NOAA Chief Says Communications Policy Is Under Review, May Lead to Improved Media Contact

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

In a letter dated May 17, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. responded to most of the questions sent to him in early April requesting clarification on NOAA’s communications policies for issuing tsunami warnings using the major mass media.

The letter reiterates some of what we already knew about how NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) react to suspected tsunamis by issuing bulletins over a large network of electronic services.

But Lautenbacher also states: “Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins.”

It’s possible I missed it in the past five months, but this is the first definitive statement I can recall that mentions what likely is a sweeping reexamination and revamping of NOAA’s communications protocols.

This obviously is a positive development and should temper somewhat the criticism directed at Lautenbacher and his agency for their early defense of protocols and procedures in place on December 26, 2004. On January 11, in a visit to the PTWC, Lautenbacher called the staff’s actions “excellent” and, according to a Honolulu Star-Bulletin story on his visit, faithful to the warning procedures in place.

It now appears new warning procedures are in the works, which is the bottom-line outcome this web log has advocated since January 2.

Lautenbacher’s letter follows; my comments are not inserted between his paragraphs but instead are referenced where appropriate within his text and listed following the letter.

Dear Mr. Carlson:

Thank you for your letter regarding the tsunami of December 26, 2004, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) media response.

NOAA recognizes the media as an important conduit of information in times of natural disasters. The Pacific and West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Centers, like all of NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS) offices, maintains procedures for communicating watches, warnings, and bulletins to the media via high speed electronic means.

Many members of the international media receive bulletins and warnings through our Family of Services subscriptions, NOAA Weather Wire, the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network, and through the Emergency Alert System. Warnings and watches are delivered with the highest priority on these systems. Customers, including the media, set subsequent priority for viewing, alerting for, or displaying products. [1]

Information in bulletins, particularly words capable of causing a public response, is crafted with the help of civil authorities in the potentially affected areas. In the case of international products, NOAA must be especially diligent about coordinating the wording of bulletins and warnings to avoid interfering with the sovereign authority of foreign governments. This is especially true with the tsunami products. Compared to severe weather events, the science of tsunami warnings is still imprecise. [2]

No NOAA or NWS policy prohibits a forecast office or center from proactively contacting media regarding a watch, warning, or bulletin. However, NOAA policy requires our offices to treat all entities “fair and equitably,” (to view the policy, see http://www.noaa.gov/partnershippolicy/). A pool operation of the type you mention is used by NOAA’s National Hurricane Center. [3]

We must remember not all countries in the Indian Ocean transmit tide gauge data, and only a few water level gauges transmit data from the region. Without such data, or a tsunami-detecting buoy, NOAA scientists have no way to detect or verify whether a tsunami was generated.

Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins. [4]

With respect to your question about the decrease in lag time between the earthquake events of December 26, 2004, and March 28, 2005, and their respective tsunami information bulletins, the difference is due to a number of changes, including the following:

• Affected countries in the Indian Ocean requested, and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) as well as the Japan Meteorological Agency agreed to provide, interim warning guidance to the region until it establishes its own warning capabilities;
• The initial estimated magnitude for the March 28, 2005, event was 8.5. The initial estimate for the December 26, 3004, event was 8.0, reevaluated at 8.5, 65 minutes after the earthquake occurred. [5]

The initial bulletin issued on March 28, 2005, indicated the earthquake had the potential to generate a tsunami. The additional procedures designed for the Indian Ocean and implemented by the scientists at the (PTWC) on March 28, 2005, are appropriate given our experience with the December 26, 2004, event and our long experience with international tsunami warning responsibilities in the Pacific. [6]

We share the same goal of saving lives. I appreciate your concerns and comments. Should you have any further questions, please contact NOAA’s Public Affairs Director, Jordan St. John, at (202) 482-6090.

Sincerely,

/signature/
Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere

cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye

Comments

[1] Inarguably, NOAA and the NWS have a vast array of electronic networks with which to disseminate tsunami bulletins, but as noted in the list of questions sent to Lautenbacher, there’s reason to question whether the media act universally upon the bulletins after they’ve been sent. One Honolulu journalist says the PTWC’s bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the news wire that services Hawaii’s media, including broadcast stations, with no special notification to alert newsrooms. Lautenbacher’s letter does not answer the question pertinent to this issue: “Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine?” The ultimate differentiation for warnings about impending calamitous events would be a telephone call made under pre-coordinated and rehearsed protocols to a handful of key media outlets with world-wide communication capabilities. Point [2] below shows that considerable coordination would be required internationally.

[2] March 23 and 25 posts to this blog highlighted the “control” issue. The final communiqué of the early-March Paris conference on the creation of a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean included this paragraph: “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories….” On its surface, this point seems like a reasonable acknowledgement of a Member State’s sovereignty, but does this mean that media such as the BBC and CNN are not to carry confirmed reports of a tsunami that is approaching the shores of a Member State? More thinking on the “control” issue is indicated.

[3] Lautenbacher disavows the existence of a NWS policy that “won’t allow” the PTWC to directly contact the news media via the telephone. Center Director Charles McCreery first alluded to a possible prohibition during my March 25 visit, a report of which is linked above. Since we must take Lautenbacher at his word that no such prohibition exists, we’re left to examine what his admonition “to treat all (media) entities ‘fair and equitably’” really means. I don't think it means that since you can't call everyone, you can't call anyone. His acknowledgement that media pools already are standard fare for NOAA at the National Hurricane Center should result in NOAA considering them for the issuance of tsunami warnings.

[4] This is the letter’s most important paragraph in my estimation. NOAA clearly has backed away from the mindset that drove Lautenbacher’s testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation at its February 2 hearings on S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005. As noted in a February 3 post, Lautenbacher’s testimony contained the following in a space of four paragraphs on page 4: “It is not the Center’s responsibility to issue local tsunami warnings from seismic events outside of the United States.” “NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no authority or responsibility to issue tsunami warnings for the Indian Ocean basin.” “As the Indian Ocean is outside the NOAA tsunami area of responsibility, NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no procedures in place to issue a warning for this region.” Authorized or not, NOAA obviously has a different stance today than it did within the first two months after the tsunami. The ongoing review of its procedures is a good development.

[5] and [6] Not to hammer this point to death, but as noted in a March 30 post, scientists acknowledged after the March 28 earthquake that quakes of 8.0 magnitude are generally known to be potentially tsunami-producing. I respectfully recommend that NOAA put less energy into explaining away its actions on December 26 and vigorously pursue the aforementioned policy review.

Summary

Admiral Lautenbacher has clarified some points and opened other issues for continued examination. The fact that a policy review is ongoing suggests there’s still time for outsiders to influence the outcome.

The issue of Member States’ sovereignty over tsunami warnings within their territories is thorny, but national sovereignty in this century isn’t what it used to be. Giving here and there on that point in favor of allowing life-saving messages to be transmitted into one’s country might just be the most noble thing a president or national sovereign could do for his or her people.

I thank Admiral Lautenbacher for addressing most of the points in my April letter. Now that the policy review has been officially mentioned, it can be the focus of this blog and the efforts of others to improve tsunami communications. I invite readers to post your comments on Lautenbacher's letter by clicking the link below.

Restating the Tsunami Warning Issues & Questions as NOAA Shifts Focus to '05 Hurricane Season

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

As the December tsunami continues to fade into the background buzz, NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher Jr. and his associates have been all over the media this week with their forecasts for hurricane season, which begins in three weeks. Regions vulnerable to hurricanes – the Gulf and East Coast states and Hawaii – are well served by NOAA’s work in hurricane forecasting and tracking.

I’m sure NOAA has not lost interest in learning the lessons of the tsunami so procedures can be improved. Any perceived criticism of NOAA here is not directed at the agency’s scientific capabilities. We’ve been focused on what NOAA does with the information gathered from its science – specifically, whether current policies and practices allow communication of tsunami warnings via the news media, which arguably represent the fastest channel to populations in danger thousands of miles away.

Because we have reason to believe policies do exist that prevent the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) from directly contacting the news media (see report on my visit to the Center, linked above), the following 10 questions were sent to Admiral Lautenbacher in April. I trust that someone is attending to the answers, even as the agency works to raise awareness about the hurricane threat.

Here are the questions in the April 5 letter to Admiral Lautenbacher:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media? What specific channels are used and how do they operate?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them? (One Honolulu journalist in a position to know says PTWC bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the Associated Press's "state" wire, with no special notification to alert newsrooms that they're there.)
• Is a formal review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Scientists didn’t transmit a bulletin about a presumed tsunami in December until 65 minutes after the earthquake; that lag time was shortened to 19 minutes on March 28. Did a policy change at NOAA, NWS and/or PTWC result in the shorter time?

NOAA In No Hurry To Respond, but Get This: Inouye's Office Has Been Waiting for 3.5 Years!

"I'll check." That was the totality of a NOAA staffer's response to my inquiry about when to expect an answer from Admiral Lautenbacher to my April 5 letter. Call me crazy, but I thought the issues we've been discussing had an urgency about them and that an answer might come rather quickly.

But then I got this note from a staffer in Senator Daniel Inouye's office about what to expect from NOAA: "...the senator would be pleased to make an inquiry on your behalf, but please keep in mind that I am still waiting on NOAA reports the senator asked for about 3 1/2 years ago."

Three and one-half years? Is that the way it works in Washington these days? One of the Senate's longest-serving members has been waiting three and one-half years to get a report out of NOAA?

And I'm getting antsy after five weeks. That's almost funny.

Honolulu's Mayor Weighs In, Says He'll Write Senator Inouye re NOAA Media-Contact Reform

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
•May 9 Update: Still waiting on Lautenbacher letter (see April 28)

Office of the Mayor
City and County of Honolulu

April 27, 2005

Dear Doug,

Thank you for your letter of April 17, 2005. At your suggestion, I will be happy to write Senator Inouye asking him to support communications reform within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).

Given the devastating travesty that occurred in the Indian Ocean region on December 26, 2004, any way to improve early warning should be instituted.

Thank you for alerting me to this opportunity, as I am pleased to assist.

Sincerely,

/signature/
MUFI HANNEMANN
Mayor

MediaChannel.org Boosts this Blog's Visibility**

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

Danny Schechter is a television producer and independent filmmaker who writes and speaks about media issues. He’s editor and "blogger in chief" of MediaChannel.org.

The TSUNAMI LESSONS blog came to his attention after he published a March 30 column on his NewsDissector.org site titled Tsunami Questions, Few Answers. One question we're both interested in is how the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center uses the news media to communicate tsunami messages to populations in danger. Turns out, it doesn't. (See above link to the report on my visit to the Center.)

Danny has enthusiastically supported our search for answers and asked me to write a commentary for MediaChannel.org. It’s currently (5/2) headlined at that site’s home page, with a link to the commentary: The Media Are Excluded from Transmitting Tsunami Warnings, and They Don’t Care.

** FOR EXAMPLE: Saying "it still rankles to know that the deaths could have been prevented," Indian Online Journalism quotes the MediaChannel.org commentary in an item titled "the death game".

Mahalo for your support, Danny.

Meanwhile, the wait continues for Admiral Lautenbacher's response to the request he revoke policies that inhibit direct distribution of tsunami warnings to the news media (see April 28 post). (UPDATE ON 5/5: Still waiting.)

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

No Response Yet from NOAA's Lautenbacher on Reported Prohibition of Direct Media Contact

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26 post)
•Qualifications to write about this stuff (see January 13 post)

It’s been three weeks since NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr. was sent a letter about his agency’s alleged prohibition of direct (telephonic) media contacts to issue tsunami warnings. We’re left to wonder whether his response will repudiate communications protocols that actually prohibit telephone calls to major international news media to issue urgent warnings.

I would hope reporters everywhere would react the way I did upon learning of this policy – with incredulity. Newcomers to this site are encouraged to read the letter here as well as the questions it contained at a separate posting.

For a two-part report on my March 25 visit and meeting with the director of the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center that first revealed the policy, click on the link above.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

McCreery Reports on Informal Mauritius Talks; Officially, Media Bulletins Still a Distant Goal

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
•Letter to NOAA’s administrator with Eleven Questions (April 8 & 3)
•National Weather Service "won't allow" phone calls to media (March 31)
•Qualifications to write about this stuff (see January 13)

Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Charles McCreery is back in Honolulu following the Mauritius tsunami warning conference. He reports a growing awareness among people in tsunami warning circles that direct contact with the media soon after a tsunami is suspected should be the subject of more discussion.

As noted here, international agreements seem to discourage media involvement in disseminating tsunami warnings to local populations (see March 23 and March 25 posts). But McCreery said yesterday that after he raised the issue at the Mauritius meeting, several attendees approached him and agreed that involving the media in tsunami warnings more than they are now is an important issue.

McCreery told his Mauritius audience that since the media are going to learn about tsunami warnings and bulletins anyway, perhaps it’s better to communicate directly with them to exert influence over how the warning is handled. “If you’re concerned about not having the public unnecessarily alarmed,” he said, “maybe what we need to do is craft language that specifically goes to the media that would spell out the uncertainties and refer them to the national authorities.”

The meeting’s final report is expected to include language on the media-contact issue that was drafted by McCreery. That report will be available around May 10.

The Associated Press -- ready to report the news

Today’s lunch with the Associated Press’s Honolulu bureau chief covered issues we’ve previously kicked around only in e-mail and phone calls. Dave Briscoe said the AP won’t be a party to an “official tsunami warning system,” and that’s understandable. The AP is a news-gathering organization, not a partner with government.

Briscoe affirmed the AP’s obvious role as a reporter and disseminator of news, and if McCreery’s Center wants to improve its communications links to the media for future tsunami warnings, the AP could only welcome the effort.

Chip McCreery: If you’re reading this, the number for the Honolulu AP bureau is 536-5510, but since he probably isn't, I’ll be in touch.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
April 26, 2005

Not Much Is Happening, but Stand By....

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (see March 26 posts)
It’s been eight days since this log’s latest post -- the longest gap since we started down this path in early January. Sometimes it’s best to just shut up and let events develop as they may. For example:

• Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Charles McCreery was due back in Hawaii today after attending meetings in Mauritius and Thailand. We’ve not yet connected, but I’m anxious to follow up on his e-mail (see April 14 post) and learn more about his colleagues’ reaction to the issues he raised last week at the tsunami warning conference.

• A NOAA representative e-mailed today that Admiral Lautenbacher’s office will get off a response soon to my letter that had about a dozen questions regarding NOAA’s communications protocols (April 8).

• Also percolating is a response to my previously unmentioned April 15 letter to Senator Daniel Inouye asking his position on the alleged prohibition on direct media contact by the Warning Center (March 31) and on recommended amendments to S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005 (February 12). Support by Hawaii’s senior senator will be crucial to changing communications procedures to include the international news media in sending tsunami warnings.

• About 170 Hawaii business leaders have been asked by letter to visit this blog and, if they agree that a bit more common sense is called for in how warnings are disseeminated, to write Senator Inouye noting their support. (No illusions here about how many will follow through, but maybe we'll get a few more pairs of eyes on this site, and that can't hurt.)

• The Associated Press's Honolulu bureau chief and I are having lunch next week to chew the fat.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

Breakthrough in Mauritius? McCreery Talks Up Media Involvement for Issuing Tsunami Warnings

•Status of letter to NOAA's Lautenbacher: Awaiting his response (see April 8 post)
•National Weather Service "won't allow" phone calls to media ( March 31 post)
•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center ( March 26 posts)
Could it be we’re actually getting somewhere?

Dr. Charles McCreery, director of the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, writes today from the Tsunami Warning Conference in Mauritius that he has introduced the idea of partnering with the media to issue tsunami warnings. As noted in numerous posts here, the media essentially are not in the loop under current communications protocols.

McCreery responded to an e-mail I sent earlier today asking if he still intended to raise the subject, as he indicated he would when we met on March 25 (see post immediately below). He said there has a been a cautious – but not negative – response from his colleagues. A representative from the World Meteorological Association reportedly said the agency has been working on this issue for years regarding major weather events and that tsunami scientists might benefit from their experience.

“Breakthrough” is too strong a word, but “progress” isn’t. Chip McCreery has made a move in Mauritius. He’ll have more to report either by e-mail or when he returns to Hawaii.

Postscript

We're about half-way through "Tsunami Awareness Month" in Hawaii, and the news media are pretty much ignoring it. They're also apparently ignoring the questions e-mailed to 28 Hawaii journalists, the answers to which would be helpful in understanding just how the PTWC sends its tsunami warnings to the media (see April 3 post).

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

New Month, New Meeting; Mauritius Conference Focuses on New Indian Ocean Warning System

•Status on letter to NOAA’s Lautenbacher: Awaiting his response (see April 8 post)
•National Weather Service “won’t allow” direct media contact (see March 31 post)
•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (see March 26 posts)

Mauritius (20º south, 57º east, some 500 miles east of Madagascar) is hosting the Second International Coordination Meeting for the Development of an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System on April 14-16. Numerous documents can be accessed here.

Among them is the 2nd Draft Edition of the Communications Plan for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, dated April 7, 2005. As with the 1st draft, which was completed just in time for the First International Coordination Meeting in March, this one was reviewed by Francois Schindele of France, chairman of the International Tsunami Information Center in Honolulu, and Dr. Laura Kong, its director.

A new reviewer this time is Dr. Charles McCreery, with whom I met on March 25 at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, where he is the director. I wrote about that visit in two posts on March 26.

McCreery told me then that although the member states in the tsunami warning network generally don’t want media transmission of tsunami warnings into their territory, he could raise the issue at the Mauritius meeting as a way to speed warnings to populations in peril. Now that he’s in Mauritius, I’ll send an e-mail to see if that’s still his intention.

A cursory reading of the 2nd Draft Edition of the Communications Plan unfortunately reveals no added emphasis on media notification. McCreery also told me on March 25 that the National Weather Service "won't allow" direct telephonic notification of the news media to issue tsunami warnings, an assertion that requires clarification.

My letter to Admiral Lautenbacher asks him to revoke such a prohibition if it exists, since it appears indefensible. He presumably holds the key to revising the PTWC’s communications protocols to use the international news media’s networks to speed tsunami warnings and save lives.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

NOAA's Lautenbacher Urged to Clarify Media Contact Policy & Revoke Any Existing Prohibitions

(see March 26 posts for report on a visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
The danger for one-topic web logs like this one is that they end up saying the same thing a couple hundred times, with variations here and there. The topic here concerns ensuring that the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center has common-sense media-contact policies that save lives, so I don't mind if you don't.

Here's the heart of the issue, as posted since March 26: Do policies actually exist that prohibit the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center from using the mass media to transmit urgent warnings to countries and populations thousands of miles away? Hard as it may be to believe, that's what I was told by the Center's director during my March 25 visit.

A list of questions prompted by that visit is now headed to NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr. Here's the letter:

Dear Admiral Lautenbacher:

On March 25 I visited the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center at the invitation of its director, Dr. Charles McCreery. I have been writing for the past three months (see web log address above) regarding the absence of a media strategy to issue a tsunami warning to the Indian Ocean region following the December earthquake.

I'm aware that the region is outside the Center's traditional area of responsibility; however, the tremendous loss of life seemingly calls for a policy review and change that would ensure the involvement of major international news media in the issuance of tsunami warnings to populations in peril many thousands of miles away.

Since news organizations such as the Associated Press, CNN, Reuters and the BBC have worldwide networks and are equipped to transmit information quickly, their involvement soon after the December earthquake quite likely could have alerted some Indian Ocean nations to the onrushing tsunami in time to save lives.

Dr. McCreery responded to my inquiries about the absence of a proactive media-contact strategy (i.e., no telephone calls with urgent messages) by saying the National Weather Service “won't allow” such contact. He said the Center would not want to exclude some media in making a limited number of calls. I did not argue the issue but could have noted that the media routinely engage in “pools” to cover events.

If a policy truly does exist that inhibits the rapid transmission of tsunami warnings using the news media, I urge you to personally revoke it. Dr. McCreery's assertion raises other questions about NOAA's media strategy and policies that have been asked by numerous sources since December, and I respectfully ask that your office address the following:

(see April 3 post for the questions)

You and I and everyone else concerned about tsunami warnings have the same goal - to save lives - yet nothing the PTWC knew or did in December achieved that goal. As I wrote in a letter to The Honolulu Advertiser published on December 30, the Indian Ocean tsunami deserves as much reflection as people of goodwill can possibly give it. To do anything less than an exhaustive after-action analysis would be both irresponsible and disrespectful to the dead.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

For Hawaii Tsunami Awareness Month, a List of Questions for Mainstream Media To Ask the PTWC

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Another consequence of the December tsunami will be greater awareness in Hawaii this April than in any previous annual observance of tsunami awareness month.

April would be an excellent time for the mainstream Honolulu news media to ask questions they’ve avoided until now about a critical and newsworthy issue – how the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center actually disseminates its warnings to distant imperiled populations.

The March 31 post to this web log has a list of questions that have been sent to NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher for a response. Why should the highest-ranking official at NOAA even bother with this list?

Because somebody has to explain the apparent existence of a policy that inhibits the dissemination of tsunami warnings to populations in peril.

According to PTWC Director Charles McCreery, his staff is “not allowed” by the National Weather Service to telephone the major news media when a tsunami is suspected. That’s a direct quote from my visit to the Center on March 25 (see March 26 posts to this blog). According to McCreery, the restriction stems from a belief that if you were to call some media, you’d have to call them all, which of course is not true.

Given the fact that the major international news media can pass on tsunami warnings to their broadcast and cablecast consumers faster than any telephone tree involving government agencies (which is what the PTWC used on March 28), the existence of this restriction is indefensible and requires examination.

The media can help the general understanding of how the PTWC operates by asking these questions. Since the whole point of a rapid tsunami warning capability is to save lives, the public deserves to know how the Center is pursuing that goal, which so obviously was not met in December.

The following questions are being sent to Honolulu reporters whose reporting responsibilities may present an opportunity to interview representatives of the PTWC:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• If the answer is "no", how does Dr. McCreery explain his March 25 assertion?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media? What specific channels are used and how do they operate?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them? (One local journalist in a position to know says PTWC bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the Associated Press's "state" wire, with no accompanying bells or whistles to alert newsrooms that they're there.)
• Is a formal review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Scientists didn’t transmit a bulletin about a presumed tsunami in December until 65 minutes after the earthquake; that lag time was shortened to 19 minutes on March 28. Is the shorter time the result of a policy change at NOAA, NWS and/or PTWC? Please explain.

It’s time for Honolulu reporters to step up and do more than ask for sound bites and quotes that satisfy not-so-inquiring editors but do little to promote understanding.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
April 3, 2005

Following Quake-Related Flurry, Attention Turns to NOAA and NWS Media-Contact Policy

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Media reports this week revealed heightened tsunami awareness in the Indian Ocean region. An Associated Press dispatch from Bangkok: “Within minutes of the earthquake, the word went out: Radio and television stations repeated government warnings, workers at beachfront hotels pounded on doors to awaken guests, and police used loudspeakers to urge residents away from the sea.”

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center reacted differently, too, as noted here in a March 28 post. Its first bulletin mentioned a possible tsunami just 19 minutes after the quake, or three-quarters of an hour quicker than in December. And judging from tons of media coverage, PTWC scientists were more successful this time in alerting colleagues and government agencies through e-mails and telephone calls.

This blog continues to speculate, though, about how the Center contacted the media on Monday. We have to speculate because we don’t know much about its media-contact protocols.

What we do know is remarkable

During my visit to the Center on March 25, Director Charles McCreery told me the National Weather Service “won’t allow” the Center to make telephone calls to the news media – i.e., no calls like the ones they made to their scientific colleagues in the region on Monday (see PTWC Visit, Part 2).

The reason, McCreery said, is that if you call some news media, you have to call them all. That reason won’t hold water, of course, and any competent news professional could map out a plan in minutes that would satisfy this alleged concern. The media “pool” their efforts all the time.

A policy that inhibits the transmission of tsunami warnings is indefensible. Maybe McCreery is misinformed or inadvertently misinformed me, but his assertion is on the table and must be addressed. Here are questions I’ve sent to a NOAA communications representative in Silver Springs, MD:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media for the stated reason or any other?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• Is there a review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them?

On second thought, these questions should be directed to NOAA's leadership. I'll route a letter to Admiral Lautenbacher through Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye's Washington office.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

PBS's "NOVA" Show Disappointing; Tsunami Program Offers More Hand-Wringing, Little Else

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
This was the depth of last night’s NOVA program -- “Wave that shook the world” -- about the December tsunami:

Near the end of the show a seismologist intoned that an effective tsunami warning system has three parts – buoys, public education and research. Buoys we understand, public education seems obvious enough and maybe so does research.

But where does the actual “warning” part fit in this list? Where’s the proactive effort that saves lives, the part missing on December 26?

I listened closely and took notes and don’t think I heard “news media” or “radio” or “television” mentioned once. Why? Because this was a show about and by scientists, and it’s obvious by now that the scientists who own the tsunami warning system don’t think the media have a role in the warning plan.

As for hand-wringing, we’ve seen it all before – the lack of Indian Ocean points of contact, nobody to call, nothing to do, we did all we could, etc. In light of 300,000 dead people in the region, this line is getting more than a little old. It appears a great deal of time has been spent on explaining why scientists couldn’t save lives on December 26, with little effort focused on what they might have done had a media plan been in place.

Again, the question must be asked: Where are NOAA's communications GS-whatevers and what are they doing to improve low-tech media-related tsunami warnings? If they have a work plan for improved communications, what is it, and how are they spending their time?

Which brings me to……

If the Media Are Great at Telling PTWC's Story, Can't They Do the Same for Tsunami Warnings?

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center’s response to Monday’s earthquake was much better than in December. Just ask the staff.

Reporters did ask, and the results are on hundreds of Internet news sites.

Not to be too cynical about it, but if the media can be used to transmit PTWC’s story all over the world, shouldn’t they have a role in transmitting tsunami warnings, too? Can it be, as suggested by the Center's director last week (see March 26 posts), that the PTWC is prohibited from engaging the media more energetically? It seems implausible, but that's what he said...and it's a subject worthy of follow-up with NOAA and the National Weather Service.

The PTWC may believe the system worked better this week, but there are still gaps in getting the information to the ultimate consumers – men, women and children on the ground. The Christian Science Monitor’s on-line story today makes that clear:

“Among the countries with quicker responses were Thailand and Sri Lanka. Thai police with loudspeakers fanned out to order thousands of residents and tourists to evacuate. Slower on the draw were India and Indonesia. India's tsunami warning came at 11:30 p.m., nearly two hours after the quake. In Indonesia, thousands of coastal residents didn't wait for government warnings. They felt the quake and fled.”

Two-hour delay? The news media can move tsunami alerts and advisories to radio and television stations in affected countries within minutes. The story also describes the success of “low-tech” methods in Phuket, Thailand. “People were telling each other and banging on doors…. It worked pretty well, even though the warning system isn’t in place yet,” said a newspaper editor.

Here’s a simple communications model: PTWC contacts Media Agencies which transmit to their Broadcast Clients which broadcast to the Public. That might take 15 minutes at most.

NOAA’s communications professionals – who are doing a good job polishing PTWC’s image – would presumably do an equally fine job creating communications plans built around that model.

Aftershock – A Sea of Bafflement

Judging from on-line stories filed since Monday’s earthquake, a major media theme is the bafflement, puzzlement and amazement of scientists that the quake didn’t generate a tsunami.

Anyone who has watched more than a few hours of the Science Channel might be amazed at their amazement. Even lay people know horizontal shifts in the earth’s plates or quakes deep in the mantel -- as NOVA reported Tuesday night -- might not trigger tsunamis.

More to the point, scientists freely acknowledged this week that earthquakes of 8.0 magnitude or more usually generate major tsunamis. Their each and every quote keeps alive questions about why that general understanding didn’t immediately trigger a tsunami alert in December, why it took 65 minutes for a bulletin to mention the possible tsunami for the first time.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 30, 2005

Q: To Contact a Fishing Village, What’s Faster – an E-mail to an Official or a Radio Broadcast?

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Yesterday’s earthquake produced no killer tsunami, but it could have reinforced a mindset among Pacific Tsunami Warning Center scientists that may impede the flow of information to distant populations.

The big story today coming out of the PTWC is that it was perfectly able to communicate with the Indian Ocean region. The Honolulu Advertiser’s story quotes a geophysicist:

“We had phone numbers and we had e-mail addresses from places that had contacted us after the big December earthquake so we had lots of numbers. This time around we had people to contact and we called everybody very quickly. Instead of having no one to talk to we had lots of people to talk to.”

But if the whole point of the communications effort is to inform potentially endangered people and save their lives, how sensible is it to rely exclusively on intermediaries in the system without also using the mass media?
A Honolulu Star-Bulletin story quotes PTWC Director Charles McCreery as saying the Center had more success in communicating with the Indian Ocean region after Monday's quake than it did in December "...so they can take some action and get people out of harm's way."

A suggestion for the mainstream media: Ask authorities in the region how or if they did that. How many of the e-mails carrying the PTWC’s first bulletin at 11:29 p.m. local time in the region were read at that hour? How many phone calls got through to their intended targets around midnight? And if they did get through, what did those recipients do with the information at that hour – sit on it or pass it on? And if they passed it on, how long did that take, what form did it take and was the information useful to individual citizens?

Asking the “What If?” Question

There was no tsunami of consequence, but what if there had been? Would populations at risk have been alerted to their peril at midnight? What systems were in place for those recipient agencies to communicate to the ultimate consumers of the PTWC’s information?

This may be at the heart of the matter: If you ask the PTWC who it serves, the first answer is the Member States in the Pacific Tsunami Warning System. Since December 26 there’s been a grudging acknowledgement that although it’s not the PTWC’s job to alert “outside” nations, they also can benefit from PTWC-generated information.

But judging by PTWC officials’ comments, that’s where it stops. They don’t see the individual in the seaside village as a link in the official communications chain. And that’s why early involvement of the international news media doesn’t have much of a priority within NOAA.

The mass media must be engaged early to ensure that life-saving information can flow throughout a threatened region no matter what happens in government agencies there. The danger is that the apparent satisfaction that all went well on March 28 may delay the PTWC's stated intention to open a dialogue with the media (see March 26 posts).

Aftershocks

Each one of these incidents prompts questions that deserve downstream attention by mainstream media. For example:

PTWC Director McCreery expresses surprise in the Advertiser article that Monday’s 8.7 earthquake didn’t generate a tsunami because, he is paraphrased as saying, earthquakes 8.0 and stronger usually generate major tsunamis.

But three months ago this expectation about 8.0 and higher earthquakes seems to have been absent. NOAA’s timeline for the December 26 earthquake says that 11 minutes after the initial shock the PTWC “initially underestimated the size as around a magnitude 8.0.” Yet no mention was made of a possible tsunami until 65 minutes after the quake, and scientists were quoted repeatedly saying they first learned of the tsunami from news reports.

Why did scientists wait 54 minutes before transmitting their presumed expectation of a tsunami in a bulletin? Has the PTWC adjusted its procedures since December? What other adjustments have been made in the Center’s standard operating procedures?

The Advertiser story reinforces the widespread notion that PTWC scientists telephoned their colleagues even before the December tsunami reached some countries in the Indian Ocean region:

When the earthquake struck on Dec. 26, the warning center staff said it frantically tried to contact Indian Ocean nations of a potential disaster. But with only two clients in the Indian Ocean – Australia and Indonesia – and no contact list, valuable time was lost. They worked for hours, sounding warnings as the tsunami swept across the vast ocean basin with deadly results.

Here again is the description of scientists who suspected a tsunami unsuccessfully trying to contact people in the region before the tsunami arrived.

PTWC Director Charles McCreery adamantly disputed a similar point I made during my March 25 visit to the PTWC (March 26 posts). Are all these reporters making it up? Not likely. Are they relying on a new “urban legend” about the the December tsunami? Maybe so, but to fully understand the recent past, the issue deserves to be clarified and resolved.

Yesterday’s earthquake thankfully did not generate a tsunami and it hopefully did not sweep away questions that must be answered about the PTWC’s communications readiness.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 29, 2005

Today's Quake Was Predicted 2 Weeks Ago

Seismologists are getting better at calling their shots:

Paris (March 16) - Seismologists say there is a heightened risk that a major earthquake may soon strike the western coast of Sumatra as a result of the monster quake that generated the December 26 tsunami. The Indonesian city of Bandar Aceh, which was already badly hit by the killer wave, could be at risk from a quake measuring up to 7.5 on the Richter scale and there is a potential for a tsunami-making 8.5 quake offshore, they warn.

Now that he has our attention, Professor John McCloskey is saying today another massive quake is to be expected in the region.

Today’s Earthquake – A Chance to See What Changes, if Any, Have Been Made Since December

The Indian Ocean has now had two 8.7 or higher earthquakes in the past three months. It’s only natural to ask whether procedures to warn the region of a potential tsunami were different for today’s quake than they were in December.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center's first mention of a possible tsunami today was contained in its first bulletin, issued just 19 minutes after the earthquake. First mention of a possible tsunami in December didn't occur until one hour and five minutes after the triggering quake. (See this UPI report for a similar comparison.)

The much earlier warning is evidence of shifts in emphasis and perhaps policy within NOAA. What else has changed? With my PTWC visit as background (see the March 26 post), here are questions I’d like to ask its director, Dr. Charles McCreery:

• In addition to the earlier mention today of the tsunami potential, were there any other changes in the NOAA and PTWC warning protocols in effect for today's earthquake?
• What message about today's quake was sent to the news media and in what form? How long did it take for this product to be transmitted to the media? What's the media contact list?
• Was Tsunami Bulletin Number 001, issued at 6:29 a.m. HST, the primary message intended for the media? (See below)
• The warning contained in Bulletin Number 001 (emphasis added below) wasn't given much prominence; in newsroom terms, it was “buried” inside the bulletin. Was any other message sent to the media that accentuated the warning about a potential tsunami?
• What communication channels exist or have been established recently to facilitate messages from the Indian Ocean region back to the PTWC?
• If a meteorological agency in the region knows a tsunami has been created, does the PTWC receive a message from that agency – by telephone, e-mail, fax or other means?
• If such a message were received, how would the PTWC react? Would it relay that information to other agencies, to the news media, to anyone?

Today’s first bulletin was issued 19 minutes after the earthquake:

TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 1629Z 28 MAR 2005

THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.

... TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN ...

THIS MESSAGE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE IS NO TSUNAMI WARNING OR WATCH IN EFFECT.

AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS

ORIGIN TIME - 1610Z 28 MAR 2005
COORDINATES - 2.3 NORTH 97.1 EAST
LOCATION - NORTHERN SUMATERA INDONESIA
MAGNITUDE - 8.5

EVALUATION

THIS EARTHQUAKE IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC. NO TSUNAMI THREAT EXISTS TO COASTLINES IN THE PACIFIC.

WARNING... THIS EARTHQUAKE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE A WIDELY DESTRUCTIVE TSUNAMI IN THE OCEAN OR SEAS NEAR THE EARTHQUAKE. AUTHORITIES IN THOSE REGIONS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS ACTION SHOULD INCLUDE EVACUATION OF COASTS WITHIN A THOUSAND KILOMETERS OF THE EPICENTER AND CLOSE MONITORING TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR EVACUATION FURTHER AWAY.

THIS CENTER DOES NOT HAVE SEA LEVEL GAUGES OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC SO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DETECT OR MEASURE A TSUNAMI IF ONE WAS GENERATED. AUTHORITIES CAN ASSUME THE DANGER HAS PASSED IF NO TSUNAMI WAVES ARE OBSERVED IN THE REGION NEAR THE EPICENTER WITHIN THREE HOURS OF THE EARTHQUAKE.

THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.

PTWC Visit (Part 1): Understanding the Mission, Agreeing to Disagree

My visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center came off as planned yesterday, the three-month anniversary of the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami. Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, and I talked for two hours and noted at the midpoint that the earthquake had struck at 2:59 HST. McCreery is an effective representative – and sometimes defender – of the PTWC and its procedures, but I came away thinking he is open to improving tsunami alert procedures. It may be a slow process, because some of his comments suggest the PTWC’s collective hands are tied due to policies imposed by superior organizations.

I spent a fair amount of time on the basic premise of this web log – that although PTWC scientists suspected a potentially killer tsunami, there was no mechanism in place to issue a warning directly to people in harm’s way; by extension, 300,000 people died. He made two primary points: 1) the PTWC provides advice but isn’t in a position to know what’s really happening out there in the world. “We have no magic here,” he said. They do their best to interpret, but it’s really an imprecise science when it comes to tsunamis; and 2) it’s not even the PTWC’s responsibility to be watchdog for the whole world. They have neither the resources nor the capability to alert the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. My main point, of course, is that media notification, had it been pre-coordinated, could have been the channel for a warning to the region. Another point is, if not the PTWC, who? The world looks to the building we were sitting in as the leader in tsunami warning capability. As he noted (below), the rest of the world may not be eager for a bigger U.S. role, notwithstanding the PTWC’s expertise.

What Did They Know, When Did They Know It?

McCreery flatly disputed my assertion (made yesterday and throughout the past three months on this log) that PTWC scientists called colleagues in the region before the waves struck Sri Lanka, India and points further west. I told him that was the obvious inference to be made from numerous interviews they’ve given to media all over the world, and I recalled some of the reports.

The very first story that caught my attention in this regard was in the December 29 Honolulu Advertiser; it prompted my initial letter to the editor the next day, leading a few days later to creation of this log. The reporter wrote that PTWC scientists “frantically worked the phones…trying largely in vain to warn Indian Ocean nations of the incoming tsunami disaster.” The most striking description of the scientists’ actions that I’ve found was in the lead of a Chicago Tribune story (posted on January 14): “With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach.”

The clear implication is that they did know enough to start making phone calls, but to the wrong people, in my view. McCreery essentially said all these inferences by the media were wrong. He said he constantly is asked by reporters about this alleged “failure” to send a warning, and he says he always straightens them out.

But consider NOAA spokesperson Delores Clark’s comments reported by UPI Pentagon correspondent Pamela Hess and linked from my January 8 post: "The watch standers first learned of the tsunami through the media almost four hours after the earthquake.” (That was Clark’s quote in January and that’s McCreery’s assertion today, but according to NOAA’s timeline, scientists first mentioned the possibility of a tsunami in a bulletin 65 minutes after the earthquake and 41 minutes before the waves arrived in Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. More telling is the continuation of Clark’s statement.) “Following the realization that a massive tsunami had been generated, they did the best job they could to contact authorities. But they were fixed on reaching agencies that have responsibilities for warning such as weather offices or disaster management offices."

NPR’s Christopher Joyce’s report for “Morning Edition” on December 28 included the following: “Other U.S. scientists who monitor earthquakes say when they realized how big the quake really was there was no clear way to get the information to authorities who might have been able to warn people in time." One of his sources said on tape: "There was knowledge that a tsunami was being generated and that information was available, but the problem we ran into was that there were not appropriate agencies in places like India and in Somalia on the East and the Horn of Africa region. There was no system set up by which we could take that information and translate it into actions that the public could react to."

Over and over again scientists have been quoted in apparent exasperation at their inability to translate what they knew or suspected into a usable warning before the waves struck because no system existed to alert the Indian Ocean. I, of course, said the media represent that system and recalled another Delores Clark quote from the UPI story: “Not only was the center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list of media contacts.”

Continued.....

PTWC Visit (Part 2): Identifying Areas for Change, Starting with Policy

Reacting to my repeated assertions about the importance of contacting the media, McCreery made one of his more notable comments: The National Weather Service (NWS) won’t allow the PTWC to call the media; the media have to come to the PTWC. This policy apparently is based on a concern at NWS and NOAA that if the PTWC calls some media, it would have to call them all. So right there is a major policy problem. The PTWC is prohibited by the NWS and possibly NOAA from using the news media as an improved warning channel over what exists today.

That policy needs focus and change. I put it to him: If tomorrow the PTWC detected a 9.5 earthquake in a subduction zone region of the Indian Ocean that assuredly had generated a tsunami, would the PTWC do anything different than what it did on December 25 HST? I.E., have lessons been learned? Are media notification protocols being rewritten? What are NOAA’s communications professionals doing to ensure lives are saved after tomorrow’s earthquake because of what the PTWC knows and does?

Maybe he was just wearing down after nearly two hours along this line, but McCreery started making observations that were encouraging. Without putting him on the spot here in this web log, I think McCreery sees the appropriateness of attempting to warn people when the PTWC detects an imminent danger.

I read him a quote from the Communiqué of the early-March conference in Paris on the establishment of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean region – “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;” – and asked McCreery what that means to him. He said the so-called Member States don’t want evacuations within their territories without first having an ability to evaluate a warning from the PTWC or any other source. That’s understandable, but doesn’t this requirement to receive and evaluate warning information simply delay transmission to coastline inhabitants? Couldn’t McCreery raise the implications of the Communiqué at the next planning meeting in Mauritius in April?

McCreery said he indeed could raise the issue and ask the Member States’ representatives what they could live with in the way of alerts from sources such as the Associated Press, CNN, etc., coming into their territories. That truly is encouraging, as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission -- the United Nations agency coordinating the new tsunami warning effort -- may not deal with the media-notification issue without prompting from someone like McCreery.

We talked about the problem of reaching out to the news media efficiently. Telephonic contact seems unlikely due to the PTWC’s workload, staffing level and the great number of media that logically would need to be reached. McCreery noted that electronic messages are sent routinely to the media about earthquakes and potential tsunamis within the Pacific, so he feels the media already are covered. I told him that the media may receive dozens of such messages a day, so a truly urgent message would need to stand out. Also, a message intended for the Indian Ocean region that requires immediate attention might well be lost in the chatter, which is why I’ve been fixated on telephone contact.

McCreery then asked whether there’s a better way to issue a warning for a tsunami or earthquake outside the PTWC’s priority area. On his own he suggested that perhaps a special electronic product could be created and coordinated with the media – a product that would be used only in extraordinary circumstances to cover situations that aren’t within the PTWC’s normal area of responsibility, such as the Indian Ocean.

The Bottom Line

McCreery seems willing to consider improvements in the warning protocols. When it was put to him that maintaining the status quo in alert procedures would be inconceivable in light of 300,000 deaths in December, he agreed. He asked for the number of the Associated Press’s Honolulu bureau and apparently intends to make at least an initial introductory call that we’ve been urging for several weeks. Contact with CNN for preliminary discussions also seems likely.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 26, 2005

The "Control" Issue May Be Biggest Obstacle

In less than two hours I'll ask Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Dr. Charles McCreery about several fundamental aspects of the tsunami warning issue. One of them is the issue of "control."

Dr. McCreery attended the Paris meeting described in the March 23 post; a report on the meeting linked here contains the following paragraph in the Communique section:

11. Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories;

The wording is murky. Does "should have the responsibility to have control" mean "should control", or does it mean something else? Whatever it means, "control" is probably what it's all about.

How can a global tsunami warning issued by one or more international news organizations coexist with this agreed-to control provision of the Communique? Maybe it can't. Maybe the ability to issue an ocean-wide warning minutes after a tsunami is suspected is undercut by the requirement for Member States "to have control over the issuance of warning (sic) within their respective territories."

If that were the case, "control" would seem to trump "effectiveness." Let's hope my visit to the Center today -- exactly three months to the minute after the Indonesia earthquake and resulting tsunami -- dispells that notion.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 25, 2005

Fly in the Ointment: Tsunami Warning Centers Have No Role in Contacting the News Media

Scores of tsunami and crisis management experts gathered early this month in Paris for a conference on creating a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean region. Buried in the conference report is a description of how tsunami warnings are to be issued – a protocol that this web log believes does not improve on the ineffective warning procedures that were used on December 26.

The International Coordination Meeting for the Development of a Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for the Indian Ocean within a Global Framework has made its report on the March 3-8 conference available here. Page 43 of the PDF document (#37 in the report itself) makes a statement about the issuance of tsunami warnings that runs 180 degrees counter to the thrust of this web log (emphasis added):

“Tsunami Warning Centres issue warnings based on scientific information, but do not provide instructions to the public for action. This is the responsibility of NDMO (each nation's National Disaster Management focal point/Organization). The NDMO must be able to interpret the warning information to provide clear, simple, and concise instructions to first responders and the affected public. Recipients of warning information include policy and decision-makers, emergency management and emergency responders, media, and the affected public….”

In other words, tsunami instructions/information for the general public must come from an agency within each country that receives the tsunami center’s warning.

Let’s leave that alone for a minute and jump to how the media are treated in this report. Page 15 of the PDF (#9 in the report) states:

“The mass media have a crucial role in assuring wide and effective warning dissemination and awareness raising. Education and training for the media is required….” (The authors must have liked that sentence so much they included it twice, one sentence after the other.)

So while the mass media are considered crucial in disseminating urgent warnings to mass audiences, the tsunami warning centers “do not provide instructions to the public for action.” Information about an approaching tsunami must come from another agency down the communications chain.

In the Indian Ocean region, that means 27 NDMOs will be critical links in that chain in transmitting tsunami information to the hundreds of millions of people living near the ocean in those countries.

There’s a Better Way

As this blog has consistently advised, the international news media should be contacted by warning centers as soon as the centers suspect a tsunami has been generated. One call to the Associated Press and/or CNN – authenticated for trustworthiness – could result in the dissemination of a tsunami warning over international electronic networks and radio broadcasts to distant populations WITHIN MINUTES!

Contrast that speed with the mish-mash of warnings that likely would emanate from 27 disparate nations around the Indian Ocean – from Australia to Yemen, with Madagascar, Mauritius and Myanmar in between.

A Visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center

I intend to press this point when I visit the Center on March 25 at the invitation of Dr. Charles McCreery. His graciousness in light of the criticism his Center has received from some quarters (particularly the lawsuit's attorneys) over the past three months is appreciated. I hope one outcome of our conversation will be a dialogue between the Center and the Associated Press office here on how best to transmit a warning through the AP’s globe-circling network.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 23, 2005

Suggested Call for Pacific Tsunami Warning Center: 808-536-5510

Three months after the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami, events have settled into a predictable pattern.

Indian Ocean governments have vowed to establish a high-tech tsunami warning system, which was not in place when approximately 300,000 people died on December 26.

Scores of tsunami, meteorological and all sorts of other experts have met in Tokyo, Bangkok, Paris, Moscow and Jakarta and soon will convene in Italy, India and Mauritius for tsunami-related conferences.

The news media have written X number of words about those conferences and 1 million times X about the tsunami itself, with X being a number too high to contemplate.

Some of those words were about the lawsuit filed on March 4 on behalf of tsunami victims. The media will write even more words about that lawsuit regardless of whether it progresses or is tossed out. It represents conflict, and that surely is news.

Comparatively speaking, though, the media haven’t written much about the general focus of this web log – the advisability of integrating direct telephonic media contact into the tsunami warning protocols of NOAA agencies, particularly the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii.

Frankly, I’ve not done a particularly good job of pressing the issue with either the PTWC or the media. Yes, I had a few contacts with the Associated Press, which seems to me, at least, to be a major link in distributing time-sensitive tsunami warnings to communities thousands of miles away. I’ve had a couple telephone calls with someone at CNN International, but I’ve yet to talk with a decision-maker there.

And I’ve exchanged some phone calls and e-mails with Dr. Charles McCreery, the PTWC’s director, who has been attending several of the aforementioned international conferences. Dr. McCreery was in Indonesia last week but is expected back in Honolulu this week.

And that brings me back to the telephone number shown above. It’s for the AP’s Honolulu bureau. Dr. McCreery should dial that number soon and talk with bureau chief Dave Briscoe.

They both know the subject of that call: What is the fastest and most efficient way for PTWC scientists to issue a usable warning to the AP for eventual transmission to endangered regions of the world when a tsunami is suspected?

I.E., what phone number in which AP office should the PTWC’s scientists call to alert the world the next time a tsunami-generating 9.2 earthquake cracks the planet?

Mr. Briscoe and the Associated Press needn’t worry the AP will be helping “make the news” by taking that call and providing the requested information. The agency already tells the general public the number to call with news tips. The only difference is that this number wouldn’t be published in a directory available to the public. There’s precedent for the news media to give “insider” information such as unpublished telephone numbers to personnel who have messages they need to communicate urgently to the media.

This call should happen soon, because it apparently didn’t happen at any time before December 26. It needs to happen so attorneys like Edward Fagan don’t file lawsuits the next time a warning fails to arrive on distant beaches before a tsunami does.

The stage is set for this call. With Dr. McCreery back in town and Mr. Briscoe anticipating it, let’s hope it happens this week.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 20, 2005

Sri Lanka Offers ‘Lessons Learned’ Advice on Using The Media; NOAA, Are You Taking Notice?

The world would do well pay attention to the "lessons learned" advice coming from Indian Ocean region countries hit by the December 26 tsunami. As much as western nations want to prevent future tragedies on this scale, these nations want it more.

In Sri Lanka, for example, more than 30,000 people died and one million were left homeless in a population of 19 million. A web site maintained by LIRNE.NET, the Learning Initiatives on Reforms for Network Economies in Sri Lanka, asks: “Could the tsunami have been avoided? No. Could this extent of human loss have been avoided? Yes.”

LIRNE.NET says casualties could be limited with a society-wide reform of Sri Lanka’s emergency preparedness system, including communications:

“Public warning is a system, not a technology. The identification, detection and risk assessment of a hazard, the accurate identification of the vulnerability of a population at risk and finally the communication of information to the vulnerable population about the threat in sufficient time and clarity so that they take action to avert negative consequences constitute the system of public warning. Warning allows people to act in order to prevent hazards from becoming disasters. Effective public warning saves lives, reduces economic loss, reduces trauma and disruption in society and instills confidence and a sense of security in the public. It is an important component of the foundation of a sound economy.” (emphasis added)

Here’s what LIRNE.NET says about the integration of the broadcast media into the warning network – something this web log has advocated since January 2:

“The telecommunications and electronic broadcasting industries play crucial roles in the effective dissemination of warnings. Action to ensure optimal contributions from the telecommunications network of networks should be ensured through the collective efforts of the operators, facilitated by the regulator. Government should also work collaboratively with the electronic broadcasting industry to ensure effective contributions to early warning at national and local levels.”

Good observations from people who paid too high a price for a communications breakdown on December 26. If NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center have done a similar review to improve tsunami warnings through media contacts, we haven't yet found it and certainly look forward to reading it.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 15, 2005

Lawsuit Turns Spotlight on Officials' Rationale for Why No Effective Tsunami Warning Was Issued

The tsunami victims’ lawsuit filed on March 4 (reported today for the first time in The Honolulu Advertiser) seems destined to use U.S. officials’ own words against them. They can be found in hundreds, if not thousands, of web postings.

Here, for example, an Associated Press story quotes NOAA Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher: “Folks out there (at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) tried to contact people that they thought would be interested….” But they didn’t try to contact the news media.

Here, one of those scientists is quoted: “At the time, given what I knew, there wasn’t a system in place to save these people and I feel very, very bad.” He refers to the lack of a high-tech system in the Indian Ocean, but there also was no low-tech system in place in Hawaii to alert the media that a devasting tsunami probably had been generated.

And here, a professor from Sri Lanka reports on his visit to the Island of Hawaii’s Emergency Operations Center: “They are engaged in a polite exchange with (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) about the timing of the release of disaster information: if CNN carries the story before their phone tree is activated, they get a busy tone which bothers them. I tell them it’s possible to give them priority numbers so their calls will go through. But they are not too keen about shedding ordinary people from the phone system.” Professor Rohan Samarajiva’s report hints at inefficiencies even inside the Hawaii emergency agency network.

Professor Samarajiva concludes his column with excellent post-tsunami advice for Sri Lanka that is equally applicable everywhere in the tsunami warning network:

“The core business of government is safeguarding the lives of its citizens; Let us train the people in the Railway Department to stop the trains going on the coastal lines when a tsunami warning is out; Let us train the Navy to communicate facts like massive waves battering the East Coast to the media; Let us train the staff of the Meteorological Department (with four alumni of the Bangkok course) and the National Disaster Management Centre (three trained, including Director, now retired) to wear pagers on holidays.

“And let’s make sure that the people who go to the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center actually attend the lectures and not go shopping or whatever else they do in Bangkok. And more than anything else, let’s make sure we have the right kind of organization to keep watch on behalf of our citizens; keep watch not only against tsunamis, but also against cyclones and flash floods and land slides and all the other hazards that turn into massive disasters in this little country. So the next time we’ll be ready and we’ll save ourselves and our children, despite the politicians who say that Sri Lanka had no reason to be prepared having only a few droughts as disasters. We need disaster education for politicians too. That might be the hardest task of all.”

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 13, 2005

Senate Panel OKs Tsunami Alert Bill; News Media Start to Notice the Tsunami Victims' Lawsuit

Backed by two of the U.S. Senate’s more influential members, S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act, was approved by the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation this week. Chair Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Ranking Member Dan Inouye (D-Hawaii) are co-sponsors.

The improvement to the bill suggested here in a February 12 post isn’t included in the bill as currently written. According to Senator Inouye’s office, he won’t make changes to the bill until mark-up. One can still hope the final version will include early news media notification among the methods to issue tsunami warnings that are specifically mentioned in the legislation.

It’s a tad after the fact, but the Honolulu news media are starting to cover the lawsuit brought by victims of the December 26 tsunami against the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration and its Honolulu-based Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. The Honolulu Star-Bulletins story today doesn’t give the filing date, which was eight days ago.

Harvard Law School student Daniel Lyons has penned a column denouncing the lawsuit that so far has appeared in The Baltimore Sun, The Houston Chronicle and perhaps other papers. Whatever one's take on the suit, it's going to keep the focus on the Warning Center and presumably will at least moderately interest the Honolulu media.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 12, 2005

Paris Meeting Agrees on Tsunami Warning Net; Elsewhere, Ed Fagan and Friends File Lawsuit

Two news items have hit nearly simultaneously about events that will ripple across the network of tsunami-related agencies for months and years to come.

The Paris conference sponsored by the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission ended with a plan to create a tsunami warning network in the Indian Ocean region. An Agence France-Press story details the timetable to put the system in place by the end of 2006 (see the meeting's Communique).

And then there's the lawsuit that attorney Ed Fagan and associates publicized in mid-February at a Vienna, Austria press conference. He finally filed it in New York on March 4 and named the Thai government, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii among the defendants. The New York Post has dubbed the case $UE-NAMI.

The goal of this web log has never been to nail someone's hide to the wall, as Mr. Fagan appears intent on doing. Rather, we've sought to establish the importance of contacting the news media with tsunami warnings as quickly as possible after a tsunami has been detected. Mr. Fagan's lawsuit may ultimately prove more effective in driving home that concept within NOAA than anything written here.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 8, 2005

Tsunami Crisis Communications Plan Located; Too Bad It Ignores Contacting the International Media

On January 3 this web log asked, “What’s in the Communications Plan?” at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. Now, we know.

A draft version of what appears to be the new “Communications Plan for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System (2005 edition)” can be downloaded as a PDF on the web site for a meeting now under way in Paris. This plan was made available to officials attending the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) meeting on creating tsunami warning and mitigation systems for the Indian Ocean (see text of e-mail to attendees, below).

The draft notes it was reviewed just four days ago by Francois Schindele of France, chairman of the International Tsunami Information Center in Honolulu, and Dr. Laura Kong, its director. It would seem to be the definitive word on how to get the word out about a tsunami.

So what's the plan for contacting the news media to issue urgent warnings?

The plan doesn’t say.

With two months hindsight on how the media were not contacted on December 26 and speculation that doing so might have saved tens of thousands of lives in the Indian Ocean region, this new draft ignores media notification with one minor exception.

The only reference in the entire plan to news media notification is within the context of what a “dissemination agency” should do – i.e., what the agencies of member governments should do when they receive tsunami watch or warning information from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:

“Tsunami Watch and Warning information may be passed (depending on the time and facilities available) to the coastal population by any or all of the following methods: radio, television, sirens, bells, whistles, warning flags, mobile loud speakers, and personal contact.”

That’s all there is on using the media to communicate life-saving messages to populations in danger; the plan leaves that function up to “disseminating agencies” of member governments. Nowhere does it suggest or outline procedures for the Warning Center itself to contact the media and thereby shave previous minutes off the notification time.

It looks as if it's going to be a “long, hard slog” to get international tsunami experts to agree that immediate telephonic contact with the major international news media has a crucial place in the crisis communications plan.

Message to IOC Attendees in Paris

The following e-mail was sent on March 3 to more than 140 IOC officials who are included on the IOC Action Addresses list available at the web page linked above:

Ladies and Gentlemen, many of you are attending the International Coordination Meeting for the Development of Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Systems for the Indian Ocean in Paris. The rest of you share the goal of mitigating the loss of life in future tsunamis through the creation of effective warning systems.

Much of your deliberation naturally will involve high-tech solutions, but I urge you to not lose sight of the importance of low-tech media notification in sending useable warnings to populations at risk. As a private citizen living in Hawaii, I have maintained a web log since January 2 on this critical -- but overlooked — communications channel.

Based on media reports, it would appear nearly all tsunami experts are focused on technology-oriented solutions to the warning problem. Certainly they must be implemented, but you are encouraged also to consider how effective a simple yet timely telephone call can be when made to major news organizations, such as the Associated Press, Reuters and CNN. Thorough coordination with the media is necessary, of course.

I hope that even a small percentage of the people who receive this e-mail will take time to read some of my web log (below) and then include low-tech media notification in your plans. A great number of lives might have been saved in the Indian Ocean region if a warning had been disseminated in this fashion.

Sincerely,

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 6, 2005

Paris Conference Begins; Will Media Be in Plans?

The world’s leading tsunami experts are in Paris for a week of meetings on creating a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean. A USA Today story on the conference paraphrases Patricio Bernal, executive secretary of the U.N. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission:

“Simple cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26, Bernal says.”

As Dr. Jerry Comcowich of the University of Hawaii said after reading this story: “Why can’t these people see that the media and especially radio are the best way to communicate tsunami warnings?”

We’ve been asking the same question for two months.

Associated Press's Senior News Executive Writes

Kathleen Carroll, executive editor of the Associated Press, responded to an e-mail I sent her yesterday with the same points made earlier in my e-mail to the David Briscoe, the AP’s Honolulu bureau chief. She said she had nothing more to add to Briscoe’s response on behalf of the AP regarding the suggestion the news cooperative could play a role in transmitting life-saving warnings about future tsunamis (see yesterday’s post).

I responded to Ms. Carroll and thanked her for her tacit reaffirmation that the AP is willing to provide information to U.S. government agencies that would facilitate warnings. My e-mail continued:

Since the AP’s Honolulu bureau is not manned 24/7 and since a tsunami could be detected in the office’s down time, one must conclude that there needs to be some higher level of coordination with the AP than the Honolulu office — perhaps with New York or a West Coast bureau that is manned around the clock and that has key decision-making authority to move bulletins on your primary wire.

I hope I’m wrong in having the impression that the AP seems needlessly stand-offish on this matter. Perhaps it’s because, as Briscoe suggested, news people don’t want to be seen as “making the news”. As a former reporter, I understand that, but it would be helpful if the AP appeared even slightly more interested than it presently does in facilitating communications channels that could save many many lives. Just today in USA Today a UN official is paraphrased as saying “simple warning cards telling people to move to high ground after an earthquake would have saved thousands of lives Dec. 26.” So would have radio bulletins and cable TV bulletins carrying information transmitted by the Associated Press.

It would be no violation of journalism ethics if the AP were to clarify for NOAA and the PTWC how they can best communicate their emergency messages to your organization. If you agree, perhaps you could help ensure that when Dr. McCreery does call or write your Honolulu office, he will be given information that will result in truly effective means for him and his scientists to contact your news agency at an appropriate level when minutes count.

That’s all I’m trying to accomplish. As the UN official said, thousands of people died — maybe tens of thousands — because an effective warning wasn’t given to the region. How can any of us be complacent knowing the news media have the ability to send information around the world at lightning speed?

Aloha, Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 3, 2005

AP's Cautious Response Opens Door for Improved Tsunami Warning Procedures

It’s not a ringing statement and it’s not in writing, but at least we have the Associated Press’s official response to the view it has a role in helping save lives in future tsunami emergencies.

As noted in the February 27 post, AP’s Corporate Communications office bucked the issue back to David Briscoe, the AP bureau chief in Honolulu. After giving him a couple days to respond to my e-mail, I called him today after correctly concluding the agency didn’t intend to put its response in writing.

Here’s Briscoe’s spoken statement on behalf of the Associated Press:

“The official position of the Associated Press is that it’s the responsibility of government to devise the best warning systems for natural disasters, and it’s our job to report the news – including news of impending disasters – in as timely and accurate a manner as possible.”

Briscoe said the AP’s statement “doesn’t really go any further than that.” Unofficially, though, Briscoe made it clear the agency will provide information to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its Pacific Tsunami Warning Center that could help facilitate future warnings.

“We want to open as many channels as possible to disseminate news. There’d still a matter of judgment of what’s put on the wire and what’s not…. We’d want to disseminate news (about a tsunami) as far as we could. That represents a problem. Don’t overestimate the reach of any news agency. We have members and subscribers all over the world but don’t have them on every shore.”

This whole issue was prompted by the fact that an effective warning reached no shores around the Indian Ocean region on Decembeer 26. We can only do what we can do, and it’s encouraging that the AP is willing to provide information to NOAA and the PTWC on how to enhance transmission of tsunami warning messages to the agency.

That said, you have to wonder whether AP executives are a wee bit too focused on (drum roll, please) JOURNALISM ETHICS when what we're talking about is simple proactive engagement by a news organization in ways that quite easily could save lives.

Next Step: Encourage the PTWC to Call the Associated Press

The AP’s door is open. NOAA and the PTWC have to go through it. I’ll write Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, suggesting he make a formal request to David Briscoe here in Honolulu for guidance on how to contact the agency in a future tsunami emergency. And although the Honolulu bureau if only a few miles from the Center, the best contact point probably is in far-off New York with someone who has the authority to approve transmission of a warning message on the AP’s global network.

Footnote:

Danette Johnson at CNN International (see February 24 post) said today she’s following up to see what can be done to help the PTWC get the word more efficiently to CNN in future emergencies.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 2, 2005