•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
In a letter dated May 17, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. responded to most of the questions sent to him in early April requesting clarification on NOAA’s communications policies for issuing tsunami warnings using the major mass media.
The letter reiterates some of what we already knew about how NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) react to suspected tsunamis by issuing bulletins over a large network of electronic services.
But Lautenbacher also states: “Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins.”
It’s possible I missed it in the past five months, but this is the first definitive statement I can recall that mentions what likely is a sweeping reexamination and revamping of NOAA’s communications protocols.
This obviously is a positive development and should temper somewhat the criticism directed at Lautenbacher and his agency for their early defense of protocols and procedures in place on December 26, 2004. On January 11, in a visit to the PTWC, Lautenbacher called the staff’s actions “excellent” and, according to a Honolulu Star-Bulletin story on his visit, faithful to the warning procedures in place.
It now appears new warning procedures are in the works, which is the bottom-line outcome this web log has advocated since January 2.
Lautenbacher’s letter follows; my comments are not inserted between his paragraphs but instead are referenced where appropriate within his text and listed following the letter.
Dear Mr. Carlson:
Thank you for your letter regarding the tsunami of December 26, 2004, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) media response.
NOAA recognizes the media as an important conduit of information in times of natural disasters. The Pacific and West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Centers, like all of NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS) offices, maintains procedures for communicating watches, warnings, and bulletins to the media via high speed electronic means.
Many members of the international media receive bulletins and warnings through our Family of Services subscriptions, NOAA Weather Wire, the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network, and through the Emergency Alert System. Warnings and watches are delivered with the highest priority on these systems. Customers, including the media, set subsequent priority for viewing, alerting for, or displaying products. [1]
Information in bulletins, particularly words capable of causing a public response, is crafted with the help of civil authorities in the potentially affected areas. In the case of international products, NOAA must be especially diligent about coordinating the wording of bulletins and warnings to avoid interfering with the sovereign authority of foreign governments. This is especially true with the tsunami products. Compared to severe weather events, the science of tsunami warnings is still imprecise. [2]
No NOAA or NWS policy prohibits a forecast office or center from proactively contacting media regarding a watch, warning, or bulletin. However, NOAA policy requires our offices to treat all entities “fair and equitably,” (to view the policy, see http://www.noaa.gov/partnershippolicy/). A pool operation of the type you mention is used by NOAA’s National Hurricane Center. [3]
We must remember not all countries in the Indian Ocean transmit tide gauge data, and only a few water level gauges transmit data from the region. Without such data, or a tsunami-detecting buoy, NOAA scientists have no way to detect or verify whether a tsunami was generated.
Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins. [4]
With respect to your question about the decrease in lag time between the earthquake events of December 26, 2004, and March 28, 2005, and their respective tsunami information bulletins, the difference is due to a number of changes, including the following:
• Affected countries in the Indian Ocean requested, and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) as well as the Japan Meteorological Agency agreed to provide, interim warning guidance to the region until it establishes its own warning capabilities;
• The initial estimated magnitude for the March 28, 2005, event was 8.5. The initial estimate for the December 26, 3004, event was 8.0, reevaluated at 8.5, 65 minutes after the earthquake occurred. [5]
The initial bulletin issued on March 28, 2005, indicated the earthquake had the potential to generate a tsunami. The additional procedures designed for the Indian Ocean and implemented by the scientists at the (PTWC) on March 28, 2005, are appropriate given our experience with the December 26, 2004, event and our long experience with international tsunami warning responsibilities in the Pacific. [6]
We share the same goal of saving lives. I appreciate your concerns and comments. Should you have any further questions, please contact NOAA’s Public Affairs Director, Jordan St. John, at (202) 482-6090.
Sincerely,
/signature/
Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere
cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Comments
[1] Inarguably, NOAA and the NWS have a vast array of electronic networks with which to disseminate tsunami bulletins, but as noted in the list of questions sent to Lautenbacher, there’s reason to question whether the media act universally upon the bulletins after they’ve been sent. One Honolulu journalist says the PTWC’s bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the news wire that services Hawaii’s media, including broadcast stations, with no special notification to alert newsrooms. Lautenbacher’s letter does not answer the question pertinent to this issue: “Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine?” The ultimate differentiation for warnings about impending calamitous events would be a telephone call made under pre-coordinated and rehearsed protocols to a handful of key media outlets with world-wide communication capabilities. Point [2] below shows that considerable coordination would be required internationally.
[2] March 23 and 25 posts to this blog highlighted the “control” issue. The final communiqué of the early-March Paris conference on the creation of a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean included this paragraph: “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories….” On its surface, this point seems like a reasonable acknowledgement of a Member State’s sovereignty, but does this mean that media such as the BBC and CNN are not to carry confirmed reports of a tsunami that is approaching the shores of a Member State? More thinking on the “control” issue is indicated.
[3] Lautenbacher disavows the existence of a NWS policy that “won’t allow” the PTWC to directly contact the news media via the telephone. Center Director Charles McCreery first alluded to a possible prohibition during my March 25 visit, a report of which is linked above. Since we must take Lautenbacher at his word that no such prohibition exists, we’re left to examine what his admonition “to treat all (media) entities ‘fair and equitably’” really means. I don't think it means that since you can't call everyone, you can't call anyone. His acknowledgement that media pools already are standard fare for NOAA at the National Hurricane Center should result in NOAA considering them for the issuance of tsunami warnings.
[4] This is the letter’s most important paragraph in my estimation. NOAA clearly has backed away from the mindset that drove Lautenbacher’s testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation at its February 2 hearings on S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005. As noted in a February 3 post, Lautenbacher’s testimony contained the following in a space of four paragraphs on page 4: “It is not the Center’s responsibility to issue local tsunami warnings from seismic events outside of the United States.” “NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no authority or responsibility to issue tsunami warnings for the Indian Ocean basin.” “As the Indian Ocean is outside the NOAA tsunami area of responsibility, NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no procedures in place to issue a warning for this region.” Authorized or not, NOAA obviously has a different stance today than it did within the first two months after the tsunami. The ongoing review of its procedures is a good development.
[5] and [6] Not to hammer this point to death, but as noted in a March 30 post, scientists acknowledged after the March 28 earthquake that quakes of 8.0 magnitude are generally known to be potentially tsunami-producing. I respectfully recommend that NOAA put less energy into explaining away its actions on December 26 and vigorously pursue the aforementioned policy review.
Summary
Admiral Lautenbacher has clarified some points and opened other issues for continued examination. The fact that a policy review is ongoing suggests there’s still time for outsiders to influence the outcome.
The issue of Member States’ sovereignty over tsunami warnings within their territories is thorny, but national sovereignty in this century isn’t what it used to be. Giving here and there on that point in favor of allowing life-saving messages to be transmitted into one’s country might just be the most noble thing a president or national sovereign could do for his or her people.
I thank Admiral Lautenbacher for addressing most of the points in my April letter. Now that the policy review has been officially mentioned, it can be the focus of this blog and the efforts of others to improve tsunami communications. I invite readers to post your comments on Lautenbacher's letter by clicking the link below.
3 comments:
Doug:
Congratulatons on your efforts to move NOAA into the 21st century with regard to the use of mass media to warn large populations that 1) a destructive tsunami is on the way; 2) that people's lives are in danger; and, 3) that they need to evacuate the shore line.
Finally, Lautenbacker's ltr seems to be a huge concession from NOAA's earlier position that everything was hunky dory with respect to the handling of information related to the Dec. 26 tsunami by its PTWC in Honolulu.
By pushing this issue relentlessly, you've made a major contribution and one would think changes are in the offing in the way future tsunami warnings are handled.
Also, there does seem to be an unresolved conflict between Lautenbacker's ltr and McCreery's statement that NOAA guidelines did not permit McCreery to contact the media when the Dec 26 incident occurred.
Obviously, the descrenpency should be clarified for the historical record.
That said, however, I must admit to some skepticism over how quickly NOAA's media protocols may change. After all these guys ---PTWC and others--- attended a meeting in Austraila just weeks before the Dec. 26 tsunami released its powerfully destructive energy. They were forewarned exactly of the event that was about to occur but they returned home and did nothing. Absolutely nothing.
What could/should they have done?
Well, at the minimum, they could have called a "What If" meeting to assess their capability to get information out to the affected poppulations in a timely manner. Surely, had they done so, someone would have suggested using mass media, i.e., the electronic media, radio & TV, as a vehicle to carry the message of impending destruction to the impacted populations.
And surely, someone would have asked, do we have the phone numbers of government officials we should call in the impacted areas?
And surely, someone would have asked, well what happens if the tsunami occurs at night or on a Sunday and no gov. officials in the impacted countries are manning a government desaster office? How do we get past that road block?
Let's not ever forget that 100's of thousands of people died as result of their neglient inactivity following the Australia meeting.
That they took no action will be a blot on the PTWC and NOAA when the historical record of this incident is completed.
With this memory clearly fixed, let's all hope that NOAA and the PTWC will move forward with all deliberate speed to incorporate a mass media component into their tsunami warning protocols.
Again, I commend you for your tenacity in keeping the focus on NOAA in how they deal with these incidents.
As you have so bravely and relentlessly pointed out 100's and thousands of lives were lost because the PTWC and NOAA had no contingency plans in place for reaching a mass population in minutes rather than hours.
And, that's the real test that should be applied to any changes made by NOAA/PTWC in the way tsunami incidents are handled. Do these new communications protocols enable NOAA/PTWC to reach impacted populations in minutes. . . .not hours. . . . once it has determned that a significant incident has occured?
Keep up the good work!
KW
Doug,
Well Done! You should feel very special that your letter was answered in much less time than Senator Inouye's!
As for the NOAA, applause--politely.
I welcome their paradigm shift but must continue to raise numerous questions about the overall situation.
While some call for a "let's get over it" position on 26 December, the world and especially those of us who have the capability, must continue to peel back the layers of deflection and deception of what actually happened. We cannot improve on what we do until we know what we have and how it works, or in this case, how it didn't.
Without the analysis and historical viewpoint, their efforts are akin to the man who built his house upon the sand.
Moving on, it is imperative that the NOAA and NWS discontinue the practice of self analysis and internal resolutions. While they are experts for sure, the notion that they have all the answers is a dangerously narrow viewpoint. It is clear that they knew the historical dangers present in the Indian Ocean and had the capability to monitor them. I don't know if it was bureaucratic red tape, budgetary constraints or plain indifference that led to a position of inaction.
To be a scientific organization of the greatest, wealthiest and most powerful country on earth, to have privy to some of the foremost technology in the world, to be in the business of warning people for 40 years and to say we don't have contacts in the area simply won't fly.
It is time for the NOAA to welcome non-government and non-profit response agencies with expertise to sit at the table and work with them resolve the way we do disaster business.
We have a unique opening in the barriers of foreign nations who
are setting aside national pride for the opportunity to improve on disaster warnings. Your efforts at changing the communications paradigm are critical right now.
This is a positive step from NOAA but still only a baby step. Will Latuenbacher and the federal government take "one giant step for mankind" and utilize the information, resources and technology available to save lives and property?
Time will tell. In the interim, the World Disaster Alliance would like to be sitting at the table with them initiating solutions.
Keep up the great work Doug--we are by your side.
Jeff Novak
VP Operations and Programs
World Disaster Alliance
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