“We want to open as many channels as possible to disseminate news. There’d still a matter of judgment of what’s put on the wire and what’s not…. We’d want to disseminate news (about a tsunami) as far as we could. That represents a problem. Don’t overestimate the reach of any news agency. We have members and subscribers all over the world but don’t have them on every shore.”
This whole issue was prompted by the fact that an effective warning reached no shores around the Indian Ocean region on Decembeer 26. We can only do what we can do, and it’s encouraging that the AP is willing to provide information to NOAA and the PTWC on how to enhance transmission of tsunami warning messages to the agency.
That said, you have to wonder whether AP executives are a wee bit too focused on (drum roll, please) JOURNALISM ETHICS when what we're talking about is simple proactive engagement by a news organization in ways that quite easily could save lives.
Next Step: Encourage the PTWC to Call the Associated Press
The AP’s door is open. NOAA and the PTWC have to go through it. I’ll write Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, suggesting he make a formal request to David Briscoe here in Honolulu for guidance on how to contact the agency in a future tsunami emergency. And although the Honolulu bureau if only a few miles from the Center, the best contact point probably is in far-off New York with someone who has the authority to approve transmission of a warning message on the AP’s global network.
Footnote:
Danette Johnson at CNN International (see February 24 post) said today she’s following up to see what can be done to help the PTWC get the word more efficiently to CNN in future emergencies.
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 2, 2005
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