Mr. Chairman, it is highly probable that tens of thousands of people died around the Indian Ocean rim on December 26, 2004 because an agency of the United States government was unprepared to issue an effective tsunami warning to the region’s population. This inference can be made with great certainty based on the public record and the statements of numerous federal government employees.
The warning failure occurred even though Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) scientists first suspected the existence of the tsunami as much as two-thirds of an hour before the first waves struck Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. That is clearly established in the tsunami timeline by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (Ref: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2358.htm)
It’s true that scientists did not initially know that a 9.0 magnitude earthquake had struck near Indonesia. They first calculated the magnitude at 8.0, which they felt would have triggered only a localized tsunami or no tsunami at all.
Others may wish to investigate the too-low estimate of the earthquake’s strength with a goal of improving early forecasting techniques. The intent of my testimony, however, is to demonstrate that the communications protocols that existed on December 26 were inadequate to issue an effective warning and that U.S. officials may not have been sufficiently trained or sensitized to the importance of calling on the news media for assistance.
We know from numerous media interviews with the scientists that about an hour after the earthquake they felt a need to alert people in the Indian Ocean region about a possible tsunami. We also know that they felt handicapped by the absence of a high-tech tsunami detection and alert-dissemination system in the region. Nothing around the Indian Ocean approximates the sophistication of the Pacific Rim tsunami warning network.
To their credit, the Center’s personnel wanted to take some kind of action to alert the region. According to the Center’s director, as quoted in The International Herald Tribune: “We wanted to try to do something, but without a plan in place then, it was not an effective way to issue a warning, or to have it acted upon.” (Ref: http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/28/news/warning.html)
Without a notification plan, the scientists resorted to telephoning their colleagues in south Asia, with virtually no success. What they did not do was telephone the major international news media, such as the Associated Press, CNN, the BBC, Reuters or any other news organization with world-wide communications capabilities.
In other words, in the 41 minutes between issuing a bulletin that mentioned a possible tsunami and when the first waves are now thought to have reached Sri Lanka, the scientists used the telephone to call one person at a time rather than call the mass media to help issue a warning through their broadcast and cable networks.
A NOAA spokesperson later gave what may be the most telling comment about the PTWC’s crisis communications preparedness: "Not only was the center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list of media contacts." (Ref: http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050107-050909-7208r.htm)
Would alerting the news media in those first critical minutes have made a difference in how many people died in south Asia? With proper planning and coordination of media protocols, I’m certain lives could have been saved.
And I’m not alone. Many others around the world have questioned the lack of an effective warning. A woman in Sri Lanka who lost her father, sister and niece was interviewed by National Public Radio: “Why didn’t we receive warning? We had two hours after Indonesian quake, and at least five minutes warning would have helped. Five minutes would have saved my father’s life.”
(Ref: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4277195)
On January 11, the day NOAA’s administrator visited the PTWC and met with the Honolulu news media, I posted questions on my web log site that I felt might well be directed to him. They are still relevant today:
• Will NOAA release the PTWC’s crisis communications plan? (If not, why not?)
• What liaison did NOAA accomplish with the major media (Associated Press, CNN, BBC, etc.) before 12/26 to ensure emergency phone calls to these media would produce timely warnings to their audiences?
• Are PTWC scientists trained to telephone the media to issue life-saving warnings?
• Is the PTWC too high-tech oriented? Do you think low-tech telephone calls have a place in your pre-crisis planning and emergency warning protocols?
• Have you ordered changes in the PTWC warning protocols since the tsunami?
• Does NOAA accept responsibility for an internal procedural failure that might have cost the lives of tens of thousands of people in south Asia?
• What is NOAA telling south Asia nations about its performance on 12/26?
• What are your personal feelings about NOAA’s performance on 12/26?
The administrator did answer many media questions that day, including a variation of the last one. According to the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, he called the PTWC staff’s actions “excellent” and faithful to the warning procedures in place. “This is a group that believes in saving lives and protecting property at all costs,” he said. (Ref: http://starbulletin.com/2005/01/12/news/index1.html)
The sad fact is the “warning procedures in place” on December 26 saved no lives and protected no property. Nothing PTWC scientists knew or did that day helped people in the tsunami danger zone.
I respectfully submit to this committee that the PTWC’s apparent inability to issue effective warnings is unacceptable. I have proposed a five-point program that would help NOAA shift its thinking and its culture to include meaningful media notification after future tsunami-generating earthquakes:
• NOAA should accept constructive criticism -- rather than deny -- that actions it could have undertaken likely would have saved lives in south Asia.
• NOAA should resolve to change its communications culture to include re-evaluating the scope of its information-disseminating mission -- i.e., whether its mission extends beyond the Pacific Rim.
• NOAA should rewrite its communications protocols to include early telephone calls to news organizations that have the capability of sending worldwide tsunami warnings.
• NOAA should accomplish high-level coordination with the management of these news agencies to ensure proper execution of the alerts when received by the media.
• NOAA should train its personnel to respond to suspected tsunamis by making direct person-to-person contact with major news outlets based on prior planning.
The media can be an efficient way to send warnings to threatened populations when time is of the essence, and NOAA would do well to integrate them into its crisis communications planning. Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on this important matter.
Submitted by:
Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
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