NOAA: It “Makes Sense” that Lives Could Have Been Saved with Proactive Warning to Media

Fifty weeks after the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, it seems this web log’s message has gotten through, judging from a letter just received from NOAA public affairs chief Jordan St. John.

Responding to my posted comments on the agency’s new tsunami notification SOP, Mr. St. John says in a December 8 letter:

“This SOP was developed to accomplish dual purposes. The first and most important is to certainly assist in saving lives. You have taken the position that had a more proactive media outreach effort taken place during the Indian Ocean event, many lives could have been saved. In hindsight, that makes sense, but we also believe that until that fateful event, many in the media would not have taken the warning seriously.”

This blog also has taken the position from its inception that coordination with the news media most certainly would have to be accomplished to achieve life-saving warnings via their international networks. While I’ve criticized the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center for not engaging those media proactively on December 25th (Hawaii time), in hindsight it’s because they and others at NOAA apparently had not thought ahead to consider how important pre-coordination with the media might one day be. (That's why the many "we did everything we could" comments by Center personnel in the weeks after the tsunami were so objectionable. By not reaching out to the major news media that day, they hadn't done everything they could.)

It’s safe to say they see the importance now. Mr. St. John’s letter continues: “Today, because of this tragic event, the media are much more sensitized to the danger of tsunamis, and have reacted very quickly to the information issued by both Tsunami Warning Centers. We expect these procedures to improve.”

I dare say, NOAA and the Centers are themselves much more sensitized to the danger of not having a solid media-notification SOP in place – an SOP that has been coordinated and game-planned with the major news media to ensure they know how to react when a Center believes a devastating earthquake and tsunami event has occurred somewhere in the world.

Mr. St. John notes that “the SOP is designed to remove (the media-contact) burden from Center staff and place it on our public affairs staff that is better equipped to manage the media onslaught.” That makes sense, and there are parallels throughout the business world. Power grid operators don’t talk with inquiring reporters during a blackout; the utilities’ public affairs personnel do.

The key point that must not be lost, however, is that NOAA’s public affairs personnel must be brought into the loop IMMEDIATELY after a potential tsunami is detected, and they should be empowered to IMMEDIATELY contact the major media using rehearsed channels of communications.

We’re talking minutes here – those precious minutes when media with globe-circling communications networks can transmit, broadcast or cablecast their warning messages BEFORE tsunami waves arrive.

That obviously was not pre-coordinated last December, and it’s not at all clear that this coordination has yet happened. If not, NOAA should call CNN, the Associated Press, the BBC and other candidate media to begin a dialogue leading to a truly live-saving capability.

In less than two weeks the world's media will carry one-year anniversary stories about the tsunami tragedy. This blog was created and did most of its proselytizing early in 2005, anticipating the delayed acknowledgement that now seems to have come that more could and should have been done to save lives on December 26.

We’ll keep this communications channel open next year with the hope that there will be reason to comment about a new public-private tsunami warning collaborative -- freely entered by government agencies and public-spirited media -- that will be a credit to all concerned.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

New Tsunami Warning Procedures Appear To Be Improvement; Proactive Media Contact Is Still Goal

January 16, 2005 post on this web log: “If a mass media response had been written into NOAA’s crisis communication plan, one phone call to the Associated Press or CNN could have been leveraged to produce a warning to millions of people before the tsunami arrived on the beaches of some Indian Ocean countries.”

You won't find specific instructions for NOAA's personnel to reach out aggressively to the major news media in the new Tsunami Warning Center Communication SOP, which is found in its entirety here -- at least, not in the manner recommended by this blog since its inception and summarized in a January 16 post, above.

But according to a NOAA spokesperson, that's NOAA's goal, and things have changed since the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to improve media notification procedures. "December 26th was a wake-up call to the world," he remarked today during a telephone call about the new SOP and its ability to engage international news media in issuing timely life-saving tsunami warnings.

At the risk of coming down too severely on this draft SOP, here's one paragraph from the "Regional Public Affairs Officer(s) Responsibility" item (see earlier post today) and the comment sent today to NOAA about that paragraph:
• Write media advisory and distribute via PR newswire (see template; messages: reiterate warning; indicate media will be notified when more information becomes available; advise that briefing will take place once the danger passes/event occurs)
COMMENT: This is an entirely misguided approach. “…once the danger passes/event occurs…”??? Tsunami notification to the news media should not be business as usual via PR Newswire or something that waits for the danger to pass! When a potentially significant life-threatening event occurs, someone at the appropriate TWC has to trigger an alert in a duty officer’s or communication professional’s office or home; that person’s job is to initiate proactive media contact according to a prearranged protocol. If that means a Duty Officer must be on station at NOAA’s headquarters around the clock, so be it. You’re making those provisions at the TWCs, so it can be done for communications professionals. This is about establishing a system to save lives – potentially hundreds of thousands of them – so the system that’s implemented must be bold and imaginative and something far different than relying on PR Newswire as the channel to communicate these messages to the media.

Following the phone call with NOAA's spokesman, I'm willing to concede that the comment above may have been a bit strong, but I believe it is still appropriate to keep the focus on NOAA's intentions vis-a-vis outreach to the major news media.

The NOAA spokesman said public affairs personnel already are assigned around the clock to be responsive to Tsunami Warning Center personnel, and they are prepared and rehearsed to reach out to appropriate news media -- especially local media when a local tsunami event is detected.

What remains to be coordinated, it appears, is a procedure that involves rapid notification to media with international communications capabilities whenever a huge December 26-like earthquake strikes anywhere in the world. Quakes of that magnitude in tsunami-prone regions of the planet ought to automatically kick in a procedure to inform the media that have global reach -- or so it seems to us.

According to NOAA's spokesman, the American Meteorological Society will hold a meeting in late January in Atlanta, GA, home city of one of those worldwide media companies, CNN. The spokesman said the meeting may be an opportunity to raise these issues with CNN executives, at least one of whom has expressed interest in the problems addressed by this blog since its inception.

'Veil of Secrecy' Lifted on New Tsunami Warning SOP; Draft (Posted Here) To Be Adopted Soon

NOAA Public Affairs representative Greg Romano today informed this writer that I'm free to publicize and comment upon the draft of NOAA's "Tsunami Warning Center Communications" Standard Operating Procedures. That draft is presented below; comments will be made in a subsequent post. ~DC
Draft *** Draft *** Draft *** Draft

Tsunami Warning Center Communication Procedures

I. Introduction

Whenever either of the two Tsunami Warning Centers issues a bulletin (warning, watch or informational) regarding potential tsunamigenic activity, the following procedures shall be used to coordinate response.

II. Tsunami Center Staff Communication Activity

The following relates specifically to media response ONLY. It does not pertain to any other procedures required of the Tsunami Warning Centers

• Notify by telephone the appropriate Regional Director

• Update voicemail to include brief information on event and direct media inquiries to regional public affairs (script to be provided and possibly have remote access for updates)

• Notify by e-mail/text message NWSH public affairs staff (Regional public affairs officers will also contact HWSH public affairs staff by telephone)

• TWCs shall focus on the event and answer public phone lines to which media have access as time allows.

III. Regional Director Responsibilities

• Notify Regional Public Affairs – if unavailable, notify NWSH Public Affairs

• Work with regional PAO to develop message points/liaison with TWC

• Participate in news briefings

• Conduct one-on-one media interviews in coordination with regional PAO

IV. Regional Public Affairs Officer(s) Responsibility

As soon as possible following issuance of a bulletin:

• Notify NWSH public affairs by telephone

• Write media advisory and distribute via PR newswire (see template; messages: reiterate warning; indicate media will be notified when more information becomes available; advise that briefing will take place once the danger passes/event occurs)

• Follow-up with phone to major media outlets in potentially impacted areas reiterating the content of the media advisory

• Ensure all media at the Tsunami Warning Center are confined to a designed location (i.e., a conference room) so as not to impede operations

As soon as possible when above is completed

• Arrange media briefing for post event/ dangers passes (drafts talking points, coordinates logistics)

V. Headquarters (NWS, OAR, NOS) Public Affairs Responsibilities

• Support/back-up regional PAOs as directed by NWSH public affairs director

• Pitch after event briefings/interviews with national and regional media using national spokespeople as necessary

Note: In the event of a destructive event, HQ PA will immediately send additional staff to assist regional PAOs on site.

The Draft SOP for Notifying the News Media About Tsunamis Is in Circulation -- but Now What?

To give Jordan St. John of NOAA his due, his email transmitting the draft SOP for "Tsunami Warning Center Communication Procedures" has been sitting here in my in-box since November 17. As Mr. St. John noted in a September email, "the tsunami public affairs team has been developing a set of media notification and response procedures for the two NOAA tsunami centers."

But that note still gives pause: "I'd be happy to share the draft with you for comment, provided you not release nor comment on it publicly until the final procedure is put in place," he wrote.

I agreed to that restriction in order to receive the draft SOP, and I'm continuing to abide by it for now. I'll also provide Mr. St. John with my reaction to his new media-notification procedures.

But what's with the secrecy? Does NOAA really believe that restricting dissemination and comment on the draft will produce a better product in the end? What's the downside for public comment on a media-notification SOP for the tsunami warning centers?

What I can say at this time without violating our agreement is that Mr. St. John and his NOAA colleagues are encouraged to re-read some of the posts to this web log (if they've read any of them at all) -- especially the ones in the first quarter of 2005 that decried the lack of proactive warning center outreach to the news media with worldwide communications networks when a potential tsunami is detected.

My premise is stated time and again in this blog, so it should be easy to find -- a point of view that still seems not to be understood or appreciated by NOAA.

In addition to commenting on the SOP, I'll urge Mr. St. John to relax this prohibition and will leave the issue there for now.

Except for this: Has NOAA invited the international news organizations with instant communications capabilities to tsunami-threatened populations to comment on the SOP? I've asked that question of Mr. St. John and others at NOAA without receiving a response.

If no such sharing has occurred, this SOP has more problems than are already evident to me.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

Patiently Waiting for NOAA's New Plan

One day at a time, the wait continues for the draft of the new NOAA emergency notification plan, as promised by public affairs chief Jordan St. John.

His offer to review the draft was appreciated, but one can only hope not much more time goes by before something reviewable is presented.

Surely they'll act several weeks before December 26 -- won't they?

Tsunami Lawsuit Over Inadequate Response Gains Media Attention Again as Prosecutors Begin Probe

Seven months ago today, New York attorney Ed Fagan reportedly filed a lawsuit naming a French hotel chain, the National Weather Service, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) and others as defendents alleging that they failed to adequately warn victims of the December 26 tsunami.

The lawsuit has more or less disappeared from public view, as Fagan faced allegations about his own conduct in unrelated matters. But several stories about the lawsuit have found their way onto the internet in recent weeks, and it appears this lawsuit has been filed and refiled again.

TheAge.com carried an Associated Press story on September 6 saying the lawsuit was filed that day; the story carried no dateline, but the location evidently was Paris, as reported several days later by FindLaw.com. FindLaw's story said prosecutors had opened a preliminary inquiry. An earlier story at News24.com carried Thai authorities' denial that they were negligent "when they failed to issue warnings ahead of December's Indian ocean tsunami...." The Bangkok-datelined story said the plaintiffs' lawyers had filed suit in US District Court for the Southern District of New York on July 29; that assertion will prompt more internet searching in light of the initial reports that the lawsuit was filed in March.

These recent stories did not mention the PTWC as a defendent, but another AP story posted on Honolulu television station KHNL's web site today says the lawsuit alleges the Center "did not do enough to protect people from the December 26th tsunami...."

The lawsuit may just be the inevitable sideshow fallout one expects after nearly every disaster, but it conceivably could affect the revision of NOAA's media-notification procedures when tsunamis are suspected by the PTWC's personnel. We're still waiting for the draft of those new procedures (see September 22 post below).

NOAA Public Affairs Chief Says New Tsunami Warning Procedures Are Nearly Completed

This web log has been in a holding pattern for the past four months as we've waited on information on the status of NOAA's new procedures to spread the word when a tsunami is suspected. We feel the case has been made for including a few of the major networked news media outlets -- AP, CNN, BBC, Reuters -- in the earliest notification (see everything back to January 2 on this blog).

That wait ended today with the receipt of an e-mail from Jordan St. John, the agency's public affairs chief:

My apologies for not responding earlier. As you know from your
conversations with Greg Romano, the tsunami public affairs team has been developing a set of media notification and response procedures for the two NOAA tsunami centers.

I believe he also indicated that a draft was under operational review.
Based on that review, we are modifying the procedures slightly and
expect to have an initial operational buyoff sometime in the next few
weeks.

At that time, I’d be happy to share the draft with you for comment,
provided you not release nor comment on it publicly until the final
procedure is put in place.

Thank you for your interest in NOAA and this important issue.

Jordan St. John

It remains to be seen what "slightly" modified procedures look like. Would including the news media in early notification be a slight shift in policy? It would seem to be bigger than that, so this initial piece of news isn't all that encouraging.

We look forward to seeing the draft and will abide by Mr. Jordan's request to not publicize it , even though we responded to him urging transparency in the process. More rather than fewer eyes on the draft communications policy presumably would craft a better product.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

New Tsunami Communication Plan Is Making the Rounds; Katrina's Lessons Become Obvious

• For a new companion web log on Hurricane Katrina's lessons, go here.

Hurricane Katrina's unbelievable aftermath has the full attention of NOAA's personnel, and that's certainly to be respected. My public affairs contact nevertheless took a moment to e-mail the news that the first draft of a new communications protocol to handle tsunami information dissemination is under review by NOAA's Hawaii and Alaska regional directors. He hoped for feedback by September 2, but that may be too much to ask due to the hurricane.

The new web log referenced above poses questions that might well be addressed to any community's disaster planning experts after they're modified to fit local circumstances. The New Orleans experience suggests that despite all the hoopla about pre-planning to handle any emergency, all that planning produced dreadful results.

NOAA's tsunami experts worked long and hard to justify their actions after the December tsunami, and this web log has suggested alternative actions that may have saved lives. There's zero chance Gulf Coast disaster management personnel will get away with a similar performance, and critics have every right to press hard for explanations.

Perhaps Katrina's legacy will be an end to the we-have-it-handled attitude that disaster planners always seem to evoke after natural disasters. Never again should citizens blindly accept those assurances. Katrina surely tells us that much.

NOAA has been busy, I'm told, but not to worry; new guidelines are coming, new guidelines are...

It's been two months since a letter was dispatched to NOAA's public affairs chief inquiring about the agency's new and improved tsunami media-notification procedures, and still no response. This seems somewhat remarkable in light of the fact that NOAA's administrator was much speedier in his response to similar inquiries.

Nevertheless, I'm told by a NOAA public affairs spokesman that my letter hasn't simply been brushed off. "We've been extremely busy" is the explanation, and something may be coming out soon on NOAA's new procedures, which are long overdue.

This web log has said pretty much everything it needs to say about the need for new procedures. Visitors are invited to grind your way through the rationale, beginning with the first post in early January.

NOAA is invited to refresh its collective memory, too. It's all there -- especially details on the failure to have a Standard Operating Procedure in place to contact the mass media as a logical communication channel to a mass audience scattered around the Indian Ocean.

If the new and improved procedures don't include direct contact with the major international mass media, NOAA had better have a good explanation, because not only this writer but residents of the nations where thousands perished will want to hear it.

Six Weeks Later, No Response from the PR Guy

We've taken a six-week break from Tsunami Lessons for some travel and had hoped to have a letter from Jordan St. John, NOAA's public affairs chief, in the accumulated mail upon our return. No such luck.

So we'll attempt to prod a response from Mr. St. John with some answers to the questions posed in our letter. They're legitimate quetions and deserve a response from the spokesman for this public agency.

NOAA’s New Warning Procedures: Will They Be Unveiled Within Six Months of the Tsunami?

• Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
• NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher’s letter (May 22)

The six-month anniversary of the December tsunami will soon be upon us. Media reports of the tsunami event and recovery have tapered off in recent weeks, as have posts to this site. A vacation trip starting next week will further curtail attention for the next few weeks.

When I resume, I hope to have definitive information on what NOAA is doing to revise its media-notification procedures. Lautenbacher’s May 17th letter said revisions were underway within NOAA. I sent the following letter today to NOAA Public Affairs Director Jordan St. John to learn what they are:

Dear Mr. St. John:

Administrator Lautenbacher’s May 17th response to my early-April letter (copies of both are enclosed) contained the encouraging news that your office “has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins.”

I would be most grateful if you would apprise me of the changes in tsunami warning procedures to which the Administrator alluded in his letter. It is my hope that the new procedures include the utilization of the major news media with international in-place communications networks in transmitting near-real-time warnings over those networks.

My web log (TsunamiLessons.blogspot.com) since early January has developed the premise that early proactive telephonic contact with the major media would certainly reduce the lag time between tsunami detection and the receipt of warnings by populations in peril. There is every reason to believe thousands of lives might have been saved on December 26 if early direct (as in telephonic) media contact had been part of the notification plan.

This premise is summarized in my letter to Admiral Lautenbacher, but I also invite you to visit my log. Thank you for your assistance in helping us understand NOAA’s revised media-notification procedures in issuing tsunami warnings.

Sincerely,

Doug Carlson

cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye

NOAA Chief Says Communications Policy Is Under Review, May Lead to Improved Media Contact

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

In a letter dated May 17, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. responded to most of the questions sent to him in early April requesting clarification on NOAA’s communications policies for issuing tsunami warnings using the major mass media.

The letter reiterates some of what we already knew about how NOAA and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) react to suspected tsunamis by issuing bulletins over a large network of electronic services.

But Lautenbacher also states: “Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins.”

It’s possible I missed it in the past five months, but this is the first definitive statement I can recall that mentions what likely is a sweeping reexamination and revamping of NOAA’s communications protocols.

This obviously is a positive development and should temper somewhat the criticism directed at Lautenbacher and his agency for their early defense of protocols and procedures in place on December 26, 2004. On January 11, in a visit to the PTWC, Lautenbacher called the staff’s actions “excellent” and, according to a Honolulu Star-Bulletin story on his visit, faithful to the warning procedures in place.

It now appears new warning procedures are in the works, which is the bottom-line outcome this web log has advocated since January 2.

Lautenbacher’s letter follows; my comments are not inserted between his paragraphs but instead are referenced where appropriate within his text and listed following the letter.

Dear Mr. Carlson:

Thank you for your letter regarding the tsunami of December 26, 2004, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) media response.

NOAA recognizes the media as an important conduit of information in times of natural disasters. The Pacific and West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Centers, like all of NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS) offices, maintains procedures for communicating watches, warnings, and bulletins to the media via high speed electronic means.

Many members of the international media receive bulletins and warnings through our Family of Services subscriptions, NOAA Weather Wire, the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network, and through the Emergency Alert System. Warnings and watches are delivered with the highest priority on these systems. Customers, including the media, set subsequent priority for viewing, alerting for, or displaying products. [1]

Information in bulletins, particularly words capable of causing a public response, is crafted with the help of civil authorities in the potentially affected areas. In the case of international products, NOAA must be especially diligent about coordinating the wording of bulletins and warnings to avoid interfering with the sovereign authority of foreign governments. This is especially true with the tsunami products. Compared to severe weather events, the science of tsunami warnings is still imprecise. [2]

No NOAA or NWS policy prohibits a forecast office or center from proactively contacting media regarding a watch, warning, or bulletin. However, NOAA policy requires our offices to treat all entities “fair and equitably,” (to view the policy, see http://www.noaa.gov/partnershippolicy/). A pool operation of the type you mention is used by NOAA’s National Hurricane Center. [3]

We must remember not all countries in the Indian Ocean transmit tide gauge data, and only a few water level gauges transmit data from the region. Without such data, or a tsunami-detecting buoy, NOAA scientists have no way to detect or verify whether a tsunami was generated.

Since the December 26, 2004, tsunami, NOAA’s Public Affairs Office has been reviewing, and updating, its procedures for notifying the media in the event of another large tsunami in the Pacific. Several procedure changes are underway, or under consideration, including issuance of media advisories (in coordination with civil authorities) in addition to the tsunami bulletins. [4]

With respect to your question about the decrease in lag time between the earthquake events of December 26, 2004, and March 28, 2005, and their respective tsunami information bulletins, the difference is due to a number of changes, including the following:

• Affected countries in the Indian Ocean requested, and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) as well as the Japan Meteorological Agency agreed to provide, interim warning guidance to the region until it establishes its own warning capabilities;
• The initial estimated magnitude for the March 28, 2005, event was 8.5. The initial estimate for the December 26, 3004, event was 8.0, reevaluated at 8.5, 65 minutes after the earthquake occurred. [5]

The initial bulletin issued on March 28, 2005, indicated the earthquake had the potential to generate a tsunami. The additional procedures designed for the Indian Ocean and implemented by the scientists at the (PTWC) on March 28, 2005, are appropriate given our experience with the December 26, 2004, event and our long experience with international tsunami warning responsibilities in the Pacific. [6]

We share the same goal of saving lives. I appreciate your concerns and comments. Should you have any further questions, please contact NOAA’s Public Affairs Director, Jordan St. John, at (202) 482-6090.

Sincerely,

/signature/
Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere

cc: Senator Daniel K. Inouye

Comments

[1] Inarguably, NOAA and the NWS have a vast array of electronic networks with which to disseminate tsunami bulletins, but as noted in the list of questions sent to Lautenbacher, there’s reason to question whether the media act universally upon the bulletins after they’ve been sent. One Honolulu journalist says the PTWC’s bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the news wire that services Hawaii’s media, including broadcast stations, with no special notification to alert newsrooms. Lautenbacher’s letter does not answer the question pertinent to this issue: “Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine?” The ultimate differentiation for warnings about impending calamitous events would be a telephone call made under pre-coordinated and rehearsed protocols to a handful of key media outlets with world-wide communication capabilities. Point [2] below shows that considerable coordination would be required internationally.

[2] March 23 and 25 posts to this blog highlighted the “control” issue. The final communiqué of the early-March Paris conference on the creation of a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean included this paragraph: “Agree that the Member States should have the responsibility to have control over the issuance of warning within their respective territories….” On its surface, this point seems like a reasonable acknowledgement of a Member State’s sovereignty, but does this mean that media such as the BBC and CNN are not to carry confirmed reports of a tsunami that is approaching the shores of a Member State? More thinking on the “control” issue is indicated.

[3] Lautenbacher disavows the existence of a NWS policy that “won’t allow” the PTWC to directly contact the news media via the telephone. Center Director Charles McCreery first alluded to a possible prohibition during my March 25 visit, a report of which is linked above. Since we must take Lautenbacher at his word that no such prohibition exists, we’re left to examine what his admonition “to treat all (media) entities ‘fair and equitably’” really means. I don't think it means that since you can't call everyone, you can't call anyone. His acknowledgement that media pools already are standard fare for NOAA at the National Hurricane Center should result in NOAA considering them for the issuance of tsunami warnings.

[4] This is the letter’s most important paragraph in my estimation. NOAA clearly has backed away from the mindset that drove Lautenbacher’s testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation at its February 2 hearings on S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005. As noted in a February 3 post, Lautenbacher’s testimony contained the following in a space of four paragraphs on page 4: “It is not the Center’s responsibility to issue local tsunami warnings from seismic events outside of the United States.” “NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no authority or responsibility to issue tsunami warnings for the Indian Ocean basin.” “As the Indian Ocean is outside the NOAA tsunami area of responsibility, NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no procedures in place to issue a warning for this region.” Authorized or not, NOAA obviously has a different stance today than it did within the first two months after the tsunami. The ongoing review of its procedures is a good development.

[5] and [6] Not to hammer this point to death, but as noted in a March 30 post, scientists acknowledged after the March 28 earthquake that quakes of 8.0 magnitude are generally known to be potentially tsunami-producing. I respectfully recommend that NOAA put less energy into explaining away its actions on December 26 and vigorously pursue the aforementioned policy review.

Summary

Admiral Lautenbacher has clarified some points and opened other issues for continued examination. The fact that a policy review is ongoing suggests there’s still time for outsiders to influence the outcome.

The issue of Member States’ sovereignty over tsunami warnings within their territories is thorny, but national sovereignty in this century isn’t what it used to be. Giving here and there on that point in favor of allowing life-saving messages to be transmitted into one’s country might just be the most noble thing a president or national sovereign could do for his or her people.

I thank Admiral Lautenbacher for addressing most of the points in my April letter. Now that the policy review has been officially mentioned, it can be the focus of this blog and the efforts of others to improve tsunami communications. I invite readers to post your comments on Lautenbacher's letter by clicking the link below.

Restating the Tsunami Warning Issues & Questions as NOAA Shifts Focus to '05 Hurricane Season

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

As the December tsunami continues to fade into the background buzz, NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher Jr. and his associates have been all over the media this week with their forecasts for hurricane season, which begins in three weeks. Regions vulnerable to hurricanes – the Gulf and East Coast states and Hawaii – are well served by NOAA’s work in hurricane forecasting and tracking.

I’m sure NOAA has not lost interest in learning the lessons of the tsunami so procedures can be improved. Any perceived criticism of NOAA here is not directed at the agency’s scientific capabilities. We’ve been focused on what NOAA does with the information gathered from its science – specifically, whether current policies and practices allow communication of tsunami warnings via the news media, which arguably represent the fastest channel to populations in danger thousands of miles away.

Because we have reason to believe policies do exist that prevent the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) from directly contacting the news media (see report on my visit to the Center, linked above), the following 10 questions were sent to Admiral Lautenbacher in April. I trust that someone is attending to the answers, even as the agency works to raise awareness about the hurricane threat.

Here are the questions in the April 5 letter to Admiral Lautenbacher:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media? What specific channels are used and how do they operate?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them? (One Honolulu journalist in a position to know says PTWC bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the Associated Press's "state" wire, with no special notification to alert newsrooms that they're there.)
• Is a formal review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Scientists didn’t transmit a bulletin about a presumed tsunami in December until 65 minutes after the earthquake; that lag time was shortened to 19 minutes on March 28. Did a policy change at NOAA, NWS and/or PTWC result in the shorter time?

NOAA In No Hurry To Respond, but Get This: Inouye's Office Has Been Waiting for 3.5 Years!

"I'll check." That was the totality of a NOAA staffer's response to my inquiry about when to expect an answer from Admiral Lautenbacher to my April 5 letter. Call me crazy, but I thought the issues we've been discussing had an urgency about them and that an answer might come rather quickly.

But then I got this note from a staffer in Senator Daniel Inouye's office about what to expect from NOAA: "...the senator would be pleased to make an inquiry on your behalf, but please keep in mind that I am still waiting on NOAA reports the senator asked for about 3 1/2 years ago."

Three and one-half years? Is that the way it works in Washington these days? One of the Senate's longest-serving members has been waiting three and one-half years to get a report out of NOAA?

And I'm getting antsy after five weeks. That's almost funny.

Honolulu's Mayor Weighs In, Says He'll Write Senator Inouye re NOAA Media-Contact Reform

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
•May 9 Update: Still waiting on Lautenbacher letter (see April 28)

Office of the Mayor
City and County of Honolulu

April 27, 2005

Dear Doug,

Thank you for your letter of April 17, 2005. At your suggestion, I will be happy to write Senator Inouye asking him to support communications reform within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).

Given the devastating travesty that occurred in the Indian Ocean region on December 26, 2004, any way to improve early warning should be instituted.

Thank you for alerting me to this opportunity, as I am pleased to assist.

Sincerely,

/signature/
MUFI HANNEMANN
Mayor

MediaChannel.org Boosts this Blog's Visibility**

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)

Danny Schechter is a television producer and independent filmmaker who writes and speaks about media issues. He’s editor and "blogger in chief" of MediaChannel.org.

The TSUNAMI LESSONS blog came to his attention after he published a March 30 column on his NewsDissector.org site titled Tsunami Questions, Few Answers. One question we're both interested in is how the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center uses the news media to communicate tsunami messages to populations in danger. Turns out, it doesn't. (See above link to the report on my visit to the Center.)

Danny has enthusiastically supported our search for answers and asked me to write a commentary for MediaChannel.org. It’s currently (5/2) headlined at that site’s home page, with a link to the commentary: The Media Are Excluded from Transmitting Tsunami Warnings, and They Don’t Care.

** FOR EXAMPLE: Saying "it still rankles to know that the deaths could have been prevented," Indian Online Journalism quotes the MediaChannel.org commentary in an item titled "the death game".

Mahalo for your support, Danny.

Meanwhile, the wait continues for Admiral Lautenbacher's response to the request he revoke policies that inhibit direct distribution of tsunami warnings to the news media (see April 28 post). (UPDATE ON 5/5: Still waiting.)

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

No Response Yet from NOAA's Lautenbacher on Reported Prohibition of Direct Media Contact

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26 post)
•Qualifications to write about this stuff (see January 13 post)

It’s been three weeks since NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr. was sent a letter about his agency’s alleged prohibition of direct (telephonic) media contacts to issue tsunami warnings. We’re left to wonder whether his response will repudiate communications protocols that actually prohibit telephone calls to major international news media to issue urgent warnings.

I would hope reporters everywhere would react the way I did upon learning of this policy – with incredulity. Newcomers to this site are encouraged to read the letter here as well as the questions it contained at a separate posting.

For a two-part report on my March 25 visit and meeting with the director of the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center that first revealed the policy, click on the link above.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

McCreery Reports on Informal Mauritius Talks; Officially, Media Bulletins Still a Distant Goal

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (March 26)
•Letter to NOAA’s administrator with Eleven Questions (April 8 & 3)
•National Weather Service "won't allow" phone calls to media (March 31)
•Qualifications to write about this stuff (see January 13)

Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Charles McCreery is back in Honolulu following the Mauritius tsunami warning conference. He reports a growing awareness among people in tsunami warning circles that direct contact with the media soon after a tsunami is suspected should be the subject of more discussion.

As noted here, international agreements seem to discourage media involvement in disseminating tsunami warnings to local populations (see March 23 and March 25 posts). But McCreery said yesterday that after he raised the issue at the Mauritius meeting, several attendees approached him and agreed that involving the media in tsunami warnings more than they are now is an important issue.

McCreery told his Mauritius audience that since the media are going to learn about tsunami warnings and bulletins anyway, perhaps it’s better to communicate directly with them to exert influence over how the warning is handled. “If you’re concerned about not having the public unnecessarily alarmed,” he said, “maybe what we need to do is craft language that specifically goes to the media that would spell out the uncertainties and refer them to the national authorities.”

The meeting’s final report is expected to include language on the media-contact issue that was drafted by McCreery. That report will be available around May 10.

The Associated Press -- ready to report the news

Today’s lunch with the Associated Press’s Honolulu bureau chief covered issues we’ve previously kicked around only in e-mail and phone calls. Dave Briscoe said the AP won’t be a party to an “official tsunami warning system,” and that’s understandable. The AP is a news-gathering organization, not a partner with government.

Briscoe affirmed the AP’s obvious role as a reporter and disseminator of news, and if McCreery’s Center wants to improve its communications links to the media for future tsunami warnings, the AP could only welcome the effort.

Chip McCreery: If you’re reading this, the number for the Honolulu AP bureau is 536-5510, but since he probably isn't, I’ll be in touch.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
April 26, 2005

Not Much Is Happening, but Stand By....

•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (see March 26 posts)
It’s been eight days since this log’s latest post -- the longest gap since we started down this path in early January. Sometimes it’s best to just shut up and let events develop as they may. For example:

• Pacific Tsunami Warning Center Director Charles McCreery was due back in Hawaii today after attending meetings in Mauritius and Thailand. We’ve not yet connected, but I’m anxious to follow up on his e-mail (see April 14 post) and learn more about his colleagues’ reaction to the issues he raised last week at the tsunami warning conference.

• A NOAA representative e-mailed today that Admiral Lautenbacher’s office will get off a response soon to my letter that had about a dozen questions regarding NOAA’s communications protocols (April 8).

• Also percolating is a response to my previously unmentioned April 15 letter to Senator Daniel Inouye asking his position on the alleged prohibition on direct media contact by the Warning Center (March 31) and on recommended amendments to S.50, The Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005 (February 12). Support by Hawaii’s senior senator will be crucial to changing communications procedures to include the international news media in sending tsunami warnings.

• About 170 Hawaii business leaders have been asked by letter to visit this blog and, if they agree that a bit more common sense is called for in how warnings are disseeminated, to write Senator Inouye noting their support. (No illusions here about how many will follow through, but maybe we'll get a few more pairs of eyes on this site, and that can't hurt.)

• The Associated Press's Honolulu bureau chief and I are having lunch next week to chew the fat.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

Breakthrough in Mauritius? McCreery Talks Up Media Involvement for Issuing Tsunami Warnings

•Status of letter to NOAA's Lautenbacher: Awaiting his response (see April 8 post)
•National Weather Service "won't allow" phone calls to media ( March 31 post)
•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center ( March 26 posts)
Could it be we’re actually getting somewhere?

Dr. Charles McCreery, director of the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, writes today from the Tsunami Warning Conference in Mauritius that he has introduced the idea of partnering with the media to issue tsunami warnings. As noted in numerous posts here, the media essentially are not in the loop under current communications protocols.

McCreery responded to an e-mail I sent earlier today asking if he still intended to raise the subject, as he indicated he would when we met on March 25 (see post immediately below). He said there has a been a cautious – but not negative – response from his colleagues. A representative from the World Meteorological Association reportedly said the agency has been working on this issue for years regarding major weather events and that tsunami scientists might benefit from their experience.

“Breakthrough” is too strong a word, but “progress” isn’t. Chip McCreery has made a move in Mauritius. He’ll have more to report either by e-mail or when he returns to Hawaii.

Postscript

We're about half-way through "Tsunami Awareness Month" in Hawaii, and the news media are pretty much ignoring it. They're also apparently ignoring the questions e-mailed to 28 Hawaii journalists, the answers to which would be helpful in understanding just how the PTWC sends its tsunami warnings to the media (see April 3 post).

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

New Month, New Meeting; Mauritius Conference Focuses on New Indian Ocean Warning System

•Status on letter to NOAA’s Lautenbacher: Awaiting his response (see April 8 post)
•National Weather Service “won’t allow” direct media contact (see March 31 post)
•Report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (see March 26 posts)

Mauritius (20º south, 57º east, some 500 miles east of Madagascar) is hosting the Second International Coordination Meeting for the Development of an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System on April 14-16. Numerous documents can be accessed here.

Among them is the 2nd Draft Edition of the Communications Plan for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, dated April 7, 2005. As with the 1st draft, which was completed just in time for the First International Coordination Meeting in March, this one was reviewed by Francois Schindele of France, chairman of the International Tsunami Information Center in Honolulu, and Dr. Laura Kong, its director.

A new reviewer this time is Dr. Charles McCreery, with whom I met on March 25 at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, where he is the director. I wrote about that visit in two posts on March 26.

McCreery told me then that although the member states in the tsunami warning network generally don’t want media transmission of tsunami warnings into their territory, he could raise the issue at the Mauritius meeting as a way to speed warnings to populations in peril. Now that he’s in Mauritius, I’ll send an e-mail to see if that’s still his intention.

A cursory reading of the 2nd Draft Edition of the Communications Plan unfortunately reveals no added emphasis on media notification. McCreery also told me on March 25 that the National Weather Service "won't allow" direct telephonic notification of the news media to issue tsunami warnings, an assertion that requires clarification.

My letter to Admiral Lautenbacher asks him to revoke such a prohibition if it exists, since it appears indefensible. He presumably holds the key to revising the PTWC’s communications protocols to use the international news media’s networks to speed tsunami warnings and save lives.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

NOAA's Lautenbacher Urged to Clarify Media Contact Policy & Revoke Any Existing Prohibitions

(see March 26 posts for report on a visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
The danger for one-topic web logs like this one is that they end up saying the same thing a couple hundred times, with variations here and there. The topic here concerns ensuring that the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center has common-sense media-contact policies that save lives, so I don't mind if you don't.

Here's the heart of the issue, as posted since March 26: Do policies actually exist that prohibit the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center from using the mass media to transmit urgent warnings to countries and populations thousands of miles away? Hard as it may be to believe, that's what I was told by the Center's director during my March 25 visit.

A list of questions prompted by that visit is now headed to NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr. Here's the letter:

Dear Admiral Lautenbacher:

On March 25 I visited the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center at the invitation of its director, Dr. Charles McCreery. I have been writing for the past three months (see web log address above) regarding the absence of a media strategy to issue a tsunami warning to the Indian Ocean region following the December earthquake.

I'm aware that the region is outside the Center's traditional area of responsibility; however, the tremendous loss of life seemingly calls for a policy review and change that would ensure the involvement of major international news media in the issuance of tsunami warnings to populations in peril many thousands of miles away.

Since news organizations such as the Associated Press, CNN, Reuters and the BBC have worldwide networks and are equipped to transmit information quickly, their involvement soon after the December earthquake quite likely could have alerted some Indian Ocean nations to the onrushing tsunami in time to save lives.

Dr. McCreery responded to my inquiries about the absence of a proactive media-contact strategy (i.e., no telephone calls with urgent messages) by saying the National Weather Service “won't allow” such contact. He said the Center would not want to exclude some media in making a limited number of calls. I did not argue the issue but could have noted that the media routinely engage in “pools” to cover events.

If a policy truly does exist that inhibits the rapid transmission of tsunami warnings using the news media, I urge you to personally revoke it. Dr. McCreery's assertion raises other questions about NOAA's media strategy and policies that have been asked by numerous sources since December, and I respectfully ask that your office address the following:

(see April 3 post for the questions)

You and I and everyone else concerned about tsunami warnings have the same goal - to save lives - yet nothing the PTWC knew or did in December achieved that goal. As I wrote in a letter to The Honolulu Advertiser published on December 30, the Indian Ocean tsunami deserves as much reflection as people of goodwill can possibly give it. To do anything less than an exhaustive after-action analysis would be both irresponsible and disrespectful to the dead.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

For Hawaii Tsunami Awareness Month, a List of Questions for Mainstream Media To Ask the PTWC

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Another consequence of the December tsunami will be greater awareness in Hawaii this April than in any previous annual observance of tsunami awareness month.

April would be an excellent time for the mainstream Honolulu news media to ask questions they’ve avoided until now about a critical and newsworthy issue – how the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center actually disseminates its warnings to distant imperiled populations.

The March 31 post to this web log has a list of questions that have been sent to NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher for a response. Why should the highest-ranking official at NOAA even bother with this list?

Because somebody has to explain the apparent existence of a policy that inhibits the dissemination of tsunami warnings to populations in peril.

According to PTWC Director Charles McCreery, his staff is “not allowed” by the National Weather Service to telephone the major news media when a tsunami is suspected. That’s a direct quote from my visit to the Center on March 25 (see March 26 posts to this blog). According to McCreery, the restriction stems from a belief that if you were to call some media, you’d have to call them all, which of course is not true.

Given the fact that the major international news media can pass on tsunami warnings to their broadcast and cablecast consumers faster than any telephone tree involving government agencies (which is what the PTWC used on March 28), the existence of this restriction is indefensible and requires examination.

The media can help the general understanding of how the PTWC operates by asking these questions. Since the whole point of a rapid tsunami warning capability is to save lives, the public deserves to know how the Center is pursuing that goal, which so obviously was not met in December.

The following questions are being sent to Honolulu reporters whose reporting responsibilities may present an opportunity to interview representatives of the PTWC:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• If the answer is "no", how does Dr. McCreery explain his March 25 assertion?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media? What specific channels are used and how do they operate?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent tsunami-related messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them? (One local journalist in a position to know says PTWC bulletins are inserted automatically and unobtrusively into the Associated Press's "state" wire, with no accompanying bells or whistles to alert newsrooms that they're there.)
• Is a formal review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Scientists didn’t transmit a bulletin about a presumed tsunami in December until 65 minutes after the earthquake; that lag time was shortened to 19 minutes on March 28. Is the shorter time the result of a policy change at NOAA, NWS and/or PTWC? Please explain.

It’s time for Honolulu reporters to step up and do more than ask for sound bites and quotes that satisfy not-so-inquiring editors but do little to promote understanding.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
April 3, 2005

Following Quake-Related Flurry, Attention Turns to NOAA and NWS Media-Contact Policy

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Media reports this week revealed heightened tsunami awareness in the Indian Ocean region. An Associated Press dispatch from Bangkok: “Within minutes of the earthquake, the word went out: Radio and television stations repeated government warnings, workers at beachfront hotels pounded on doors to awaken guests, and police used loudspeakers to urge residents away from the sea.”

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center reacted differently, too, as noted here in a March 28 post. Its first bulletin mentioned a possible tsunami just 19 minutes after the quake, or three-quarters of an hour quicker than in December. And judging from tons of media coverage, PTWC scientists were more successful this time in alerting colleagues and government agencies through e-mails and telephone calls.

This blog continues to speculate, though, about how the Center contacted the media on Monday. We have to speculate because we don’t know much about its media-contact protocols.

What we do know is remarkable

During my visit to the Center on March 25, Director Charles McCreery told me the National Weather Service “won’t allow” the Center to make telephone calls to the news media – i.e., no calls like the ones they made to their scientific colleagues in the region on Monday (see PTWC Visit, Part 2).

The reason, McCreery said, is that if you call some news media, you have to call them all. That reason won’t hold water, of course, and any competent news professional could map out a plan in minutes that would satisfy this alleged concern. The media “pool” their efforts all the time.

A policy that inhibits the transmission of tsunami warnings is indefensible. Maybe McCreery is misinformed or inadvertently misinformed me, but his assertion is on the table and must be addressed. Here are questions I’ve sent to a NOAA communications representative in Silver Springs, MD:

• Is there a policy that deliberately curtails PTWC contact with the media for the stated reason or any other?
• If so, where is that policy to be found in writing?
• Is there a review of communications policy underway at NOAA arising from the December and March earthquakes?
• What changes in communications policy or PTWC standard operating communications procedures have been initiated since December 26?
• Just how does the Center send tsunami alerts to the news media?
• Which media receive these messages? Which organizations are on the recipient list?
• Are any media recipients outside the PTWC's traditional area of responsibility -- the Pacific Basin? Are any Indian Ocean regional media on the list?
• Have recipients been added since December 26?
• Are urgent messages differentiated in any way from the routine? If so, how is attention drawn to them?

On second thought, these questions should be directed to NOAA's leadership. I'll route a letter to Admiral Lautenbacher through Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye's Washington office.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI

PBS's "NOVA" Show Disappointing; Tsunami Program Offers More Hand-Wringing, Little Else

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
This was the depth of last night’s NOVA program -- “Wave that shook the world” -- about the December tsunami:

Near the end of the show a seismologist intoned that an effective tsunami warning system has three parts – buoys, public education and research. Buoys we understand, public education seems obvious enough and maybe so does research.

But where does the actual “warning” part fit in this list? Where’s the proactive effort that saves lives, the part missing on December 26?

I listened closely and took notes and don’t think I heard “news media” or “radio” or “television” mentioned once. Why? Because this was a show about and by scientists, and it’s obvious by now that the scientists who own the tsunami warning system don’t think the media have a role in the warning plan.

As for hand-wringing, we’ve seen it all before – the lack of Indian Ocean points of contact, nobody to call, nothing to do, we did all we could, etc. In light of 300,000 dead people in the region, this line is getting more than a little old. It appears a great deal of time has been spent on explaining why scientists couldn’t save lives on December 26, with little effort focused on what they might have done had a media plan been in place.

Again, the question must be asked: Where are NOAA's communications GS-whatevers and what are they doing to improve low-tech media-related tsunami warnings? If they have a work plan for improved communications, what is it, and how are they spending their time?

Which brings me to……

If the Media Are Great at Telling PTWC's Story, Can't They Do the Same for Tsunami Warnings?

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center’s response to Monday’s earthquake was much better than in December. Just ask the staff.

Reporters did ask, and the results are on hundreds of Internet news sites.

Not to be too cynical about it, but if the media can be used to transmit PTWC’s story all over the world, shouldn’t they have a role in transmitting tsunami warnings, too? Can it be, as suggested by the Center's director last week (see March 26 posts), that the PTWC is prohibited from engaging the media more energetically? It seems implausible, but that's what he said...and it's a subject worthy of follow-up with NOAA and the National Weather Service.

The PTWC may believe the system worked better this week, but there are still gaps in getting the information to the ultimate consumers – men, women and children on the ground. The Christian Science Monitor’s on-line story today makes that clear:

“Among the countries with quicker responses were Thailand and Sri Lanka. Thai police with loudspeakers fanned out to order thousands of residents and tourists to evacuate. Slower on the draw were India and Indonesia. India's tsunami warning came at 11:30 p.m., nearly two hours after the quake. In Indonesia, thousands of coastal residents didn't wait for government warnings. They felt the quake and fled.”

Two-hour delay? The news media can move tsunami alerts and advisories to radio and television stations in affected countries within minutes. The story also describes the success of “low-tech” methods in Phuket, Thailand. “People were telling each other and banging on doors…. It worked pretty well, even though the warning system isn’t in place yet,” said a newspaper editor.

Here’s a simple communications model: PTWC contacts Media Agencies which transmit to their Broadcast Clients which broadcast to the Public. That might take 15 minutes at most.

NOAA’s communications professionals – who are doing a good job polishing PTWC’s image – would presumably do an equally fine job creating communications plans built around that model.

Aftershock – A Sea of Bafflement

Judging from on-line stories filed since Monday’s earthquake, a major media theme is the bafflement, puzzlement and amazement of scientists that the quake didn’t generate a tsunami.

Anyone who has watched more than a few hours of the Science Channel might be amazed at their amazement. Even lay people know horizontal shifts in the earth’s plates or quakes deep in the mantel -- as NOVA reported Tuesday night -- might not trigger tsunamis.

More to the point, scientists freely acknowledged this week that earthquakes of 8.0 magnitude or more usually generate major tsunamis. Their each and every quote keeps alive questions about why that general understanding didn’t immediately trigger a tsunami alert in December, why it took 65 minutes for a bulletin to mention the possible tsunami for the first time.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 30, 2005

Q: To Contact a Fishing Village, What’s Faster – an E-mail to an Official or a Radio Broadcast?

(see March 26 posts for report on visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center)
Yesterday’s earthquake produced no killer tsunami, but it could have reinforced a mindset among Pacific Tsunami Warning Center scientists that may impede the flow of information to distant populations.

The big story today coming out of the PTWC is that it was perfectly able to communicate with the Indian Ocean region. The Honolulu Advertiser’s story quotes a geophysicist:

“We had phone numbers and we had e-mail addresses from places that had contacted us after the big December earthquake so we had lots of numbers. This time around we had people to contact and we called everybody very quickly. Instead of having no one to talk to we had lots of people to talk to.”

But if the whole point of the communications effort is to inform potentially endangered people and save their lives, how sensible is it to rely exclusively on intermediaries in the system without also using the mass media?
A Honolulu Star-Bulletin story quotes PTWC Director Charles McCreery as saying the Center had more success in communicating with the Indian Ocean region after Monday's quake than it did in December "...so they can take some action and get people out of harm's way."

A suggestion for the mainstream media: Ask authorities in the region how or if they did that. How many of the e-mails carrying the PTWC’s first bulletin at 11:29 p.m. local time in the region were read at that hour? How many phone calls got through to their intended targets around midnight? And if they did get through, what did those recipients do with the information at that hour – sit on it or pass it on? And if they passed it on, how long did that take, what form did it take and was the information useful to individual citizens?

Asking the “What If?” Question

There was no tsunami of consequence, but what if there had been? Would populations at risk have been alerted to their peril at midnight? What systems were in place for those recipient agencies to communicate to the ultimate consumers of the PTWC’s information?

This may be at the heart of the matter: If you ask the PTWC who it serves, the first answer is the Member States in the Pacific Tsunami Warning System. Since December 26 there’s been a grudging acknowledgement that although it’s not the PTWC’s job to alert “outside” nations, they also can benefit from PTWC-generated information.

But judging by PTWC officials’ comments, that’s where it stops. They don’t see the individual in the seaside village as a link in the official communications chain. And that’s why early involvement of the international news media doesn’t have much of a priority within NOAA.

The mass media must be engaged early to ensure that life-saving information can flow throughout a threatened region no matter what happens in government agencies there. The danger is that the apparent satisfaction that all went well on March 28 may delay the PTWC's stated intention to open a dialogue with the media (see March 26 posts).

Aftershocks

Each one of these incidents prompts questions that deserve downstream attention by mainstream media. For example:

PTWC Director McCreery expresses surprise in the Advertiser article that Monday’s 8.7 earthquake didn’t generate a tsunami because, he is paraphrased as saying, earthquakes 8.0 and stronger usually generate major tsunamis.

But three months ago this expectation about 8.0 and higher earthquakes seems to have been absent. NOAA’s timeline for the December 26 earthquake says that 11 minutes after the initial shock the PTWC “initially underestimated the size as around a magnitude 8.0.” Yet no mention was made of a possible tsunami until 65 minutes after the quake, and scientists were quoted repeatedly saying they first learned of the tsunami from news reports.

Why did scientists wait 54 minutes before transmitting their presumed expectation of a tsunami in a bulletin? Has the PTWC adjusted its procedures since December? What other adjustments have been made in the Center’s standard operating procedures?

The Advertiser story reinforces the widespread notion that PTWC scientists telephoned their colleagues even before the December tsunami reached some countries in the Indian Ocean region:

When the earthquake struck on Dec. 26, the warning center staff said it frantically tried to contact Indian Ocean nations of a potential disaster. But with only two clients in the Indian Ocean – Australia and Indonesia – and no contact list, valuable time was lost. They worked for hours, sounding warnings as the tsunami swept across the vast ocean basin with deadly results.

Here again is the description of scientists who suspected a tsunami unsuccessfully trying to contact people in the region before the tsunami arrived.

PTWC Director Charles McCreery adamantly disputed a similar point I made during my March 25 visit to the PTWC (March 26 posts). Are all these reporters making it up? Not likely. Are they relying on a new “urban legend” about the the December tsunami? Maybe so, but to fully understand the recent past, the issue deserves to be clarified and resolved.

Yesterday’s earthquake thankfully did not generate a tsunami and it hopefully did not sweep away questions that must be answered about the PTWC’s communications readiness.

Doug Carlson
Honolulu, HI
March 29, 2005

Today's Quake Was Predicted 2 Weeks Ago

Seismologists are getting better at calling their shots:

Paris (March 16) - Seismologists say there is a heightened risk that a major earthquake may soon strike the western coast of Sumatra as a result of the monster quake that generated the December 26 tsunami. The Indonesian city of Bandar Aceh, which was already badly hit by the killer wave, could be at risk from a quake measuring up to 7.5 on the Richter scale and there is a potential for a tsunami-making 8.5 quake offshore, they warn.

Now that he has our attention, Professor John McCloskey is saying today another massive quake is to be expected in the region.

Today’s Earthquake – A Chance to See What Changes, if Any, Have Been Made Since December

The Indian Ocean has now had two 8.7 or higher earthquakes in the past three months. It’s only natural to ask whether procedures to warn the region of a potential tsunami were different for today’s quake than they were in December.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center's first mention of a possible tsunami today was contained in its first bulletin, issued just 19 minutes after the earthquake. First mention of a possible tsunami in December didn't occur until one hour and five minutes after the triggering quake. (See this UPI report for a similar comparison.)

The much earlier warning is evidence of shifts in emphasis and perhaps policy within NOAA. What else has changed? With my PTWC visit as background (see the March 26 post), here are questions I’d like to ask its director, Dr. Charles McCreery:

• In addition to the earlier mention today of the tsunami potential, were there any other changes in the NOAA and PTWC warning protocols in effect for today's earthquake?
• What message about today's quake was sent to the news media and in what form? How long did it take for this product to be transmitted to the media? What's the media contact list?
• Was Tsunami Bulletin Number 001, issued at 6:29 a.m. HST, the primary message intended for the media? (See below)
• The warning contained in Bulletin Number 001 (emphasis added below) wasn't given much prominence; in newsroom terms, it was “buried” inside the bulletin. Was any other message sent to the media that accentuated the warning about a potential tsunami?
• What communication channels exist or have been established recently to facilitate messages from the Indian Ocean region back to the PTWC?
• If a meteorological agency in the region knows a tsunami has been created, does the PTWC receive a message from that agency – by telephone, e-mail, fax or other means?
• If such a message were received, how would the PTWC react? Would it relay that information to other agencies, to the news media, to anyone?

Today’s first bulletin was issued 19 minutes after the earthquake:

TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 1629Z 28 MAR 2005

THIS BULLETIN IS FOR ALL AREAS OF THE PACIFIC BASIN EXCEPT ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.

... TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN ...

THIS MESSAGE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. THERE IS NO TSUNAMI WARNING OR WATCH IN EFFECT.

AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS

ORIGIN TIME - 1610Z 28 MAR 2005
COORDINATES - 2.3 NORTH 97.1 EAST
LOCATION - NORTHERN SUMATERA INDONESIA
MAGNITUDE - 8.5

EVALUATION

THIS EARTHQUAKE IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC. NO TSUNAMI THREAT EXISTS TO COASTLINES IN THE PACIFIC.

WARNING... THIS EARTHQUAKE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE A WIDELY DESTRUCTIVE TSUNAMI IN THE OCEAN OR SEAS NEAR THE EARTHQUAKE. AUTHORITIES IN THOSE REGIONS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THIS ACTION SHOULD INCLUDE EVACUATION OF COASTS WITHIN A THOUSAND KILOMETERS OF THE EPICENTER AND CLOSE MONITORING TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR EVACUATION FURTHER AWAY.

THIS CENTER DOES NOT HAVE SEA LEVEL GAUGES OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC SO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DETECT OR MEASURE A TSUNAMI IF ONE WAS GENERATED. AUTHORITIES CAN ASSUME THE DANGER HAS PASSED IF NO TSUNAMI WAVES ARE OBSERVED IN THE REGION NEAR THE EPICENTER WITHIN THREE HOURS OF THE EARTHQUAKE.

THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.

THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE BULLETINS FOR ALASKA - BRITISH COLUMBIA - WASHINGTON - OREGON - CALIFORNIA.

PTWC Visit (Part 1): Understanding the Mission, Agreeing to Disagree

My visit to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center came off as planned yesterday, the three-month anniversary of the Indonesian earthquake and tsunami. Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC director, and I talked for two hours and noted at the midpoint that the earthquake had struck at 2:59 HST. McCreery is an effective representative – and sometimes defender – of the PTWC and its procedures, but I came away thinking he is open to improving tsunami alert procedures. It may be a slow process, because some of his comments suggest the PTWC’s collective hands are tied due to policies imposed by superior organizations.

I spent a fair amount of time on the basic premise of this web log – that although PTWC scientists suspected a potentially killer tsunami, there was no mechanism in place to issue a warning directly to people in harm’s way; by extension, 300,000 people died. He made two primary points: 1) the PTWC provides advice but isn’t in a position to know what’s really happening out there in the world. “We have no magic here,” he said. They do their best to interpret, but it’s really an imprecise science when it comes to tsunamis; and 2) it’s not even the PTWC’s responsibility to be watchdog for the whole world. They have neither the resources nor the capability to alert the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. My main point, of course, is that media notification, had it been pre-coordinated, could have been the channel for a warning to the region. Another point is, if not the PTWC, who? The world looks to the building we were sitting in as the leader in tsunami warning capability. As he noted (below), the rest of the world may not be eager for a bigger U.S. role, notwithstanding the PTWC’s expertise.

What Did They Know, When Did They Know It?

McCreery flatly disputed my assertion (made yesterday and throughout the past three months on this log) that PTWC scientists called colleagues in the region before the waves struck Sri Lanka, India and points further west. I told him that was the obvious inference to be made from numerous interviews they’ve given to media all over the world, and I recalled some of the reports.

The very first story that caught my attention in this regard was in the December 29 Honolulu Advertiser; it prompted my initial letter to the editor the next day, leading a few days later to creation of this log. The reporter wrote that PTWC scientists “frantically worked the phones…trying largely in vain to warn Indian Ocean nations of the incoming tsunami disaster.” The most striking description of the scientists’ actions that I’ve found was in the lead of a Chicago Tribune story (posted on January 14): “With a killer tsunami bearing down on Sri Lanka and India at airliner speeds, an effort to save thousands of lives came down to a handful of overworked employees in Hawaii trying to telephone government officials they did not know and did not know how to reach.”

The clear implication is that they did know enough to start making phone calls, but to the wrong people, in my view. McCreery essentially said all these inferences by the media were wrong. He said he constantly is asked by reporters about this alleged “failure” to send a warning, and he says he always straightens them out.

But consider NOAA spokesperson Delores Clark’s comments reported by UPI Pentagon correspondent Pamela Hess and linked from my January 8 post: "The watch standers first learned of the tsunami through the media almost four hours after the earthquake.” (That was Clark’s quote in January and that’s McCreery’s assertion today, but according to NOAA’s timeline, scientists first mentioned the possibility of a tsunami in a bulletin 65 minutes after the earthquake and 41 minutes before the waves arrived in Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. More telling is the continuation of Clark’s statement.) “Following the realization that a massive tsunami had been generated, they did the best job they could to contact authorities. But they were fixed on reaching agencies that have responsibilities for warning such as weather offices or disaster management offices."

NPR’s Christopher Joyce’s report for “Morning Edition” on December 28 included the following: “Other U.S. scientists who monitor earthquakes say when they realized how big the quake really was there was no clear way to get the information to authorities who might have been able to warn people in time." One of his sources said on tape: "There was knowledge that a tsunami was being generated and that information was available, but the problem we ran into was that there were not appropriate agencies in places like India and in Somalia on the East and the Horn of Africa region. There was no system set up by which we could take that information and translate it into actions that the public could react to."

Over and over again scientists have been quoted in apparent exasperation at their inability to translate what they knew or suspected into a usable warning before the waves struck because no system existed to alert the Indian Ocean. I, of course, said the media represent that system and recalled another Delores Clark quote from the UPI story: “Not only was the center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list of media contacts.”

Continued.....